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An ethical theory, in general, is an attempt to explain what actions and/or 
inactions will be designated as ethical or not, moral or immoral, and why that is the 
case. Since such a designation requires a justification, some criterion in virtue of 
which decisions may be made and praise and blame may be assigned, the field of 
ethics is at its core a search for justifications and reasons to prefer some actions 
and/or inactions over others. Historically, western philosophers have, of course, 
advocated different positions on the matter. Some, such as Kant, maintained that 
moral action must accord with duty, while others, such as Mill, have held that the 
moral course of action is that which creates the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number. Often, philosophers have sought an eternal or immutable justification for 
their ethical theories, perhaps one that is based on a notion of “the good” or one that 
would be incumbent upon any rational agent without regard to the agent’s type of 
being or situation; however, the theory that I will put forward here does not aim at a 
timeless or fixed foundation for ethics. Rather, it is an attempt to ascertain what is 
best for humans and what is right for us to do, given that we are physically and 
conceptually vulnerable creatures, who have certain attributes and needs that are 
common to the species, and given that we all struggle to survive and fulfill our 
particular interests, at the same time that we are embedded in families, societies, and 
cultures—that is, collectivities—that shape our lives and personal possibilities. It is 
an exploration into what we are here and now, within the evolutionary niche we fill 
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on earth. If, for instance, we were no longer vulnerable, if we no longer had certain 
attributes, if we no longer struggled singly and collectively for survival, then this 
account would have little or nothing to say about how we ought to behave. The theory 
concerns the contingent. But perhaps that is only fitting since we are contingent 
beings whose attributes and context have developed in the environment of the 
evolving world. 
 The theory is a practical approach to ethical reasoning that is founded on the 
notion that there are certain factors that structure every human life (given by the 
vulnerabilities, attributes, and context noted above) within which we carry out our 
separate projects and responsibilities, work toward our particular goals, care for our 
own loved ones, and, in general, attempt to fulfill our particular interests. It asks the 
reader to do the hard work of setting aside, if only temporarily, her preconceived 
notions about morality in order to consider seriously what humans have in common 
and what this commonality might entail. The goal is to give each reasons to work 
toward attaining choice and freedom for the self as well as for all others. The theory 
is, above all, not an apology for the status quo. It does not ask whether its conclusion 
can be easily implemented or whether it adheres to commonly or socially accepted 
ethical standards. Humans are capable of all sorts of behaviors and what is best need 
not also be easy, and commonly or socially accepted standards may, for instance, 
merely reflect common prejudice or the particular interests of the powerful, rather 
than the interests each of us has in virtue of our shared humanity.  
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 The argument I will defend herein is appropriated from Simone de Beauvoir’s 
The Ethics of Ambiguity, although I will extract the argument from its original 
existentialist context, modify it significantly, and supplement it with information 
gathered from fields that study the existence of humans, such as neuroscience, 
nutrition, and social psychology. That is, although Beauvoir’s theory is the impetus 
for the present work, I will make significant changes (to be addressed in sections 1.4 
and 1.5) that also entail substantial alteration in the Beauvoirean argument. 
Beauvoir’s theory, I maintain, is a novel ethical theory in western philosophy that has 
yet to garner the attention it deserves, and this situation is, I believe, in part due to a 
rift within western philosophy itself. 
 Most present day philosophers are aware of this divide within the discipline. 
On the one hand, there are those who work in the continental tradition, including the 
existentialists in general and Beauvoir in particular. Existentialism, as a genre of 
philosophy, tends both to focus on the meaning of lived experience and to 
communicate in a literary mode. On the other hand, there are those who work in the 
analytic tradition, who are also interested in human experience, broadly construed, 
but who prefer to communicate in the language of scientific discourse. Some analytic 
philosophers reject the work of their continental counterparts, with the explanation 
that the latter’s unwillingness to approach philosophical research from a scientific 
perspective weakens the credibility of their arguments. Moreover, many continental 
philosophers have failed, it is claimed, to take the “linguistic turn”—an approach to 
philosophy that has become nearly taken for granted in analytic circles within the last 
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century—which might be characterized as both a recognition that past philosophical 
endeavors were sometimes embroiled in confusions due to the ambiguities that exist 
in natural languages and a commitment to focus on language itself (as reflective of 
the human experience of the world) in order to avoid such linguistic mistakes in the 
future. The two traditions then advocate opposing methodologies and, as a result, see 
themselves as having little in common. 
 Given this situation within the discipline, in addition to defending the theory 
that Beauvoir put forward in The Ethics of Ambiguity, part of my goal is to 
demonstrate that a modified version of the Beauvoirean theory—a charitable 
interpretation, when cast into the language of pragmatic philosophy—is relevant to 
philosophers in both traditions. The problem with what I have depicted above as the 
analytic philosopher’s position is that one may express oneself in a literary mode and 
still communicate something that is largely consistent with scientific research. It 
would seem then unreasonable to dismiss an argument based upon the mode in which 
it is expressed. If the analytic philosopher is concerned about the human’s experience 
of the world, including her attempts to make sense of that experience, then this theory 
has much to offer. The approach that I will utilize, in order to help bridge the divide, 
does not belong strictly to either camp; rather, it utilizes a pragmatic methodology, 
that leans on scientific discourse for support and that draws on the spirit of American 
pragmatism (an often ignored philosophical alternative to the (false) dichotomy 
created by the either-continental-or-analytic scenario). And while I will not, along 
with many ethicists in the analytic tradition, concentrate specifically on the ethical 
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language—in and of itself—that is employed in the theory, I will clearly define the 
terms in use in order to avoid linguistic ambiguity. The appropriated theory argues 
that it is in the prior interest of all persons to help provide the pre-conditions of 
choice—those things that are necessary if choice will occur for individual persons—
for all beings who are genetically human and the conditions of choice—those factors 
that minimize the personal costs of choice and ensure the practical availability of 
possibilities for particular choosers—for all members of one’s cultural group. Any 
person who does not help supply the pre-conditions for all simultaneously 
dehumanizes herself, lacks any and all warrant for her action, and leaves herself open 
to warranted suppression by all others. In some instances, she may also put her own 
prior interest in choice, as well as that of all others, at risk. Thus, the appropriated 
theory argues that it is in each person’s prior interest to will choice for all persons 
and freedom for those with whom one shares a cultural system. 
This chapter will be devoted to explaining Beauvoir’s ethical theory and to 
clarifying just what it is that I will extract from it. It will first be necessary to lay out 
Beauvoir’s account (utilizing the vocabulary of existentialism) in some detail, while 
taking care to explain key concepts that will feature (directly or in altered form) in the 
appropriated version of the argument. In what follows, these components will be 
assigned identifiers (e.g., (A1), (A2), and so forth), since they will be revisited in 
section 1.5, after the presentation of the Beauvoirean theory, in order to offer 
preliminary definitions of key concepts. However, not all aspects of Beauvoir’s 
argument will be retained. Two components—an ambiguity between consciousness 
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and the factical body and a proposed desire for self-coincidence—will be set aside as 
extraneous to my purpose. These factors will also be assigned identifiers (i.e., (E1) 
and (E2)) in the explication and discussed again in section 1.4, in order to explain 
why they will not be useful for the present project. It is important to note that the 
following explication of the Beauvoirean theory is just that—an explication. A 
defense of the appropriated version of the argument will be taken up in Chapter 2 and 
extend through Chapter 4. 
1.2: Human Ontology 
 Ultimately, Beauvoir argued for an ethical principle that may be stated thus: 
one should recognize the ontological conditions of one’s own freedom and that of 
others, and act so as to treat oneself and other humans as freedom, so that each 
human’s end may be freedom. As I will explain (in section 1.3), human freedom 
occurs on four levels in Beauvoir’s theory: one ontological and three moral levels. In 
order to demonstrate how she arrived at this principle, an explicit illumination of her 
account of human ontology will prove helpful.  
Human ontology (A1), as the term is used by existentialists, is a description of 
the type of being that humans experience; it is an account of the phenomena that 
show up upon examination of human life. According to Beauvoir, our existence is 
characterized by an inherent dichotomy (E1)—that each of us is both for-itself 
(transcendence) and in-itself (immanence) (Ethics 52)—and that, as such, there is an 
ambiguity at the core of our experience (7). As in-itself, the human is matter, a 
physical body that is given by nature; as for-itself, the human is mind or 
consciousness. 
Due to its ambiguous ontological status, the human may be described as pure 
consciousness, a mind that is unattached to anything physical, or as a purely material 
body, a physical being devoid of mind.1 However, on Beauvoir’s view, if one were to 
describe the human as exclusively either, one would be gravely mistaken. Each of us 
is both transcendence and immanence, and when I, as a human, reflect upon my 
ontology, both aspects are apparent.  
Consider first one’s own act of reflection. That a human can undertake such 
contemplation indicates that she has certain attributes. In my capacity to reflect, I find 
that my consciousness consists, in part, of intentionality. It is due to my 
consciousness (A2) that I can undertake this mental act, and it is my capacity to 
intend that enables me to choose and to aim at some particular object of reflection, 
rather than all the other possible objects. It appears to me that I could have rejected 
the proposal to reflect or chosen a different object altogether on which to focus. That I 
can direct my mental act in this way indicates that I have capacities for intention, for 
choice, and for differentiation (A3), and these are displayed immediately upon 
reflection.  
 Consider now one’s relation to the object of reflection. This relation is such 
that, unless I focus on my own consciousness, or some other intimate aspect of my 
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1 Beauvoir maintained that “the Cartesian cogito expresses both the most individual experience and the 
most objective truth” (Ethics 17).  
own capacity to reflect, I find that I am not identical with the object. The object 
appears as other than myself. Moreover, if I think about the types of objects that show 
up in everyday life, another relation is present. This object before me—a chair, 
hammer, or drinking glass—has some purpose with regard to human intentionality in 
general. The chair, for instance, has been purposefully planned and constructed with 
regard to the function it can fulfill in different activities. It may be an easy chair 
designed for my comfort or a three-legged cobbler’s chair created for easy movement. 
Whatever the case may be, when I think of or have contact with such an object, I 
reveal the intention of the designer and maker and the function that the chair serves 
for people on a daily basis as part of the meaning or significance of the object. 
Moreover, when I react (or not) to the object—perhaps I lounge in it, reject it as 
uncomfortable, buy it to take home, tell a friend of its unusual color, or simply walk 
away from it—I further contribute to its significance. I help to designate the chair as 
cozy, ugly, expensive, unusual, or simply not worth my time. When I reveal objects 
and/or signification and contribute to additional objects and/or further signification, 
in Beauvoirean terms, I disclose being (A4) (Ethics 41). Disclosure is for Beauvoir a 
description, at the most basic level, of how a human engages in the world; it is how 
“the world becomes present by [our] presence in it” (23). She maintained that one 
cannot help but disclose, because it is the core of every activity or inactivity. 
 Disclosure is also, for Beauvoir, the source of all value and signification 
(Ethics 14). There is no external view point, “inhuman objectivity”, or divine decree 
in virtue of which value is determined (14). It is because one desires rest, and because 
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humans are such that they require rest, that the chair is valuable; it has no value in and 
of itself. The value of the object or signification is created through its utility. As she 
explained, “[v]alue is this lacking-being of which freedom makes itself a lack” (14); 
that is, we create value through our capacities to intend, choose, and differentiate in 
disclosure. As noted, disclosure is the basic mode of engagement for a person; it is 
what we do. If I touch, hear, smell, taste, see, think of, or remember some object, I 
reveal something of it; my response, or lack there of, is a contribution to signification. 
The very possibility of lack of constraint is derivative of the capacities for intention, 
choice, and differentiation in disclosure, and, for Beauvoir, it is upon these qualities 
that a person “spontaneously cast[s herself] into the world” (25). Thus, it is in virtue 
of these capacities that one is “originally” or ontologically free (25).2 Ontological 
freedom (A5) is then, for Beauvoir, that which enables human activity (it is its core), 
creates value (it is the original value and the source of all others), and, as I will 
explain, makes moral freedom (ongoing free disclosure) possible. 
 If I consider now the factical aspects of the ontology, I also note that the 
freedom of my consciousness is inextricably bound to physical being. I have a body 
which is my mode of engagement (Ethics 41), and this body, for Beauvoir, is the 
locus of a “historical idea” or factical situation (35). But just what is a factical 
situation? In Beauvoir’s view, facticity (A6) itself includes our physical selves, the 
                                                 
2 For Beauvoir, consciousness is essentially free due to its pre-reflective awareness that is non-identical 
with its object of awareness and that invests its object with the meaning that it has. As my concern is 
not to give an exhaustive account of the Beauvoirean theory, I set this notion aside for my present 
purpose. 
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raw materials we use to create objects, these objects themselves, the signification that 
we attribute to objects, other significations, non-human animals, and each other (both 
near and distant). It also includes the social, cultural, symbolic, political, and 
economic systems within which we exist. Facticity is everything that affects human 
life (other than consciousness itself), including the material and immaterial 
byproducts of consciousness. The body, as a factical situation, then, is the mode in 
which I am embedded within facticity. My factical situation is such that I am a flesh-
and-blood being who is born into and inextricably tied to family, society, and/or 
culture—that is, collectivities—that affect my potentialities and possibilities. I require 
food, water, and other physical necessities. I am a body that will decay and die, and 
an object that can be “crushed” (7). And these attributes not only affect my physical 
being, they in part determine whether I will be able to utilize my capacities for 
disclosure—that is, they potentially affect my ontological freedom. A specifically 
placed knife or a bullet on a certain trajectory can stop the functioning of my heart or 
brain; tainted or inadequate food and water can disable or kill me. In short, due to my 
factical situation, I am a physically vulnerable creature (A7). I exist in a state of 
physical vulnerability, in which a potential for malnourishment, disabling disease, or 
death is always present, and any one of many such potentialities may affect my 
capacities for freedom. 
 Now, I also note that I am not alone in the world. In fact, this aspect of my 
ontology became apparent when I considered my capacity to disclose. While the 
world in its physicality existed prior to any human (Ethics 28), the objects that I 
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reveal are already imbued with human significance (74). Many people, from many 
cultures, have come before me and they have constructed the world in which I now 
find myself. Much of the mathematics we use, for instance, to construct buildings and 
structures originated in India and Greece, and many others, of course, have honed and 
added to this stock of practical knowledge. In addition, other people currently co-
exist, and these others are, along with myself, revealing and contributing to the 
objects and signification that are relevant to survival and fulfillment.   
 These others may construct either my physical surroundings or the 
significations attributed to them such that my freedom may be wholly or partially 
visible to me or invisible.  Each of us is born, in a helpless state, into already 
constructed social, cultural, economic, and symbolic systems. What will these 
systems afford to each? A person must be nourished, nurtured, and educated in order 
to come to see the scope of her own ontological freedom. The issue is whether or not 
one has been taught to think and to respect oneself as a person who discloses being 
and enacts choice. For Beauvoir, it is not the case that a person’s ontological freedom 
must be either fully apparent or fully hidden from her. While both of these scenarios 
are possible, her factical situation may also be such that she can see herself as 
freedom in some limited sense or context, but fail to see herself as a free actor in the 
world or outside her sphere. 
Each of us learns and grows within a factical situation in which we are taught, 
via family, school, television, movies, clubs, activities, and culture in general, that 
certain values and significations are set in stone. Through these media, others teach us 
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what we will reveal through disclosure, and this determines, to a large extent, what 
future objects and significations we will be able to contribute. If a person is not 
educated (or if she is under-educated), she will be able to contribute few, if any, 
innovative objects. She may not even understand the usefulness of common objects 
around her (say a book or computer). Moreover, some significations may escape her 
grasp. I once had a chance to engage with a seemingly bright, but under-educated, 
woman in a conversation about a then current political race. Some twelve years prior, 
she had graduated from an inner city high school and had more recently completed 
training in cosmetology. When I suggested to her that I had heard on the news that a 
certain candidate was “ahead in the polls”, the woman questioned me: “Oh, you mean 
he gets to vote first.” In Beauvoirean terms, she was unable to reveal my intended 
signification merely because she lacked knowledge regarding campaign polling 
activities. Her contribution reflected her ignorance of the multiple meanings of the 
word poll. In addition to being physically vulnerable, humans are also psychically 
vulnerable (A8). We come to understand and to be able to utilize concepts that are 
common to everyday life through interactions with others. If this interaction (i.e., 
education) does not occur or is insufficient, we may not understand or fully grasp the 
meanings (concepts), objects, and or activities of those around us.   
 I am psychically vulnerable because I enter the world in a state of ignorance, 
and I rely on others to rectify this situation. Others may construct my facticity such 
that I will remain ignorant. They may teach me that some alternatives don’t exist or 
that they are not really choices at all, or that I am not really one who can intend and 
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choose; that is, they may construct for me a constrained view of the world such that I 
cannot see or utilize, or cannot grasp the scope of, the capacities that I have. And if 
these others who affect me have not been made aware of their own capacities for 
freedom or if they have been taught that I belong to a group whose members lack or 
should not have the relevant capacities, then chances are they will not provide for 
mine. In the first instance, from what standpoint and with what resources would they 
teach me? In the second, what would be their motive to teach me? In Beauvoirean 
terms, if I have come into a factical situation in which my freedom has been fostered, 
then I have been afforded an “apprenticeship of freedom” (A9) (Ethics 37).  
 Upon further consideration, I realize, if I am consistent, that just as these 
others contribute to my facticity, I contribute to theirs. While they have an effect upon 
me, I affect them. Each of us is a part of the social, cultural, political, economic, and 
symbolic systems that determine whether or not and how these others are nourished, 
nurtured, and educated. I help determine what is out there for the other to reveal, how 
she will reveal it, and, given this background, what she will be likely to contribute. 
Human freedom does not operate in a vacuum; it is inextricably embedded in its 
context. What this other can think, can do, and what activities she will undertake is, in 
part, determined by the conditions that I help to create via my own contribution. Each 
of us helps shape the world. By choosing actions and inactions, we take part in and 
choose the objects, significations, and values that are cast back onto the world as 
conditions upon which to act for others as well as for ourselves.  
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Past creations of objects and significations are springboards upon which one 
may act. When I write a philosophical essay, I read the work that others have written 
and I utilize citations and a bibliography to acknowledge my debt since I used and 
built upon the thoughts of others to write the paper. When I make dinner, I may or 
may not use a recipe, but I am indebted to those who either taught me how to cook or 
to read (and those in the past that helped to create language and to set it down in 
writing), and I utilize the objects—ingredients that others grew and produced—and 
the significations—the designation of some objects as healthy or not, tasteful or not, 
edible or not—in my activity. If I create a nutritious dinner, I reinforce one type of 
signification; if I become frustrated at the attempt to cook and settle for a twinkie, I 
reinforce another. Any and every human activity exists in reference to some others 
and to the people who carried them out. Consider another example. Perhaps I create a 
commercial in which I depict (by using special effects) young people as having 
flawless skin—indeed, as having no pores. If others reveal the commercial in the way 
that I intend and contribute to the success of my product by buying it, then other 
creators of commercials will likely follow suit. They want to sell their product too. 
The result will be the airing of many commercials that depict young people in such a 
light. The signification that will be cast out into the culture is that it is very important 
to have flawless skin, and young persons may attempt to emulate those in the ads (in 
order to do as the culture—in this instance, in the form of the media—says they 
ought). Since the depiction was created with special effects, they will have no means 
of succeeding; however, such a situation seldom abates the desire that has been 
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created (especially if the persuasive commercials continue). In consequence it may be 
that many people will attempt to attain the impossible (trying to have pore-less skin 
through buying products or undergoing plastic surgeries). In this case, my activity has 
affected many people because humans share their facticity in a communal fashion. I 
utilized the psychic vulnerability of some humans in order to influence the way they 
reveal themselves and the signification they contribute regarding themselves. The 
signification that these young people will likely contribute has been effectively 
limited; thus, I have limited their chance to enact choice in what they disclose. Since I 
have impacted so many people in order to sell my product, then, if it is determined 
that I have some particular responsibility for my actions, that responsibility will be 
vast. Now, of course, not all of my activities will have such an enormous effect, as 
that will vary with regard to the factical situation and my relation to the others in 
question. However, since each of my actions and inactions contributes values and 
signification (that I and others will use as springboards for future action), none will be 
without some effect.  
 Thus, Beauvoir has proposed that each of us, at least potentially, affects and is 
affected by all others. Examination of the ontology of the human shows that we have 
a potential for freedom—that is, that humans in general have capacities for intention, 
choice, and differentiation in disclosure—but that, since we are physically and 
conceptually vulnerable, and since we exist within an interdependent context (A10), 
the freedom that each possesses may be wholly or partially hidden. According to 
Beauvoir, when I reflect on the ontology, I reveal myself as a subject who is both 
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consciousness and immanence, who is in “turn an object for others” and who is “an 
individual in the collectivity” upon which I am dependent (Ethics 7). The collective is 
also dependent on each, and it is for these reasons that, according to Beauvoir, the 
“me-others relationship is as indissoluble as the subject-object relationship” (72). 
Both relations are inherent to the ontology. The fact is that others are my concern, as I 
am theirs (72). 
1.3: The Conversion 
 Beauvoir used the term “[e]xistentialist conversion” (Ethics 14) to denote 
undertaking an examination of the ontology and accepting the conclusion of her 
argument. This conversion, according to Beauvoir, is analogous to Edmund Husserl’s 
epoché (Beauvoir, Ethics 14). Husserl held that if a person brackets the question of 
whether or not the world and its objects exist, she will be led to a clearer 
understanding of the processes of consciousness (Husserl 22-3 and 28). Beauvoir 
argues that if one reflects seriously upon the ontology of the human, including the 
interests each has in virtue of her capacities, vulnerabilities, and the interdependent 
context, one will come to recognize that it is reasonable (in that it avoids self-
defeating behavior) to undertake action that safeguards one’s own capacities for 
freedom. This involves willing (creating) a situation that allows for ongoing use of 
the capacities for freedom, for both oneself and all others. It is, then, one’s own 
interest in freedom that gives one a reason to accept one’s responsibilities to freedom 
in general.  
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The conversion includes three steps toward moral freedom: first, recognition 
of the ontological; second, willing freedom for oneself; and third, willing freedom for 
others. Recall that, for Beauvoir, each person is able to be free in that consciousness 
is capable of intentionality, choice, and differentiation in disclosure. Disclosure is the 
way that one engages with the world, but if one knows of the scope of one’s 
freedom—that is, if one is not compelled by ignorance and/or one’s factical situation 
toward revealing or contributing particular or limited objects and/or significations—
then one is, for Beauvoir, capable of moral freedom.  
Beauvoir also maintained that humans have two basic desires: (1) a desire for 
self-coincidence (E2) (Ethics 12), and (2) a desire for disclosure (A11) (Ethics 11). 
Regarding (1), recall that each of us is both for-itself and in-itself. The human 
experiences, according to Beauvoir, tension as a result of existing between these two 
modes; as such, one may choose to deny one’s ambiguity and attempt to assert 
oneself as fully one or the other mode. However, if I assert myself as pure 
consciousness (i.e., behave as if no physical thing and no other person can affect me), 
I will be hard pressed to explain the existence of the body to which I am attached. The 
puzzle would be to explain why physical factical phenomena can diminish my 
capacities for freedom. Alternately, if I assert myself as a pure immanence (i.e., 
behave as though my behavior is determined and beyond my control), my psychic 
vulnerability becomes the puzzle and I deny my own capacities. Beauvoir explained 
that asserting oneself as either fully for-itself or fully in-itself is an attempt to “dispel 
the ambiguity of [one’s] being” (13); however, it is an attempt that will fail, because 
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one “rejoins [oneself] only to the extent that [one] agrees to remain at a distance from 
[oneself]” (13). That is, if I assert that I am pure consciousness or pure immanence, I 
cannot fulfill my desire for self-coincidence, because I am a being with both 
attributes. I hold self-defeating beliefs if I maintain otherwise. It is, then, in my 
interest (in order to avoid a self-defeating stance), to acknowledge my own 
ambiguous ontological status. And since others affect me, it is in my interest to 
recognize theirs as well.  
Now consider (2). Beauvoir maintained that humans have a desire to disclose. 
She explained that a person is a “‘being who makes [itself] a lack of being in order 
that there might be being’” (Ethics 11);3 that is, that consciousness separates itself 
from the factical context in which it is embedded in order to reveal and contribute 
objects and signification. Consciousness is, for Beauvoir, an intentionality that makes 
itself present to the world so that it may disclose, and since the desire for disclosure 
occurs in virtue of one’s own intent, the desire is “not inflicted . . . from without” 
(11). If, then, I accept disclosure as my purpose, with regard to (1), I coincide exactly 
with myself since I am no longer tormented by the desire to be fully for-itself or in-
itself (13). 
However, for Beauvoir, if I desire disclosure then I must desire ontological 
freedom as well. On her view, “[t]o wish for disclosure of the world and to assert 
oneself as freedom are one and the same movement” (Ethics 24). Recall that the very 
possibility of non-constraint derives from the capacities for disclosure. Thus, 
                                                 
3 Here, Beauvoir is quoting Sartre. 
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Beauvoir maintained that a desire for disclosure is the same as a desire for lack of 
constraint. It is via one’s ontological freedom that one is able to disclose; when I 
desire disclosure, I then desire to disclose freely. My choices in disclosure—the kinds 
of objects and significations I choose to bring into the world—must be consistent with 
the possibility of future disclosure, if I will fulfill my desire to disclose. Some 
activities and inactivities will be inconsistent with my desire to disclose, and it is in 
my interest (with regard to freedom) to will objects and significations that are 
consistent. It will be specifically in my interest to will for myself anything and 
everything that is included in an “apprenticeship of freedom”. It will also be in my 
interest to create a factical situation in which my desire for disclosure can be fulfilled 
on an ongoing basis. However, given the context displayed in the examination of the 
ontology, there are many ways in which my interest may be thwarted. I will not have 
an apprenticeship unless I have been nurtured and educated. It is near and distant 
others, who may or may not know of their own freedom and who may or may not 
want me to know of mine, who help to determine whether the factical context is 
conducive to these needs. Is nutritious food available or do some members of my 
society have extensive access while I have little? Does my government, in an 
agreement with global buyers or other governments, encourage farmers in my 
community to produce crops for export rather than for local consumption? Is a broad 
based education available for all, or is it accessible only to the elite or not at all? In 
each of these cases, near or distant others are creating the conditions that determine 
whether I will have my apprenticeship, and, if it has been previously fostered, 
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whether or not I exist in a context in which I will be able to make choices in 
disclosure. Humans may be kept in chains, ignorance, and other generally oppressive 
states, and of course we are easily killed. Given these physical and psychic 
vulnerabilities and one’s interest in and desire for ongoing choice in disclosure, how 
should one proceed?  
 Thus far, I have focused mostly on the first level of freedom (ontological 
freedom) that is apparent in her theory, but, as noted earlier, freedom also occurs on 
three moral levels for Beauvoir. These three moral levels correspond to the three 
levels in which consciousness finds itself to be free. As I will explain, it is one’s 
interest in ontological freedom (created by the desire to disclose) that makes it 
reasonable to accept the principle of freedom. The first step toward moral freedom is 
to recognize the interactive and interdependent conditions of the ontology, including 
the notion that the freedom I desire can only be carried out in this context. The human 
is consciousness and immanence, and since she has a desire for self-coincidence, she 
can avoid self-defeating behavior if she acknowledges she is both. Since this other 
can affect me, my interest in my freedom compels me to acknowledge that the other 
is both as well. Thus, the first moment of the conversion is the recognition of the 
interdependent conditions of my own ontological freedom, and, due to my interest in 
freedom, this recognition compels me toward the epistemic responsibility to coincide 
with myself and to acknowledge the ontological freedom of others. 
 The second step toward moral freedom involves accepting that I ought to will 
conditions for myself that accord with my own freedom. It is at least partially through 
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my own freedom that I contribute objects and significations that I will use as 
springboards upon which to disclose in the future. If I don’t will actions that accord 
with my own desires and capacities, I may, in the future, be paralyzed by my own 
past action. Thus, the second moment of the conversion is my recognition of my desire 
to freely disclose, and, due to my interest in freedom, this recognition compels me 
toward the responsibility to will my own self free. 
 The third step toward moral freedom is the recognition that I ought also will 
for others conditions that accord with their capacities for freedom as well as with my 
own. In cutting off another’s potential for freedom, I create a situation in which some 
possibilities cannot be revealed. I also limit what I and others can contribute. 
According to Beauvoir, human facticity is interdependent in such a way that I cannot 
will moral freedom (an open-ended future in which each choice leaves room for 
further choice) for myself and not will it for the other as well. This scenario is, with 
regard to the desire for ongoing disclosure, as destructive as willing that I should have 
a restrictive future. Potentially, they have the same effect. Humans share their 
facticity in a communal and interdependent way. Thus, the third moment in the 
conversion is my recognition that humans are factically interdependent, and, due to 
my interest in freedom, this recognition compels me toward the responsibility to will 
all others free at the same time that I will myself free.  
 Each step in the conversion is precipitated by recognition of some crucial 
aspect of the ontology; one is then compelled, due to one’s interest in freedom, to 
accept the respective epistemic, personal, and/or social responsibility regarding the 
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capacities for freedom. If one considers each step of the conversion together, one 
arrives at the principle of freedom: one should recognize the ontological conditions of 
one’s own freedom and that of others, and act so as to treat oneself and other humans 
as freedom, so that each human’s end may be freedom. 
1.4: Extraneous Factors 
 Having laid out Beauvoir’s ethical theory, I turn now to the task of setting 
aside components that will not prove to be theoretically useful in the modified version 
of the argument. These components are: (E1) a dichotomy between consciousness and 
the factical body and (E2) a desire for self-coincidence. 
 The notion that humans have a dual mode of existence, as both mind and 
matter, has a long history. Saint Augustine was one of the first to hold such a position 
from a philosophical perspective. He maintained that a human is a physical being (a 
body) who is vivified or enlivened by a non-physical soul (Augustine 308 (X.10.15)). 
The Augustinian soul permeated the body and enabled movement (318 (XI.2.2); 135 
(IV.3.5); 150 (IV.13.16)); it was, for him, also that which “lives, remembers, 
understands, wills, thinks, knows, and judges” (308 (X.10.14)). He was then 
something of a precursor to Descartes. And while there is no indication that 
Augustine, along with Descartes, entertained the notion that the body might exist 
without the mind, both philosophers held the mind and the body to be distinct 
substances.4 Descartes, however, took this position one step further. He maintained 
                                                 
4 Descartes did not maintain that the soul vivified the body; rather, he maintained that the body is a 
machine. He held that in much the same way that a clock has “wheels and counterweights” that 
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that the human body is but a machine that can move about without help from the 
mind (Descartes, Meditations 80; see also Philosophical 315), and that as a mind one 
is purely a “thinking being” (Meditations 27). This and other similar views, which 
hold the human to be a dichotomy between mind and matter, have become a 
significant feature of day to day life in many cultures. In western culture, for instance, 
dualism has become a common feature of folk psychology.  
 In setting aside (E1) or the notion that a dichotomy exists between mind and 
the physical body, I do not deny that it is possible for a human to experience herself 
in this way. Indeed, I will retain a distinction (though not a dichotomy) between 
conceptual and physical traits for heuristic and categorization purposes. I merely do 
not find it useful to posit that these traits are, in reality, distinct. Consider: if one takes 
seriously the notion of evolution, it makes little sense to posit that mental functioning 
derives from a something distinct from physical matter. On the contrary, intellectual 
and emotional attributes will be best understood, along with all other human 
attributes, as outcomes of evolutionary pressures (survival and reproduction). 
Moreover, (E1) is at best philosophically and scientifically controversial. Thus, since 
it is also the case that nothing in the modified version of the theory rests upon or 
requires such a dichotomy, it will be discarded for my present purpose. Then, 
although one may experience herself as a dichotomy and perhaps have a 
                                                                                                                                           
function as they obey “all the laws of nature” (Meditations 80), the body has parts—bones, nerves, 
blood, and such—that are set into motion by fireless heat (Discourse 33). When the human body is in 
good working condition, its parts are composed in such a way that they may engage in movement 
without the direction of the mind or soul (Meditations 80). 
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corresponding desire for coincidence between these two attributes (E2), neither 
premise will be useful for the present endeavor.  
1.5: The Appropriation 
 I turn now to an explanation of just what it is that I will extract from 
Beauvoir’s argument. In general, Beauvoir sought to explain how moral freedom is 
possible, and what it entails, given that humans, on her view, have an ambiguous 
ontological status. Since the notion of an inherent dichotomy or ambiguity at the core 
of personhood has been set aside, my concern will be to discern what enables the 
possibility of choice (and, hence, freedom) and to determine what that possibility 
entails for us with regard to morality. It will be helpful then to recall the components 
of her argument that were designated as (A1), (A2), etc., and to explain whether and 
how they will be recast into the language of pragmatic philosophy for the 
appropriated version of the theory. 
 Earlier, (A1) human ontology was described as an account of the phenomena 
that show up upon examination of human life. In Beauvoir’s project, it functions as an 
implicit thought experiment through which one attempts to get at factors that all 
humans have in common. But an implicit thought experiment relies upon little more 
than a hope that others will view the world in a similar way. It leaves itself open both 
to incessant disagreement regarding the facts of human existence and to the charge of 
armchair philosophizing. It avoids the hard work of presenting scientific evidence in 
support of philosophical reasoning (in fairness to Beauvoir, one should note that most 
of the information that will be presented was unavailable during the time in which she 
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wrote). Rather than relying on this type of thought experiment, a pragmatic approach 
will be to undertake an extensive analysis of the physical and conceptual factors that 
affect human choice and structure experience (a task that will be accomplished 
throughout Chapters 2 and 3). The phenomena that feature in the main arguments will 
be those that are accepted in different scientific fields—such as, neuroscience, 
nutrition science, and social psychology—or those that are established through 
explicit philosophical argumentation. The evidence compiled and presented 
throughout the next two chapters supports Beauvoir’s position that people are (A7) 
physically vulnerable and (A8) conceptually vulnerable and that humans exist in an 
(A10) interdependent context. As such, these points will be retained virtually 
unchanged, though I will elaborate upon each of them and offer further examples. 
Consider now the way in which Beauvoir introduces her notion of freedom. 
Beauvoir’s starting point seems to be Sartre’s view that a human is “‘a being who 
makes [itself] a lack of being in order that there might be being’” (Beauvoir, Ethics 
11). In Beauvoirean terms, one is a lack of being as consciousness and consciousness 
is what makes being appear in the act of disclosure; but Beauvoir also locates the 
phenomenon of choice in this passage. She noted that, since the human is making 
herself a lack, her basic activity is “not inflicted upon [her] from without” (11). She 
“chooses it” (11). Moreover, she explained that the “term in order that clearly 
indicates intentionality” (12). With regard to this starting point, I will first discuss the 
relation between choice and freedom that is implicit in the passage, second, the more 
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explicit conflation of choice with disclosure, and, third, the concept of consciousness 
that is displayed.  
In introducing her notion of freedom with the passage above, Beauvoir 
implies that it is choice that opens the possibility of freedom. However, as the 
explication of her theory (in sections 1.2 and 1.3) demonstrated, the existence of 
choice is not enough in and of itself. One also requires facticity that is conducive to 
choice in order to exist in a state of freedom. Thus, the point seems to be that choice 
is a necessary, but insufficient, component of freedom. This notion seems consistent 
with the way the term freedom is used in everyday speech. The term may be said, for 
instance, to signify a number of interrelated concepts, such as the absence of want, 
restraint, enslavement, detainment, or subjection to arbitrary or illegitimate authority; 
and this last concept, absence of subjection, often includes the notion of gaining 
and/or maintaining political independence and of holding of civil rights and 
privileges. The term may also be used to denote the ability to exercise choice in 
determining what one’s activities will be and how they will be carried out. This last 
definition seems to be at the root of all the others. Consider: one desires the absence 
of want, restraint, enslavement, detainment, and subjection, because each of these 
prevents one from carrying out one’s own choices. The notion of choice also 
underpins the concepts of political independence and civil rights and privileges; the 
former denotes the ability of a group to determine how they will organize and govern, 
and the latter indicates a situation in which the ability to make certain choices 
(perhaps those most highly valued by the group) is preserved (likely at the expense of 
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less valued choices). Thus, along with Beauvoir and common usage, I will conceive 
of choice as a necessary element of freedom that alone is insufficient.  
Second, in taking this sentence as her starting point, Beauvoir combined the 
phenomena of choice and disclosure into one activity. To the degree that all that is 
meant here is that a person is such that she can discern possibilities, determine a 
preference between them, and aim at obtaining her preference in her daily interactions 
and activities, this notion is not, on the face of it, terribly problematic. We do most 
often attribute these capacities to people. However, if one considers that Beauvoir 
also held that humans have a desire to disclose and that this desire is one and the 
same thing as a desire for freedom (Ethics 24), a problem becomes apparent.  
 This problem is that disclosure (general activity in the world) and choice (a 
necessary condition of freedom) are conceptually (and perhaps physically) distinct 
activities. And in a certain way, Beauvoir acknowledged this point in that she 
maintained that disclosure is what we always do (and cannot help but do) and that 
one’s ability to enact choice can be hidden from one’s view. But her concern was 
with cases in which persons were, on her view, already able to make choices—those 
situations in which people suffer from ignorance and/or constrictive facticity. The 
capacity to disclose is for Beauvoir a capacity that is inherent to being human, and the 
phenomenon of choice is included in the activity of disclosure. If someone is left to 
wallow in ignorance, the goal, for Beauvoir, is to set her “in the presence of [the] 
freedom” that she already has (Ethics 98).  
 27
However, in utilizing Beauvoir’s definition of disclosure, it is possible to 
show that a person can disclose (reveal and contribute) without performing any 
activity that is normally called choice. Consider a child who has been born with a 
serious brain defect, perhaps due to a genetic fluke or a birthing complication. Such a 
person may not have the brain functions that are necessary to make a choice. I’m 
thinking of a scenario in which certain relevant brain functions simply don’t occur. It 
is entirely possible, though, that this person will both reveal and contribute, if in a 
somewhat limited fashion. In all likelihood, she will come to reveal her caretakers’ 
faces (that is, she will interpret them and at least recognize them as familiar); 
moreover, if she persists in her existence, she will contribute to her surroundings. By 
requiring some things and desiring others, she indicates that these are of value to her. 
If she cannot articulate her preference, her caretakers will still reveal the contribution. 
Thus, first, choice and disclosure cannot be one and the same activity; and, second, a 
desire for disclosure cannot be one and the same as a desire for freedom. The person 
in this example may in fact desire to participate in the activities that surround her—
that is, she may want to disclose—but if she has no capacity to choose and if having 
such a capacity is a necessary condition of freedom, it will not make sense to say that 
her desire for disclosure is also a desire for freedom. Moreover, many actions have 
their origin, for instance, in biological, hormonal, and/or conditioned responses 
(Deacon 434; Geary 202-04), and it would be odd to depict these actions as deriving 
from choice. Thus, the appropriated argument will hold choice and disclosure to be 
conceptually distinct, though intimately connected, activities, because, while every 
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choice is an act of disclosing, it is not also the case that every act of disclosure is a 
choice. Thus, I will maintain along with Beauvoir that one’s capacity for choice (and 
hence one’s capacity for freedom) may be hidden, but I will also argue that this 
capacity cannot be taken for granted. That is, on my view, persons are not 
automatically capable of choice; as I will explain, many conditions must obtain if the 
capacity or ability to choose will be enabled for any particular person. 
Third, consider another notion present Beauvoir’s starting point: that (A2) 
consciousness is what enables choice and, hence, freedom. First, it is important to 
note that Beauvoir did not clearly state what she takes consciousness to be. She held 
that it is the means by which a person has the capacity to be non-constrained; it is, for 
her, the possibility of freedom, as opposed to the physical body which is, at least in 
certain ways, determined like other physical objects. There is textual evidence, for 
instance, that Beauvoir took consciousness to be the human ability to conceptually 
(though not physically) separate the self from its environment (Ethics 7),5 and it is 
this latter notion that is most similar to the notion of choice (though not the notion of 
consciousness) that will be utilized in the appropriated version. The neural functions 
that enable consciousness—the quality of being aware of oneself and one’s 
environment—are distinct from the neural functions that enable conceptual separation 
and choice. As I will explain in Chapter 2, the capacity to conceptually separate from 
the environment results from particular neural processes that allow a well-functioning 
                                                 
5 Beauvoir explains that she takes a human to be a “[r]ational animal” or “thinking reed,” who is able 
to escape “from [her] natural condition without, however, freeing [herself] from it” (Ethics 7). 
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human to escape concrete thinking (contemplation only of what is immediately 
present) and to consider multiple and often physically non-present possibilities at 
once. Thus, I will maintain that a particular mode of consciousness—that is, certain 
types of brain functions (together with the functions of the rest of the body), that are 
common, as a potentiality, to members of the species—facilitates the capacity to 
conceptually separate (and this ability will, in turn, be conceived of as a necessary 
component of the ability to make a choice). 
Let us return to Beauvoir’s notion that each person is (A5) ontologically free 
in that she has a (A3) capacity for intention, choice, and differentiation in (A4) 
disclosure. I will consider (A4) first, then (A3), and lastly (A5). Recall that, for 
Beauvoir, (A4) disclosure is a dual activity through which one reveals and 
contributes objects and/or signification. Now, if this concept is understood charitably 
and in a practical mode, every action or inaction may be construed as disclosing. In 
reading the italicized portion of the sentence above, for instance, the reader has 
revealed—that is, interpreted—the sentence, and, if she has had any response to it 
whatsoever, she has contributed something of her own in return. Or consider going to 
the store, market, bazaar, or whatever place in one’s culture one goes to obtain 
objects that one has not manufactured for oneself. The reader should picture herself in 
the act of perceiving an object (perhaps a head of lettuce or a loaf of bread). In merely 
determining what the object is, she has made an interpretation. She has also 
conceived of how the object may be utilized or not, and in choosing the object or not 
she has contributed to or added to the signification of the object in terms of its utility. 
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The goal in using such a mundane example was to show that the concept of disclosure 
is applicable in any case. However, to disclose means only to expose to view or to 
make known. Thus, the term disclosure seems to refer more to the act of interpreting 
rather than to contributing. I propose, since Beauvoir maintained that disclosure is the 
mode in which a human engages with others and objects in the world, that 
engagement is a more apt term. The notion of engagement (in the sense of 
participating in or meshing with something) will then be said to encompass both 
acts—interpreting and contributing objects and/or signification. 
 Next, I define the capacity to make a choice (A3) as a capacity to consider 
multiple physically present and/or non-physically present possibilities that are 
feasible within and appear to be feasible within one’s physical and conceptual 
environments, to compare the similarities and differences between them, to project 
oneself into each scenario, to have an effective emotional response that motivates one 
toward a particular possibility, and to aim one’s activities at actualizing the possibility 
toward which one is motivated. Then, since making a choice includes comparing and 
aiming at some outcome, differentiation and intentionality will be construed as being 
parts of a capacity for choice. As noted above, I take it that a person’s potential to 
make choices depends in part upon certain neural processes that enable a person to 
escape concrete thinking (contemplation only of what is immediately present), and I 
also maintain a distinction between physical and conceptual attributes. Further, I will 
argue that both types of attributes are relevant to the phenomenon of choice. 
However, I will decline to theorize the relation between the brain and what is 
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commonly referred to as the mind. Such an endeavor would take me too far astray 
from my stated purpose. Instead, I maintain first that, whatever the relation between 
the brain and the mind, the latter does not perform well unless the former is 
physically functioning well. Second, I will take the conjunction of what neuroscience 
and psychology have to say about the workings of the brain as an acceptable 
explanation of how our cognitive, social, and emotional neural processes should be 
conceived.  
Barring currently non-preventable genetic malformities, these relevant 
potentialities for choice exist for particular members of the species in virtue of their 
genetic makeup, and, as I will discuss in Chapter 2, certain conditions must obtain if a 
genetic attribute will be enabled. An organism comes to be via the interaction 
between its genes and the environment. Accordingly, I will reinterpret Beauvoir’s 
notions of choice (A3) and ontological freedom (A5) as species attributes, and I 
stipulate that a particular species member’s enabled species attribute for choice in 
engagement will be called a capacity, and that a particular person’s enabled capacity 
for choice in engagement will be termed an ability. Since a capacity and an ability 
must be enabled, they may not only be hidden from one’s view, as Beauvoir would 
have it, but, in situations marked by deprivation, a person may not develop a capacity 
or ability for choice at all or she may become incapacitated with regard to what was 
previously enabled. The means by which attributes and capacities are enabled are 
addressed in sections 2.4 through 2.9. 
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This leads to Beauvoir’s notion of (A9) an “apprenticeship of freedom”. She 
maintained that one has been apprenticed if one exists in a factical situation, through 
which one’s awareness of and respect for one’s ontological freedom has been 
fostered. In light of the stipulation above, I will recast this notion of an apprenticeship 
and maintain that a person’s genetic potential for choice has been enabled if she has 
received the pre-conditions of choice. Collectively, the pre-conditions are necessary 
for one to develop the capacity to make a choice in one’s activities. And since choice 
is as a necessary condition of freedom, a human will be said to have a potential for 
freedom in virtue of her genetic attributes, a capacity if her attributes are enabled, and 
an ability to live freely if her capacities are enabled. A list of the pre-conditions 
includes such things as adequate micro- and macro-nutrition, stimulation/nurture, 
education, an absence of violence, sleep, clean water and air, and overall health. 
Together, the pre-conditions of choice will perform a function in the appropriated 
version that is analogous to the role that an “apprenticeship of freedom” played in 
Beauvoir’s theory. And while one might contend that not all of the pre-conditions 
need be simultaneously present for choice to occur, I will argue that choice cannot be 
said to occur unless each pre-condition obtains for a given person in a sufficient 
amount both within one’s period of development and throughout adulthood. 
 Now, as noted above, these pre-conditions are not a sufficient condition for 
living freely; and that is because, as Beauvoir has pointed out, the facticity in which 
one exists may or may not be conducive to making choices. Recall that (A6) facticity 
is everything that affects human life (except consciousness itself), including the 
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material and non-material byproducts of consciousness. However, since Beauvoir’s 
notion of facticity includes nearly everything, it fails to distinguish between the 
specific kinds of things that help or hinder one’s ability to make choices. Thus, 
instead of utilizing this notion, I will draw a distinction between the human’s physical 
environment and her conceptual environment, while keeping in mind that different 
contexts and factors may affect either environment in any number of ways. The 
availability of nutritious food, for instance, is a factor that, in part, depends upon a 
given political context, and which potentially affects either the physical or the 
conceptual environment or both. Moreover, whether a person exists in a context in 
which she can speak and move about without restraint and whether she is allowed to 
take part in making the laws to which she is subject, help determine what choices she 
can make for herself and which ones will be off limits. Thus, if the appropriated 
theory offers a person reasons to safeguard her capacities and ability to enact choice, 
then not only will she have reason to secure for herself the pre-conditions of choice, 
but she will also have reason to create a physical and conceptual environment that 
respects her as a person who makes choices. The elements that make up such an 
environment will be termed the conditions of choice.  
 The last concept to be addressed in this section is (A11), the notion that 
humans have a desire to disclose. This desire performed a very important function in 
Beauvoir’s argument. She held that if one has a desire to disclose then one also has a 
desire for freedom (as the two desires are, for her, one and the same). Since, on her 
view, humans do have the former, they ought to take steps to safeguard their original 
 34
or ontological freedom, in the sense that if they do not do so they are behaving in a 
self-defeating manner. This is the crux of the Beauvoirean argument; it is the interest 
that is said to compel one toward one’s responsibilities to freedom in steps two and 
three of the “conversion”. However, as I have argued, the desire to disclose cannot be 
one and the same as a desire for freedom, since the phenomenon of choice is 
conceptually distinct from disclosure. Thus, the main arguments in Chapter 4 will be 
akin to (but not the same as) Beauvoir’s (in that they will arrive at a similar 
conclusion), but they will not hinge on the notion that persons have a desire to 
disclose. A different concept will need to stand in its place in the altered theory.  
 As such, consider the notion of having any particular non-trivial interest (I 
will explain in section 2.11 that a non-trivial interest is one that involves novelty). 
That humans have such interests—anything from maintaining health for oneself 
and/or dependents to attaining the highest position in a particular field or business—is 
not in question. At least two things are necessary conditions of actualizing the 
situation in which one is interested. First, one must engage with others and the 
world—that is, one must take some sort of action. And, second, one must be able to 
consider which possibilities may or may not help that situation obtain, compare the 
similarities and the differences between them, project oneself into each scenario, have 
an emotional response that motivates one toward a particular scenario, and then aim 
one’s activities at actualizing that scenario. That is, if one wants to fulfill any 
particular non-trivial interest, one will utilize the ability to enact choice in 
engagement. Then, in order to obtain any particular non-trivial interest, a person will 
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have a reason to will for herself whatever enables her ability to make choices with 
regard to the way she engages. And if the way others engage in the world affects 
whether or not the situation in which she exists is conducive to her ability to make 
choices in engagement, then she will have reason to make certain sorts of choices 
with regard to others as she does for herself. However, it is not the case that a person 
has only one particular non-trivial interest at only one specified moment. Indeed, each 
of us has multiple interests and this is a situation that continues throughout life.6 The 
having of interests is ongoing, and some present choices may be practically 
inconsistent with one’s ability to make choices in the future; that is, they may 
preclude one’s ability to obtain one or any number of particular non-trivial interests in 
the future. Thus, if it is established that a person does have a reason to will certain 
kinds of things for herself and others, then this reason will be significant. I will argue 
that if a person is able to engage in such a way that she knowingly and purposefully 
utilizes her capacity to enact choice—that is, if its use is not impeded and if she is not 
compelled, via incapacity, cultural factors, and/or force, toward revealing or 
contributing trivial or limited objects and/or significations, in the present or in the 
future—then she will have the best ongoing chance of fulfilling her particular non-
trivial interests. What choices will be said to be in her general interest will be limited 
only by the fact that she has a prior interest, which will take precedence over any 
particular interests, in safeguarding her ability to enact choice in the future. She will 
                                                 
6 Some might argue that a person could even be said to hold interests after her death. However, given 
the constraints of my current project, I will not enter into that debate. 
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also be said to be in an environment in which she may engage freely. She will exist in 
a state of freedom.  
1.6: Summary of Chapters 2 through 4  
 The thesis I defend holds that choice or freewill, as a confluence of neural and 
cultural factors, is enabled and maintained through interdependent relations with 
others. That is, choice is within human control in general, but not at all initially and 
later only partially in the control of the individual person. But choice need not be and 
often is not enabled for particular persons. I will argue that since persons hold 
interdependent relations with each other (and, in certain ways, with all others), we 
have important reasons, that are in our prior interest (an interest that is prior to and 
necessary for being able to fulfill any particular non-trivial self-interest), for wanting 
each person, both near and far, to be raised and to exist within situations that foster, 
grow, promote, and maintain choice or freewill. That is, it is in one’s prior interest to 
help create the pre-conditions of choice for all persons and the conditions of choice 
for all members of one’s cultural group. As I will explain, many factors must obtain 
in order for a person’s capacity and ability to choose to be enabled, and these factors 
regard things as diverse as nutritional science and codified law. The discussion of 
them that extends through Chapters 2 and 3 is extensive and, some might argue, non-
philosophical. Thus, a defense of my method is in order. 
 Philosophers and lay persons hold all sorts of assumptions about the “nature” 
of humans. One such assumption holds that persons are choosers, beings who, in 
nearly all but the most exceptional circumstances, are able to choose one action over 
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another. On this view, they are personally (and perhaps morally) responsible for their 
actions in the overwhelming majority of cases. Another view holds that persons are 
rational agents, without ever asking how it is that persons come to be that way. In 
fact, most ethical theories attempt to say what persons ought to do—for instance, 
refrain from lying, cheating, and killing—without ever asking how it is that people 
become capable of restraint. However, a moral command that holds that a person 
ought to choose truth and non-violence is empty if the person in question cannot 
choose. The appropriated theory (at least implicitly) criticizes all such positions, 
because it demonstrates that persons are choosers only if certain pre-conditions 
obtain. And, if one considers seriously the situations of millions upon millions of 
persons in the world, the factors that enable choice are for them either absent or 
inadequate. As such, there are unfortunately many millions (perhaps billions) of 
persons who are either not capable of or are at great risk with regard to choice or 
freewill.  
 However, if I were merely to assert that many humans lack a capacity for 
choice, while some interlocutors might nod in agreement, others might mount an 
opposition against my position. In either case, would I and my interlocutor be using 
the same basic assumptions about humans and their situations? Given the multitude of 
those that are available to use, I have no good reason to think that is the case. It is not 
uncommon, for instance, to encounter the notion that persons tend, via their nature, 
toward greed and selfishness or that they are basically prudent creatures who, all else 
being equal, work toward attaining their own advantage. Others want to emphasize 
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that people are quite capable of sympathy, empathy, and altruism. Particular persons 
may have these qualities, but one cannot assume such notions generally without being 
able to back them up. My argument holds that humans do not necessarily tend toward 
any specific type of behavior by nature (including choice), unless “nature” is said to 
refer to all the intricate, minute, and momentous interactions that occur between the 
organism’s genetics and the environment throughout the prenatal period and the 
lifespan; persons are the outcome of these interactions. This position is supported by 
the most recent scientific information. 
 Moreover, when discussing the “nature” of persons (or what people are like), 
the philosopher leaves herself open to the charge of armchair philosophizing. The 
interlocutor can merely claim that her experience differs or that her understanding of 
the world just does not yield the same result. Philosophical argumentation, or any 
argumentation for that matter, is as vulnerable as its presuppositions. Thus, I offer 
extensive information regarding the phenomenon of choice from a neurological 
perspective, how it is that people become choosers, and the context in which persons 
live and make choices. That is, I make few assumptions about the basic phenomenon 
of my and all ethical theories: the human and thoroughly personal capacity for choice. 
I do presume that choice and freewill are possible, that the various scientific fields 
that study humans are the appropriate place to glean information about that 
possibility, and that persons have interests (anything from survival to achieving 
premier status in one’s field) that they want to fulfill. As such, my account will 
neither convince a hard determinist (or those who hold for whatever reason that 
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choice, freewill, and freedom are not possible), nor those who hold scientific research 
in low regard, nor those who maintain that they want nothing and have no interests 
(though if such a person exists, she won’t for long). The price of maintaining few 
assumptions about my basic phenomenon and still communicating with the reader is a 
lengthy description of the issues in question and that is precisely what I have 
provided.  
 Although some philosophers, such as Peter Singer, Martha Nussbaum, and 
Thomas Pogge (to name but a few), have done significant work to bring attention to 
our moral responsibilities to those who suffer without the basic necessities of life, to 
my knowledge, no philosopher has compiled and utilized this type of information as it 
relates to the phenomenon of human choice and how (or whether) it is enabled. This 
omission is, to me, striking. How does one know that a person has a capacity for 
choice unless one examines what choice is, how a person chooses, and what that 
person needs in order to do it? Without that examination, the ethicist builds a theory 
on little more than personal experience or, in some cases (two of which will be 
considered in Chapter 4), faith in the belief that all persons are equally choosers. In 
times past, the philosopher had the perfect excuse: neuroscience was not advanced 
enough to explain the capacity for choice. As such, my proposed method would have 
been imprudent. But that is no longer the case (fMRI technology, for instance, has 
supplied neuroscientists with knowledge of the functioning brain) and the old excuses 
seem feeble. Ethicists can no longer evade an analysis of their basic phenomenon. 
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 Philosophers pride themselves on having and being skilled in the use of the 
very capacities that will be examined (in Chapter 2); that is, my analysis concerns the 
“higher” brain functions that enable rational thought, social understandings, and 
emotional stability. Moreover, since the philosopher is trained to use these capacities 
in order to recognize and pick apart bogus arguments and faulty scientific 
presuppositions, I have not merely stated the results of various scientific 
investigations. The goal was to provide enough information for the ethicist (as a 
chooser) to examine the force of the evidence. Again, such an endeavor cannot be 
undertaken with few words.  
 Ethical theory, if it is to be in any way relevant, must concern itself with the 
reality of human life. Beauvoir’s existentialist approach recognizes this as it is 
concerned, like most other existentialist theory, with lived meaning and experience. 
However, as noted earlier, most philosophers who work in the analytic tradition tend 
to discount this sort of theory due to the manner in which it is expressed. In order to 
avoid this problematic expression, I have turned to the sciences to gain useful and 
recent information about our type of being. Thus, it is for these reasons that I ask for 
the reader’s indulgence. In the next two chapters, I will refer only to one philosopher 
and then merely in passing. But that does not make my work non-philosophical. I 
merely wish to establish with clarity what has previously been left to the 
philosopher’s personal imagination. 
 In this chapter, I have explained, though not defended, Beauvoir’s ethical 
theory and I have indicated which components of her work are to be adopted and/or 
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changed for the appropriated theory. Chapter 2 offers a definition of choice and an 
explanation of it from a neurological perspective. It also examines extensively how an 
individual’s capacity for choice is established and maintained. The chapter ends with 
a discussion of concepts that are important components in the appropriated theory, 
such as, human well being, trivial and non-trivial interest, novelty, the development 
of an inner world (conditioned neural processes) as it regards choice or preference 
selection, the notion of humanity, preliminary definitions of interference and 
interdependence, and one’s prior interest in the pre-conditions of choice.  
 While Chapter 2 is centered on considering choice from the point of view of 
the individual, Chapter 3 is concerned with an examination of the impacting 
environment. The discussion is general—that is, it regards the components present in 
social life that influence choice no matter one’s culture, nationality, or individual 
circumstance. The issues addressed are: engagement and its overwhelmingly 
symbolic attributes; an argument against the idea that persons are or can be self-
reliant; as well as an analysis and description of intra-cultural interdependence, the 
conditions of choice, and inter-cultural interdependence. Chapters 2 and 3, taken 
together, perform a function in the appropriated theory that is analogous to what 
human ontology did for Beauvoir. That is, these chapters layout the phenomena in 
question in all of their relevant details.  
 Chapter 4 presents the theory’s three core arguments: the argument from 
consistency, the justification argument, and the argument from consequences. The 
first argues that if a person is consistent, she will engage in interference that helps 
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provide the pre-conditions of choice for all persons and the conditions of choice for 
persons within her cultural group. The second maintains that choice is the basis of 
and the method toward justification in general and that justifications and actions that 
offend choice are without warrant. A person who offends choice simultaneously 
dehumanizes herself, negates any justification for her action, and leaves herself open 
to justified suppression by any other human. The last argument explains that there are 
often (though not always) significant consequences—that affect one’s prior interest—
if other persons, either in one’s own or another culture, exist without the pre-
conditions of choice. These consequences have the potential to harm such that any 
person’s capacity for choice—no matter that person’s socio-economic status—may be 
negatively affected or destroyed. Thus, it is in each person’s prior interest to prevent 
such situations. I conclude that all persons have significant reason to be consistent—
that is, to help provide the pre-conditions of choice for all and the conditions for those 
who share their culture. 
 However, I will also consider whether other factors—such as just deserts, 
norms of non-interference, and special obligations—might mitigate against the 
conclusion or prevent any particular inferences in the arguments. Just deserts are said 
to be those things, pleasant or not, that a person deserves because of what she has 
done on her own, because she is responsible for her actions. Since Chapter 2 
demonstrates that persons without choice, through no fault of their own (in the 
overwhelming majority of cases), act merely from conditioning and Chapter 3 shows 
that these persons are constrained by this conditioning and sub-group interactions, it 
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will not make sense to maintain that they could have done otherwise. The notions of 
responsibility and desert cannot apply to them in the usual manner of application. 
Desert may be a relevant concept with regard to persons with choice, though the 
analysis will show that even these persons never deserve anything without reference 
to the many persons who have developed in them a capacity for choice. However, the 
present theory does not rely on a notion of desert to determine how persons ought to 
be treated. 
 Norms of non-interference are also shown to be inapplicable because 
interference is a basic part of life. To demand non-interference, in and of itself, is to 
require others to affirm one’s actions, no matter what those actions might be or entail. 
The theory will show that persons with choice ought to affirm actions that are 
consistent with choice and disaffirm those that are not. Special obligations to 
dependents or those to whom we hold specific responsibilities will be upheld; but, as 
I will explain, these obligations give us reasons to set up systems to provide the pre-
conditions of choice for everyone. Lastly, I will briefly consider what the theory 
might entail for political philosophy. Persons have reason to submit to political 
authority, I will argue, only if that political system provides for the pre-conditions and 
conditions of choice; moreover, a state earns legitimacy (sovereignty) by providing 
the pre-conditions for those who live within its borders and by taking an active and 
cooperative part in the system that provides them for all persons. A state that fails to 
do the former may be coercive. 
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Chapter Two: The Pre-Conditions of Choice and Humanity 
2.1: Introduction 
Each of us needs and wants certain things for survival and fulfillment. These 
needs and wants constitute, for each, interests, which each attempts to satisfy through 
her activities in the world. Thus, that each of us has particular interests is not in 
question. While one person may be attempting to actualize a situation in which she 
will get a promotion at work, another may be set on the objective of teaching a child 
to read; one person may be planning a trip to a local market and another a trip around 
the world. However, our interests not only vary in their objects, they also differ with 
regard to complexity. It takes a lifetime and a multitude of interwoven tasks to, say, 
reach the goal of Aristotelian eudaimonia, but only a few moments and relatively few 
actions if one seeks to satisfy hunger and thirst in a situation in which food and drink 
are plentiful. However, there are few instances in this world in which a person can 
satisfy her interests and needs as easily as this latter situation. Throughout adulthood, 
the overwhelming majority of us have to engage with others to fulfill our needs, and 
most interest satisfaction requires complex thought and planning. Given that this 
theory is intended as a practical approach to ethics, the important consideration is 
what everyday life is like on earth. We are constrained by our environments, our 
genetic make up, the fact that we come to be through an interaction between the two, 
and our subsequent predispositions and needs given that this is the scenario in which 
we live. These things are true no matter where a person is from or to what culture she 
belongs. 
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 Since we have in common these factors that give structure to our lives, we 
also share structural factors that help determine both what it takes to satisfy any 
particular non-trivial interest and whether or not we are able to do so (trivial and non-
trivial interests will be addressed in section 2.11). Whatever factors affect the 
possibility of fulfilling any given non-trivial interest will be important to each of us. 
That is, each will have a prior interest in these factors, since they are what enable 
each of us to fulfill any particular non-trivial interest we may have. And if it is the 
case that near and distant others feature prominently in this prior interest, as I will 
argue in Chapter 4 that they do, we will have important reason to take these others 
into account.  
I mentioned in Chapter 1 that satisfying any particular non-trivial interest will 
require making choices in engagement. Engagement is action and interaction in the 
world. Choice, as one possible way of engaging, of course has to do with determining 
what one needs and/or wants to obtain and/or the way in which one will go about 
doing it. In this chapter, I consider the notion of choice and its preconditions in some 
detail. I approach the phenomenon of choice from a neurological perspective. We are 
physical beings. If one wishes to explain a given behavior, such as choice, it will be 
important to consider the physical apparatus that is responsible for the behavior. 
Choice, I will explain, occurs, when it does, as a confluence of cognitive, social, and 
emotional neural processes (it also inevitably involves the physical and conceptual 
environments within which one is situated). If these neural processes do not obtain, 
neither does choice. Thus, whatever facilitates these processes—such as adequate 
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nutrition, nurture/stimulation, education, sleep, overall health, and the absence of 
other factors that impede the growth and/or maintenance of them—are the 
preconditions of choice. In so far as interest fulfillment requires choice, these things 
are prior to and preconditions of interest fulfillment as well. My goal will be to 
describe a neurological perspective of choice, including an example that relates neural 
functions to the cognitive, social, and emotional processes of choice. I will then 
explain how the preconditions are necessary conditions of these processes.  
2.2: Choice and its Neurological Processes 
The human brain has of course an impressive structure and functional 
potential, and if this potential is actualized for a given person, she will have many 
capacities which together constitute her capacity for choice. The capacity for choice 
appears to make her unique among animals, but there are many ways in which the 
human brain is not that different from those of other mammals, especially those of 
our nearest primate cousins (Wexler 32-33; Geary 92; Deacon 255). So why is it that 
humans have the potential to develop the capacities requisite for choice (and other 
cognitive feats), whereas it seems that our closest relatives are limited in this area? 
The answer appears to be that throughout our evolution, presumably in response to 
ecological and/or social pressures that influenced our chances for reproduction and/or 
survival (Geary 7; Deacon 408),7 the human brain has grown, most prominently in the 
                                                 
7 Geary and Deacon agree on this basic point; however, they hold different positions regarding which 
pressures were significant enough to impact our evolution. Geary emphasizes the human attempt to 
gain “ecological dominance” and the subsequent social pressures that would have arisen (such as, “a 
within-species arms race”) as a result (7). Deacon focuses instead upon the notion that food 
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prefrontal region (Stone, 105; Deacon 255; Wexler 31; Geary 230).8 And, as I will 
explain, this region is implicated in the capacities involved in choice (and other 
uniquely human functions, such as the use of symbols and language). However, the 
issue is not just the relative increase in the number of cells or neurons that make up 
the prefrontal lobe (though this by itself is an important piece of the puzzle, as this 
region is “clearly disproportionately larger in humans compared with recent hominids 
and great apes” (Stone 123; see also Deacon 343 and Wexler 31)), this region’s 
connectivity has also expanded (Geary 230). That is, other brain systems have 
experienced a “shift in connectivity favoring prefrontal connections” (Deacon 255), 
and greater connectivity allows “a greater number and variety of messages . . . to be 
processed” (Gallagher 13).  
The brain has some 100 billion neurons, and each of them are “functionally 
linked with one another by a combined chemical and electrical communication 
system” (Wexler 20). Each is connected to every other through chains of neural fibers 
“with no more than six intermediary cells” (Wexler 23), gets signals from 
approximately 1,000 other neurons and sends to 1,000 in return (Peterson interviewed 
by D’Arcangelo 68; Wexler 20), and “may receive hundreds of signals from other 
neurons within a millisecond” (Wexler 20). The well developed and well connected 
frontal lobe then serves as “the center for executive functions and for broad 
                                                                                                                                           
provisioning needs and “unique demands of reproductive competition and cooperation created 
conditions that led to our unique from of intelligence” and the use of the symbolic communication we 
call language (408).  
8 Wexler explains that this increase is mostly in the “surface area rather than cortical thickness” (31). 
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supervisory and behavioral control” (Geary 214)—that is, it controls and, to varying 
degrees, executes a number of functions (Wexler 108; Geary 211; Birberg-Thornberg 
et al 33; Noble et al 72; Zysset et al 1386; van ’t Wout et al 567; Bar-On et al 1791; 
Stone 104-05; Bechara and Bar-on 22-23; Deacon 256-57), many of which facilitate 
choice. These functions include amplified and sustained attention, working and long-
term memory, retention of relevant information and separation of what is irrelevant, 
inhibition of internal and external stimuli, organization, simulation of possibilities, 
imagining oneself in the place of another, emotional stability, planning, and 
strategizing.  
Of course, not all of the brain’s functions are controlled by the prefrontal lobe. 
Neuroscientist and evolutionary anthropologist, Terrence Deacon, explains that 
human action is given by both “bottom-up” processes—neurological sources of 
activity that are either “purely physiological” or “physiological sources mediated by 
conditioned associations” (i.e., learning) (Deacon 434)—and “top-down” processes—
that is, “end-directed behaviors” (435)—such as the functions that are listed above. 
Purely physiological functions are those over which a person has little or no control; 
they arise involuntarily and result from internal stimuli such as hormones or other 
biological sources. Those sources that are “mediated by conditioned associations” are 
not strictly automatic functions; rather these sources regard information gained from 
experience and learning that has been internalized and integrated such that it is 
available as a stimulus for action without intentional deliberation on the part of the 
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actor. Top-down processes, in contrast, are those sources of behavior that require pre-
meditated information processing on the part of the agent.  
 Psychologist David C. Geary makes a distinction that is very similar to 
Deacon’s. Geary explains that human action may derive from “implicit processes” 
that “operate below the individual’s awareness” (Geary 202), on the one hand, or 
“explicit” processes, on the other. The former operate quickly and automatically 
(168) and include either “inherent or learned ecology-cognition-behavior links” 
(204); the latter require the inhibition of the former (204), are slow and effortful 
processes (168), and enable complex behavior, such as processing the “conscious, 
abstract, and decontextualized”9 information that is utilized in “controlled problem 
solving” (195-199).10  
 Given these distinctions, many of our everyday actions and activities are 
carried out by bottom-up or implicit processes. These processes enable all the things 
that one thinks and does with little or no deliberative effort. Alternately, choice, as I 
have defined it in Chapter 1, is a top-down or explicit function. It specifically requires 
the types of mental processes that are effortful, abstract, and end-directed. Moreover, 
the top-down or explicit processes involved in enacting choice employ the 
supervisory controls of the pre-frontal cortex. Indeed, neuroscientists credit the 
expansion and connectivity of this region with facilitating these cognitive, social, and 
                                                 
9 Decontextualized information should be taken to mean information that is intelligible but that has 
been taken out of its original context. 
10 Part of Geary’s purpose is to tie the implicit processes with patterns of information that have been 
invariant throughout human evolution and an individual’s lifetime and the explicit processes with 
variant information (168). That aim will not be considered herein. 
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emotional functions involved in choice. However, since a significant part of human 
activity can be explained by appealing to bottom-up or implicit processes (Geary 
195), the question becomes: why and how do the prefrontal cortex’s supervisory 
processes become activated? According to Geary, it “does not activate itself” (215). 
In that case, either the supervisory processes would always be activated to some 
extent, indicating that implicit processes may not be such a good explanation of 
behavior after all, or we would be faced with the homunculus problem (that is, a 
worry about whether there is a neural system controlling the supervisor, leading to an 
infinite regression in supervisory systems). Geary explains that the supervisory 
function of the prefrontal cortex “is automatically activated” when implicit processes 
are insufficient to deal with information presented in the environment (215). Thus, it 
is called into play by the implicit systems when a person is presented with what 
seems to her to be a novel or complex situation.11 Of course, if the prefrontal region 
controls and executes these functions, it is implicated in each function but carries out 
none of them alone. Choice requires the integration of the functions of many brain 
regions that work in concert, creating systems that carry out particular processes.  
 I turn now to an example of choice, in order to demonstrate how a given 
person’s cognitive, social, and emotional processes coalesce to carry out this type of 
explicit function. Recall that the capacity to enact choice is the capacity (a) to 
consider multiple physically present and non-physically present possibilities that are 
                                                 
11 In the considerations that follow and especially in section 2.11, I focus on novelty rather than 
complexity. That is because when a person is confronted with something that she takes to be complex, 
that thing must also be in large part novel to her. Thus, I take complexity to be a subset of novelty. 
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relevant to the issue at hand, (b) that are feasible within and appear to be feasible 
within one’s physical and conceptual environments, (c) to compare the similarities 
and differences between them, (d) to project oneself into each scenario, (e) to have an 
effective emotional response that motivates one toward some particular possibility, 
and (f) to aim one’s activities at actualizing the possibility toward which one is 
motivated. The goal will be to consider choice from a neurological perspective while 
keeping in mind that each chooser is embedded in a particular physical and 
conceptual context. I will consider each component (i.e., (a), (b), and so forth) of 
choice individually.  
 With regard to (a), if a person considers two (or more) physically present 
possibilities, she engages in relatively concrete thinking, so the interesting case will 
be the one in which the person entertains two or more non-physically present (or 
conceptually present) possibilities. Here the chooser, who I will call Amanda, is 
dealing with multiple abstractions. Amanda will, in the coming months, graduate 
from high school; she is choosing what endeavor to undertake next. The general end 
of her activities up until this point had not previously been in question (she had been 
focused solely on the goal of graduating from high school). Now, faced with novelty 
and a complex decision, her implicit neural systems call into play the explicit in order 
to plan a course of action. She has three possibilities before her: she can attend 
college, find a job, or travel for a year before taking one of the other two options.  
In order to consider each as a possibility, she must have had some prior 
exposure to them. She will obviously not entertain notions to which she has never 
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been introduced. The issue here regards Amanda’s subjective relation to different 
possibilities in her environment; what is it that she knows and has been exposed to, 
and what is her relation to that which she has been exposed? The point for the 
moment is that if she has never heard of Geling (a remote village in Nepal) and hence 
does not know of its existence, she will not consider traveling there. It will not be one 
of her considered options. Likewise, if she knows of Geling but has internalized the 
notion that she could not navigate the terrain, even if she is actually well equipped 
(with knowledge, physical capacity, and resources) to do so, she will likely not accept 
it as a possibility. Her prior exposure—to the possibility or to something similar 
enough that she can extrapolate from the non-identical case for this application—may 
have come through first hand experience, an academic setting, or hearing it from 
another, but in every case her knowledge of possibilities has originated in her 
interaction with others and her environment (i.e., engagement).  
In any case, with regard to neural processes, she will utilize both working 
memory and long-term memory, the former in order to remain aware of the applicable 
information (utilizing “the dorsolateral prefrontal regions, the anterior cingulated 
cortex, and . . . the parietal cortex” (Geary 326)) and the latter to pull up and employ 
that which featured in her previous experience (involving the prefrontal cortex, the 
hippocampus, and other regions (Noble et al 72)). In addition, that the possibilities 
under consideration must be relevant entails that she must be able to sift through and 
set aside (or inhibit) a significant amount of information (both with regard to what is 
present to her senses and what is retrievable via long-term memory) that is not 
 53
pertinent to the case at hand. Such an activity exercises the prefrontal cortex and the 
anterior cingulated, among other regions (Geary 214).  
 Component (b) refers to the physical and conceptual state of affairs in one’s 
environment. While it might seem that these states of affairs do not directly affect the 
person’s neural processes, one’s neural processes are in fact deeply affected by 
interaction with a microcosm or subset of the larger states of affairs (the impacting 
environment is addressed in Chapter 3). The issue regarding (b) is whether, for 
instance, resources, infrastructure, and/or institutions are physically available, on the 
one hand, as well as what concepts are applicable to that which is present, on the 
other. With regard to the former, Amanda cannot attend the university in the city if 
either the university (including faculty, classrooms, and libraries) or the city is not 
there. Moreover, many other constraints apply. For instance, if she will attend college 
or travel, she must have sufficient financial means. If she will work, she must have a 
suitable wardrobe and transportation. These possibilities regard both the physical 
environment (the objective state of affairs) and the conceptual environment (the 
intersubjective state of affairs), and the two types of environment intermingle. Those 
who have come before Amanda have either utilized their resources (supposing that 
such resources were available) and created the infrastructure and institutions or they 
have not. However, their actions, inactions, and interactions in large part have 
depended on the conceptual environment in which they operated. With regard to the 
latter (that is, the intersubjective state and what concepts are available), the issue is 
what social or institutional concepts govern the availability of the possibilities. This 
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again concerns the conceptual environment. In this case, the job Amanda wants is 
available, but perhaps the hiring manager has a predilection toward not hiring those of 
her gender, race, or level of schooling. Or the university and funds exist, but 
admittance may be awarded primarily to those of a certain social class, to those who 
score extremely high on an entrance exam, or perhaps by some other notion of 
exclusivity. Or, as Beauvoir pointed out, Amanda’s conceptual horizons may be so 
low, given her upbringing, that she cannot see herself as carrying out these tasks or as 
one who can choose between them. The point for the moment is that if the physical 
and/or conceptual environments are such that some possibilities are unavailable or 
barred, then these will not pass the criterion of feasibility.  
 In order to (c) compare the possibilities that are feasible (and appear to be so), 
Amanda must have at least basic cognitive abilities and be aware of that which is 
physically and conceptually applicable. The relevant brain processes here are similar 
to those covered in the discussion of (a), such as awareness and working knowledge, 
and maintaining applicable information in working memory. She must also have 
sufficient concepts available for use such that she is able to recognize, and perhaps 
articulate (if only to herself), the similarities and differences in question. Such 
concepts are socially acquired and depend upon the cultural beliefs and mores of 
those around her. If she does not know of anyone who has attended college, for 
instance, her representation of it may not be accurate enough to conceive of credit 
hours, self-motivated study, and navigating a bureaucracy. If she has never traveled, 
she may be lacking information about airports and hostels. If she has not held a 
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position, say, in a factory, she may be unaware of the demands of a regimented work 
schedule. If she does have these and other concepts at her disposal, she will again 
utilize her prefrontal functions to facilitate the comparison and to inhibit irrelevant 
information from intruding during her deliberations. 
 If Amanda will have the capacity (d) to project herself into each possible 
scenario under consideration, she will create what Geary calls a “mental model” 
(195). She will engage in a conscious sustained effort to represent decontextualized 
and abstract information (195). As such, she will be limited to whatever “attentional 
and working memory resources” (195) that are available in her current state. She will 
imagine different states of affairs—for instance, places to travel, subjects to study, 
and jobs and pay available just out of high school versus after college—none of 
which are, as yet, actual. Geary explains that this type of mental activity requires 
“autonoetic awareness”, that is, “the ability to consciously consider the self across 
time, . . . to recall personal experiences, relate these experiences to current situations, 
and project oneself into the future” (Geary 210). This is a capacity that appears to be 
unique to humans, and it utilizes the prefrontal region’s supervisory processes in 
order to be able to inhibit immediate stimuli from the external context (e.g., 
distractions or irrelevant sensory information) as well as her internal context (e.g., 
biological and/or implicit processes or irrelevant information stored in memory). In 
the present example, extraneous external stimuli might include peer pressure in a 
given direction or the excitement surrounding high school graduation; implicit 
processes might include a fear response toward an uncertain future or other 
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biologically based compulsions; and irrelevant information abounds in all contexts of 
choice. Concerns regarding everything from “the phone is ringing” to “I’m hungry” 
to “I wonder where so-and-so will attend college” must be resolved, overridden, or 
otherwise generally inhibited in order to maintain attention on the mental model.  
Moreover, whichever possibility Amanda simulates, other actors will be 
present who may influence the way that a given scenario plays out. There are 
teachers, bosses, and travel agents of whom to take account. Amanda will likely need 
to consider the reactions and preferences of family members and relevant others. She 
will need to be able to simulate their positions in an effort to predict their future 
behavior. This ability to put oneself in the place of another is, in non-philosophical 
circles, referred to as theory of mind. Theory of mind is a neural process that supports 
social interactions; it is a capacity that is used in all sorts of social situations as it 
allows one to attribute belief states to others, given experience with people in general 
or specific observations of some particular other. From this, one attempts to ascertain 
how a person with such a belief state would act (Birberg-Thornberg et al 33). The 
ability to empathize is not what is at issue here, although empathy—the attempt to 
arrive “at an emotional state that is the same as, or parallel with, that of another” 
(Deacon 428)—must also be involved if one will successfully put oneself in the place 
of another. Rather, the issue is one of arriving at an internal representation of the 
processes that are likely to be present in the other. This type of simulation is 
dependent upon the functions of the prefrontal cortex (Mitchell et al 68; Stone 105-
06) in conjunction with other cortical and limbic structures (Mitchell et al 65). 
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However, since theory of mind is always based in part upon autonoetic awareness, 
theory of mind is easier if the other is similar to the self (with regard to beliefs) and 
more difficult if not.  
 Throughout the history of western philosophy, reason and emotion have often 
been contrasted. Kant, for instance, held the emotions to be morally suspect; a moral 
choice, for him, was one that is made solely through the faculties of reason. Current 
neuroscience tells us that there is some basis for a contrast between cognition and 
emotion, in that the two are functions of different (though perhaps partially 
overlapping (Bar-On et al 1798)) brain systems. The former “is more dependent on 
cortical structures”, whereas the latter is supported by the “limbic and related neural 
systems” (Bar-On et al 1798). However, recent neural research indicates that emotion 
(and the neural systems that subserve it) plays a significant role in enacting choice  
(van ’t Wout et al 567; Bechara and Bar-On 22-23; Bar-On et al 1798), moral or 
otherwise. An emotional response is often taken to be a given, not as something 
requiring analysis and explanation. However, the neural structures that support the 
emotions are intricate much like those that facilitate the cognitive faculties. The 
prefrontal cortex and the amygdala (among other structures) are implicated in the 
neural processes that facilitate (e) having an effective emotional response. And such a 
response is affected by nurture, nutrition, sleep, and stress.12 In general terms, one 
must possess emotional stability and be capable of experiencing the full spectrum of 
emotions (rather than experiencing some prominently and frequently or some not at 
                                                 
12 Of course, brain damage may also determine whether an effective emotional response is possible. 
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all). If the amygdala does not function well, for instance, a person may literally have 
no fear, leading the person to take unreasonable risks. Her choices then suffer 
accordingly (Bechara et al 5480). An effective emotional response will allow the 
reasonable attainment of interests; if a person is hungry, for example, her effective 
emotional response will lead her toward ingesting that which is edible rather than 
paint chips or poisonous berries.  
 Lastly, in order to enact choice, a person must be able (f) to aim her activities 
at actualizing the possibility toward which she is motivated. If Amanda’s aim is to get 
a job, there are subgoals that must be obtained along the way. She must fill out 
applications and go on interviews. If she decides to spend all of her time with friends 
or watching television instead, her goal will not be met. Aiming at some end requires 
planning and strategizing, both of which are prefrontal processes (Wexler 108). 
Carrying out a strategy necessitates ongoing inhibition of non-conducive behaviors, 
and often this amounts to making a series of choices that work in service of one’s 
greater aim.  
 This description of choice demonstrates that choice occurs at a conjunction 
between three interconnected and overlapping realms: first, the person, including her 
cognitive, social, and emotional brain processes, her knowledge of relevant 
possibilities, and her conceptual relationship to that knowledge; second, the physical 
environment and what it affords; and, third, the conceptual environment regarding the 
concepts that are applicable to those possibilities. I will address the latter two realms 
in Chapter 3, while in the next section I will be concerned with the first. That is, I will 
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address how it is that a person comes to have the neural capacity to make a choice. 
She has the potential to engage in these sorts of mental feats—to amplify and sustain 
attention, engage working and long-term memory, retain relevant information and 
separate off what is irrelevant, inhibit internal and external stimuli, organize her 
thoughts, simulate possibilities, imagine herself in the place of another, maintain 
emotional stability, plan, and strategize—in virtue of being genetically human. But 
that is not the whole picture. It is obvious, for instance, that neither an infant nor one 
who has sustained severe deprivation during development has these capacities. That is 
because certain factors must obtain if a given person will have the requisite brain 
processes, knowledge, and conceptual understandings to enact choice. Some of the 
pre-conditions are more sensitive to short-term deficit than others; as such, I maintain 
that choice will not be said to occur unless each precondition obtains for a person in a 
sufficient amount over a given period of time (both throughout a person’s 
development and throughout the lifespan). A list of the pre-conditions includes 
factors like adequate nutrition, nurture/stimulation, education, sleep, overall health, 
and an absence of the things that detract from the growth and maintenance of the 
neural capacities involved in choice. After presenting some background information 
about human brain development, I will discuss each of the pre-conditions. However, 
as these factors and their effects intermingle—often one (for instance, general 




2.3: Early Brain Development 
 As noted earlier, the human brain consists of some 100 billion neurons. Prior 
to birth, brain cells (neurons) are generated (and over-produced) through the process 
of neurogenesis (Chugani 186); the wiring of the cells is accomplished automatically 
and is presumably controlled genetically, since no brain activity need be present for 
the process to occur (Peterson interviewed by D’Arcangelo 68). The first “activity-
dependent stage” occurs prior to birth, during which cells send and receive 
electrochemical signals (68); however, no particular external stimulus is yet present. 
As a result of these processes, most of the neurons are already in place prior to birth 
and are set to receive information regarding whatever stimuli will be present in the 
environment. A process called apoptosis (“programmed cell death”) begins prior to 
birth and extends until the child is around two (Chugani 186). After birth, another 
process—synaptogenesis—begins, during which the synapses (the connections 
between brain cells) develop rapidly, becoming more dense and more numerous 
(Gallagher 13). There is an overproduction of synapses. A one year old child, for 
instance, has roughly “150 percent more synapses than an adult” (13). The reason for 
the over production is unclear, but it is likely to facilitate adaptation to the 
environment so that the brain has enough material to be able to adjust to any of the 
potential environments in which it may find itself. It will be better able to cope with 
whatever demands are present there (13). As such, there is also a process for weeding 
out or pruning whatever connections do not prove useful. Pruning is a normal process 
that is “based on activity-dependent stabilization” (Chugani 186). Recurrent neural 
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activity (within a given circuitry) “will result in stabilization of those circuits rather 
than elimination during the pruning process” (186). However, there are circumstances 
(i.e., impoverished environments) in which over pruning may occur (Gallagher 14; 
Peterson interviewed by D’Arcangelo 69). Finally, after the synapses are in place, 
another process called myelination takes place, in which “the brain surrounds and 
insulates” the axons (a thread-like part of the neuron) which in turn allows for faster 
conduction of impulses and signals (Peterson interviewed by D’Arcangelo 69). 
Moreover, different areas of the brain myelinate at different times throughout the life 
span; hence different capacities “become efficient at different ages” (69). With this 
brief summary of early brain development as background, I turn now to a discussion 
of the pre-conditions of choice.  
2.4: Pre-condition--Micronutriture 
 Many factors are necessary for the human brain and its processes to develop 
and remain functional. Nutrition is one such factor. General adequate nutrition is very 
important for the growth of the brain and its processes that are involved in choice in 
engagement. One must of course have adequate caloric intake in order to have the 
energy to function in the environment. We need energy in order to obtain energy for 
ourselves in the next hour, day, and week. However, none of us starts off this cycle of 
energy/nutrient attainment and expenditure by ourselves. During our early months 
and years, we are entirely dependent on others to start off the cycle, to give to us what 
we will need to eventually develop the capacity/ability to carry out the brain functions 
involved in choice. We don’t come into this world as choosers. We begin with a 
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genetic potential and become choosers or not, and whatever else we will become, due 
to the interaction between our genetic predispositions and the environment. Without 
adequate nutriture, a child will not have the energy to explore her environment and 
interact with others; and both of these factors are very important for the development 
of the capacity for choice. I will return to a discussion of food insecurity and the 
effects of malnutrition in section 2.8. In what follows, I will focus upon five 
micronutrients: choline, folate, iron, iodine, and the essential fatty acids. Scientists 
have found choline and folate to be generally indispensable for normal brain function. 
Without these (and perhaps many others), the development of neural processes of 
choice may not even get off the ground. Without the latter three, people experience 
decreased capacity in regard to the cognitive, social, and emotional processes that are 
crucial for choice. 
 Choline is important for numerous functions that underpin choice, such as the 
“structural integrity and signaling functions of cell membranes”, the development of 
the “brain and spinal cord structure and function”, and the development and 
maintenance of memory (Zeisel, “Choline” 229). Adequate choline intake during the 
fetal and postnatal period has significant positive impact on brain development and 
function (Zeisel, “Fetal” S131), whereas a deficiency is strongly associated with brain 
damage or neural tube defects (Zeisel, “Choline” 229). The implication for the overall 
development of the neural processes of choice then is clear. Many (but not all) 
women of childbearing age do have some ability to synthesize this vital nutrient 
(while most men and postmenopausal women do not); however, the fetus’ and 
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lactating infant’s demand for choline is so great that it often depletes the woman’s 
stores (Zeisel, “Fetal” S134). A case study in California “found that women in the 
lowest quartile for daily choline intake had a 4-fold greater risk of having a baby with 
[a neural tube defect] than women in the highest quartile” (S132), and another study 
found that only ten percent of older children, women, men, and pregnant women in 
the U.S. have adequate daily intake of choline (Jensen et al lb219).  
 Memory features large in components (a), (c), (d), and (f) of choice and 
choline is strongly implicated in both the development and maintenance of memory. 
Studies on rodents have shown that rats deprived of choline in utero experienced 
greater cell death in the hippocampus (the memory network of the brain), while the 
opposite was the case if the pregnant rat’s diet was sufficient in choline (Zeisel, 
“Fetal” S132). In another study, working memory was enhanced in rodents that 
received choline supplements (S133). While it is best to be cautious when 
generalizing from studies performed on animals, there is increasing evidence that 
choline supplementation affects human memory as well. Three separate experiments 
on adults showed that explicit memory, logical memory, and working memory are 
significantly enhanced by choline supplements (Zeisel, “Choline” 238-39). Another 
study showed that choline may be beneficial for older adults who have memory 
difficulties as well (239). 
 Given, first, that choline deprivation is strongly associated with neural tube 
defects in the human fetus/infant, and, second, that the findings in the animal models 
clearly demonstrate a direct and positive correlation between choline and memory, it 
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is unlikely that any ethics review board would approve a complete or partial choline 
deprivation experiment on humans. Thus, one cannot with certainty imply that partial 
choline deprivation is associated with hippocampus cell death in humans. Yet, such a 
scenario is likely given the present state of evidence. Due to its role in facilitating the 
structural integrity of the brain and neural system and in at least enhancing working 
memory, choline is clearly a pre-condition of choice. 
 Folic acid (or folate), a type of B vitamin, is also implicated in human brain 
development. It is estimated that adequate “folate intake by the mother during 
pregnancy can prevent 50% or more of neural tube defects” (Zeisel, “Fetal” S132), 
which result in brain, skull, and spinal cord malformations. One study found that 
folate supplementation given to women “who had previously had a child with a 
neural tube defect lowered the risk of recurrence by 72%” (Zeisel, “Choline” 236). 
One solution—folate fortified wheat flour—is cost effective and feasible, given that 
the expense is merely “$1.50 US dollars per metric ton of wheat flour” and “the 
consumption of wheat flour is greater than that of any other grain” worldwide 
(Maberly et al, 8-9). However, despite efforts to promote the fortified flour and make 
it available, about 4 billion people worldwide lack access (8). Since the U.S. began 
fortifying foods (such as cereals and breads) with folate in 1998, the incidence of 
neural tube defects within the U.S. population has declined by 26%, and similar 
initiatives in Chile and Canada yielded declines of 40% and 42%, respectively (9). 
However, a recent study in the US demonstrated that the group of women who 
“account for nearly one third” of births in the US (5) and who “have the highest rate 
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of unintended pregnancies” (7), is also the group that is least informed about folate 
and least likely to take a supplement (5). Thus, the potential consequences for choice 
are significant both in the US and abroad.  
 Iron may be involved in multiple brain functions that facilitate choice, such as 
the formation of myelin (the white matter that speeds neural impulse conduction), and 
the synthesis of two neurotransmitters, dopamine (required for functions of the central 
nervous system) and serotonin (which helps to regulate mood and the emotions) 
(Kretchmer et al 998S; Beard 1468S). For instance, iron anemia negatively affects 
emotional stability (Kretchmer et al 998S) which is essential for component (e) of 
choice. However, iron deficiency has an even greater influence on choice through its 
connection with the cognitive faculties. Studies consistently indicate that younger 
children with an iron deficiency “have alterations in attention span, lower intelligence 
scores, and some degree of perceptual disturbance” (998S), and older children exhibit 
“decreased attentiveness, narrow attention spans, and perceptual restriction” (998S). 
Even adult brain functions appear to alter according to variations in iron (998S). But 
attention—or better yet, amplified attention—is crucial for component (d) of choice. 
A person with inadequate iron intake might be described as being at risk with regard 
to choice. This is important because iron deficiency is a problem worldwide “with an 
estimated 2.5-5 billion people . . . afflicted” (Beard 1468S), and it is an especially 
acute concern for children. As “many as 40-45% of children” are deficient or anemic 
(Kretchmer et al 998S). In the United States alone, it is estimated that roughly 50% of 
pregnant women may be at risk (National Institutes of Health).  
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 A deficiency with regard to the fourth micronutrient, iodine, is a general bane 
to the processes of choice; it often results in mental retardation, spastic paralysis, 
deaf-mutism, and decreased visual capacity (Kretchmer et al 997S). Researchers 
estimate that some 20 million people alive today could have been spared significant 
and irreversible brain damage if their mothers had had adequate access to iodine prior 
to conception and during pregnancy, as often the damage is done before the end of the 
second trimester (997S-998S). Where iodized salt (an inexpensive and practical 
remedy) is readily available, such as in the U.S., the problem is rare and controlled; 
however, in developing countries, another 20 million are currently at risk (997S). 
Indeed, researchers estimate that the majority of the population (approximately 80 to 
100%) of New Guinea are afflicted resulting in a predominance of mental retardation 
(998S). 
 Lastly, the essential fatty acids, omega-6 and omega-3 (the latter, in 
particular), appear to have a significant effect on the development of neural tissue, the 
development of cognitive faculties, the capacity for theory of mind, as well as the 
lifelong maintenance of cognition—each of which are crucial for the components of 
choice. First, the fatty acids are a key element in neurogenesis (the formation of brain 
cells), myelination, synaptic function (Birberg-Thornberg et al 34), and perhaps 
synaptogenesis (Bouwstra et al 317). Adequate supply of the fatty acids during the 
fetal and postnatal period promotes neuro-protection (it makes “nervous tissue less 
susceptible to damage” (Gustafsson et al 1280)), neurological development, and 
ultimately learning and behavioral control (Birberg-Thornberg et al 34; Gustafsson et 
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al 1280). Second, the fatty acids are implicated in the growth of cognition. For 
instance, infants who received a supplement containing omega-3 and omega-6 
exhibited better problem solving skills than did their cohorts whose formula did not 
include the supplement (Wainwright 337). Another study showed that giving omega-
3 supplements to pregnant women and nursing mothers positively influenced their 
children’s IQ measures at four years of age (Gustafsson et al 1281). Researchers 
found that approximately 76% of the variability in the children’s IQ scores (at age 4) 
could be accounted for by the duration of breastfeeding, its omega-3 content, and the 
gestation week of the infant (1285). Part of the issue is the proportion of omega-6 to 
omega-3 that is present in the body and diet; inordinately high levels of omega-6 and 
low levels of omega-3 are undesirable (1285). A study regarding the capacity for 
theory of mind and cognition found that high levels of omega-6 are negatively 
correlated with the capacity for theory of mind (perhaps causing difficulties with 
component (d)), while high levels of omega-3 are positively correlated with increased 
cognitive capacity (Birberg-Thornberg et al 37). As such, high omega-3 levels are 
also positively correlated with a capacity for components (a), (c), (d), and (f). 
 This correlation between high levels of omega-3 and enhanced cognitive 
capacity holds true for middle age and older adults as well. In middle age subjects, 
high omega-3 intake is related to a low risk of cognitive decline or impairment, 
whereas a high intake of saturated fats is associated with greater risk (Kalmijn et al 
275). Older adults with greater plasma proportions of omega-3 were significantly less 
likely to experience a decline in cognition and motor capacity (Dullemeijer et al 
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1483). And multiple studies have linked high omega-3 intake with a decline in the 
risk of Alzheimer Disease (Kalmijn et al 275; Barberger-Gateau et al 1921).  
 These five micronutrients—choline, folate, iron, iodine, and the essential fatty 
acids—are critical for the development of the brain and its functions. As such, they 
are essential for and pre-conditions of the neural processes of choice. Without choline 
and folate, there is a significant risk that a fetus/infant will not develop either the 
brain structure or processes that are necessary for choice to occur. Without iron, 
children and adults suffer with regard to cognition and emotional stability. Iodine 
deficiency often results in mental retardation or other symptoms that to varying 
degrees interfere with a person’s potential capacity for choice. Low levels of omega-3 
may result in cognitive deficits, whereas high levels of omega-6 are associated with a 
decreased capacity for theory of mind. Thus, it is not just that a person requires 
adequate caloric intake if her capacity for choice will be enabled (although this is 
surely true), she must have nutritious food as well. Anyone who is concerned about 
people as choosers (i.e., most liberal theorists) has an important reason to be 
concerned about people’s nutritional status. People are physical beings; one cannot 
separate choice, or any other mental faculty, from the physical apparatus that 
facilitates it. 
 I have considered only five nutrients that feature prominently in the 
neurological literature. There are likely many more that either directly or indirectly 
affect choice. Before turning to the next precondition of choice (nurture/stimulation) 
it is important to note first the physical and conceptual vulnerability of the 
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infant/child with regard to these nutrients, as well as the utter dependency of the 
infant/child in obtaining them. Each person reading this (and I presume that my 
reader has a high level of cognitive, social, and emotional attainment) was once 
vulnerable to nutritional deficit in utero or during childhood. If a person can engage 
the intricate processes involved in choice, it is because someone else provided these 
vital nutrients for her. And in every case, this provider obtained the nutrients through 
engagement in the world. In adulthood, each of us is profoundly vulnerable to 
deficiency in the latter three micronutrients. Moreover, this physical vulnerability 
translates into a conceptual vulnerability as well. Deficits in cognition, emotional 
stability, and theory of mind limit one’s capacity to partake of and contribute to 
conceptual interaction (to be further elaborated in Chapter 3) that occurs among 
people in all cultures. 
2.5: Pre-condition—Nurture/Sensory Stimulation 
 These micronutrients are of course just the tip of the iceberg with regard to 
what is required to enable a capacity for choice. The person’s cognitive, social, and 
emotional neural processes come to be through the interaction between her genetics 
and the physical/conceptual environment. And many aspects of these environments 
impact the processes of choice. In this section, I consider the effect of sensory 
stimulation (and nurture, as one type of stimulation) upon the components of choice. 
Stimulation is a precondition of choice because our early interactions with the world 
help to build the structure and functionality of the brain; without it, the neural systems 
involved in choice atrophy or are excessively pruned. As I will explain, it is because 
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of this that each of us has been and is both physically and conceptually vulnerable to 
sensory deprivation. Moreover, in our early years, it is always someone else (a 
caregiver, teacher, playmate, and so forth) who provides the stimulation that is so 
vital for our cognitive, social, and emotional processes. Even in adulthood, we are 
vulnerable to the effects of isolation and deprivation. I will, first, discuss the 
relevance of sensory stimulation for choice; second, present a success story—that is, a 
case in which the stimulation provided is adequate to contribute to an enabled 
capacity—regarding choice; and third, describe the affect of deprivation, enrichment, 
and some scenarios in between the two.  
 However, before proceeding, an explanation regarding the method I will use 
in some instances to relate the impact of sensory stimulation to the capacity for choice 
is in order. There are various studies that demonstrate the effect of what I call the 
preconditions of choice on humans; however, none of them (at least to my 
knowledge) considers the consequences of such things specifically on the capacity for 
choice. Instead, they speak in terms of emotional, social, and cognitive deficits (some 
of which can be tied directly to the components of choice), but, more often, 
researchers utilize testing, most notably measures of IQ, in order to gauge the impact 
of deprivation/enrichment. The problem for my project is that IQ testing does not 
necessarily measure a person’s capacity for choice. The two are not one and the same 
thing. Nevertheless, there is a way in which choice and IQ are positively correlated. 
Neuroscientists take it that “the amount of material that can be held in working 
memory is highly correlated with scores on intelligence tests” (Wexler 53; see also 
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Geary 277), as is the capacity to “consciously manipulate” this material (Geary 277). 
And both of these are prefrontal processes. Working memory and manipulation of 
information are key to four ((a), (c), (d), and (f)) of the six components of choice. 
Thus, since no scientist has, as yet, developed the notion of a choice quotient, in what 
follows, I will take IQ to be a partial and tentative measure of whether a person’s 
capacity for choice is being enabled.  
 Neuroscientist and psychiatrist, Bruce E. Wexler,13 explains that from birth to 
early adulthood, the brain is dependent on sensory stimulation in order to develop 
both its physical structure and functional organization (2). As stimulation occurs, the 
brain “recreates in itself a representation of environmental input” (40), which, 
cumulatively and over time (through processes that will be discussed in conjunction 
with the success story), forms a person’s inner structure or inner world (137 and 143) 
that largely conforms to the nature and complexity of the external stimulation (40). 
Without such input, synapses are excessively pruned (Gallagher 14; Peterson 
interviewed by D’Arcangelo 69) and neurons die (Wexler 5). Indeed, Wexler explains 
that entire “information-processing structures” (41; that are made up of neurons, 
multi-neuronal ensembles, as well as multi-ensemble systems (19)) atrophy in the 
absence of sensory stimulation (41). This, in turn, negatively influences the functional 
organization of the brain because the balance of neuronal activity shifts in response to 
                                                 
13 Wexler received his B.A. from Harvard in 1969 and his M.D. from Albert Einstein College of 
Medicine in 1973. He is currently Professor of Psychiatry at Yale Medical School and Director of the 
Neurocognitive Research Laboratory at the Connecticut Mental Health Center. 
 72
the deprivation (43). All of this then affects what neural processes—including 
whether those necessary for choice—are active and functional in a given person. 
 To a very large degree, we are the sum total of our interactions with the world. 
Wexler notes that humans often have an exaggerated sense of having unique qualities 
possessed by the self that unfolds through development. However, he explains that 
the relation between a person “and the environment is so extensive that it almost 
overstates the distinction between the two to speak of a relationship at all” (39). Our 
emotional, social, and cognitive thought processes are thoroughly dependent upon 
environmental input (39). And if it does not appear this way to us, on Wexler’s view, 
it is because we cannot detect, track, and sum all the subtle and countless 
“environmental influences on our development and thought, any more than we can 
count and track the different molecules in the air we breathe” (40). Even the stomach 
is more autonomous with regard to the environment than is the brain (40).  
 During the first months and years of development, the brain is highly plastic 
and it conforms to and internally recreates the situation in which it finds itself. The 
question for my purpose is, then, whether that situation includes factors that foster a 
capacity for choice. Wexler points to three broad avenues14 through which a person 
develops an inner world that recreates that to which she is exposed during 
development. He focuses mainly on what I would call a success story with regard to 
choice. He describes, for instance, how a caregiver may be instrumental in helping an 
                                                 
14 Wexler describes two additional types of stimulation: turn-taking and internalization. As all five 
types overlap, for my purposes, I take it to be sufficient that the most important aspects of these two 
types are briefly discussed within the other three categories. 
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infant/child acquire and build well-functioning prefrontal lobes, the part of the brain 
most implicated in choice. The three broad types of stimulation are: (x) instrumental 
caregiving,15 (y) imitation, and (z) play (Wexler 98). Instrumental caregiving includes 
at least three sub-categories as well: (x1) adjusting and training infant physiology, 
(x2) creating the environment in which development takes place, and (x3) providing 
cognitive and motor functions that the infant/child has not yet developed (98-99).16
 The instrumental caregiver helps to (x1) adjust and train the infant’s 
physiology by repetitively talking to, positioning, holding, and touching the infant 
(Wexler 99). For instance, by consistently holding her the same way before bed or 
providing gentle rocking motions when she is distressed, the adult trains the child to 
react in certain ways to mundane activities or to distressing events (99). The latter 
issue is especially important, because as the infant becomes familiar with the rocking, 
the simple movement will induce “neural activity in the infant that leads to 
reestablishment of equilibrium” (99). Through these types of interactions, self-
regulation and emotional stability begin to develop in the child (99). The child learns 
a skill; that is, to begin to control her thoughts, emotions, and actions. This skill is 
significant with regard to choice, because the capacity to self-regulate is an important 
precursor to the capacity to override internal and external stimuli (necessary for 
                                                 
15 Wexler’s term for this is “instrumental parenting” (98). I use the term instrumental caregiving, 
instead, in recognition that different caregiving situations arise in different contexts and cultures. A 
caregiver may be, for instance, a daycare worker, a grandparent, an extended family member, or 
tribesperson, or many from these same (or similar) categories. 
16 I have combined three of Wexler’s subcategories—“Creating New Objects in the Rearing 
Environment” (100), “Directing and Shaping Attention” (101), and “Language and Other Symbolic 
Media” (104)—into one subcategory, (x2) creating the environment in which development takes place.  
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components (a), (c), (d), and (f)) and emotional stability is necessary if one will have 
an effective emotional response (component (e)). In enabling the child to calm herself 
under stress, the caregiver helps to shape her cognitive and emotional processes.  
 It is also important to note that the caregiver does not determine in isolation 
what types of activities will be conducive to restoring the infant/child’s emotional 
equilibrium. She utilizes her own experiences (presumably, especially the patterns 
that were developed in her through her interactions with her own caregiver as a child) 
whether or not these were conducive to enabling a capacity for choice for her. 
Moreover, as Wexler points out, she likely has recourse to discussions with “other 
adults caring for the infant,” with adults caring for other infants, and “with 
individuals designated as experts by the larger social group” (100). One might say 
that she doesn’t go it alone; there are always others, either in her past or present, who 
influence the way that she trains the infant’s physiology—and, hence, the way that 
she trains the infant’s capacity for self-regulation and emotional stability as well.   
 Humans are the only species that significantly (x2) create the environment in 
which their young grow, develop, and learn. For my purposes, there are three 
different aspects of this issue that are important for choice. The instrumental 
caregiver provides human-made objects, directs the child’s attention, and brings the 
child into the human community of language users; and there is increasing evidence 
that these activities, by exposing the child to the human-created world, affect the 
structure and functionality of the brain. With regard to the first activity, fMRI testing 
has shown that “repetitive use of human-made objects . . . is associated with actual 
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changes in brain structure” (Wexler 101). That is, the toys, musical instruments, 
television shows, computers, household objects, etc. to which a child is exposed 
affect and alter the child’s psychobiological development (100-101). Moreover, there 
is evidence that exposure to and competence with written language and other complex 
human-made artifacts “appears to increase brain functional capability as measured by 
intelligence tests” (101). For example, there was a “substantial difference (6 points) in 
IQ between rural and urban populations in the United States . . . during the 1930s and 
1940s” (73), with the latter consistently out scoring the former; however, this 
difference all but disappeared as rural communities became less isolated through 
mass communication, improved their schools, and utilized technological advances in 
farming (73). Moreover, when Virginia closed its public schools in an attempt to 
avoid school desegregation, “the IQ scores of the children dropped by approximately 
6 points per missed year of school compared with children of similar backgrounds 
who were in school” (73). Presumably, it was, at least partly, the greater exposure to 
complex human-made objects and concepts that made the difference.  
 Although one has reason to be skeptical of the notion that one such factor 
explains these differences in IQ (several factors, as I will explain, are candidates and 
they may perhaps coalesce), additional evidence points in the same direction. The 
average IQ in the U.S. is rising at “about 3 IQ points per decade” (Neisser et al 89), 
with each generation out performing the one before. A similar phenomenon is 
apparent in all other countries for which adequate longitudinal data is available 
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(including “England, Scotland, France, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Germany, Japan, and Israel” (Wexler 71-72)).  
 A panel of intelligence researchers (a task force created by the Board of 
Scientific Affairs of the American Psychological Association (Neisser et al 77)) 
entertained 4 possible reasons for the phenomenon: (1) “increases in test 
sophistication”, (2) “modern improvements in nutrition”, (3) “the very definition of 
intelligence”, and (4) the complex and “striking cultural differences between 
successive generations” in an increasingly modernized world (Neisser et al 90). They 
argued that the “consistent IQ gains . . . seem too large to result from” (1) (90). They 
found (2) and (3) to be more probable. With regard to (2), they noted that “large 
nutritionally-based increases in height have occurred during the same period as the IQ 
gains”; there may have been “increases in brain size as well” (Ibid., 90). With regard 
to (3), James Flynn (who first documented the rising IQ phenomenon (Neisser et al 
89)) argued that if the gains in IQ were actual, the countries listed above ought to be 
experiencing “‘a cultural renaissance too great to be overlooked’” (Flynn cited in 
Neisser et al, 90). Since this does not appear to be the case, Flynn proposed that 
“what has risen cannot be intelligence itself but only a minor sort of ‘abstract problem 
solving ability’” (90). The panel found (4) to be the most plausible explanation. They 
argued: 
Daily life and occupational experience both seem more “complex” . . . 
today than in the time of our parents and grandparents. The population 
is increasingly urbanized; television exposes us to more information 
and more perspectives on more topics than ever before; children stay 
in school longer; and almost everyone seems to be encountering new 
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forms of experience. These changes in the complexity of life may have 
produced corresponding changes in complexity of mind, and hence in 
certain psychometric abilities (90).  
 
 Now, if either (2), (3), (4), or a confluence of these factors is responsible for 
this IQ gain, it is relevant to this discussion of the preconditions of choice. Nutrition, I 
have argued, is vital, as are abstract problem solving abilities. However, it is quite 
likely that a significant portion of the gain is attributable to the impact that the ever 
increasing complexity of daily life has on the human brain. Thus, it seems to be that 
when the instrumental caregiver makes available human-made objects, including 
complex artifacts like written language, in the child’s environment, the child’s neural 
processes are both structurally and functionally enhanced. Then, in so far as IQ scores 
are correlated with a capacity for choice, this latter capacity is enhanced as well.  
 The instrumental caregiver intervenes in the child’s activities such that the 
intervention ultimately grows the attentional capacity of the child. First, by 
interacting with the adult, the infant learns to follow the adult’s gaze, eye movements, 
and pointing gestures (Wexler 101), and these attentional mechanisms then permit the 
child selective attention over objects whether near or at some distance. Through such 
seemingly mundane interactions, the caregiver influences what, with regard to 
incessant sensory stimuli, “infants are most aware of, become most familiar with, and 
think most about” (102). That is, the instrumental caregiver in part determines what 
types of neuronal activity the infant/child will have. But, since such activity both 
makes and maintains neural connectivity (recall that in the absence of it connections, 
neurons, and systems atrophy), the caregiver is actually shaping the circuitry of the 
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infant/child’s brain. Some possible connections weaken or decline; other possible 
connections, those that are important to the caregiver(s) amplify (103). According to 
Wexler, the infant’s neural wiring is then  
shaped by what adults [around her] are interested in and direct the 
infant’s attention toward, features which themselves are the product of 
the [adults’] own childhood experiences and the continuing effects of 
their adult social community (103). 
 
Because selective attention is necessary for components (a) and (c) while amplified 
attention is critical for components (d) and (f), in training the child’s attention 
capacity, the caregiver contributes to enabling the child’s capacity for choice. Again, 
if the main caregiver(s) is deficient—due to her own upbringing—in these neural 
processes, the child in her care will likely remain deficient as well unless someone 
else (who has a capacity for choice) interferes. 
 When the instrumental caregiver brings the child into the community of 
language users, she both further develops the child’s attentional capacities and 
provides “a vocabulary and structure for thought” (Wexler 104-05). As noted earlier, 
exposure to written language appears to increase cognitive capacity (as measured by 
IQ tests), and this is done through its impact on the structure and functionality of the 
prefrontal cortex (105). Both spoken and written language, as social modes of 
interaction, are important, first, because competence with them allows the child to 
participate with the caregiver in making finer distinctions than can be made with 
gestures (104), and the ability to make distinctions is crucial for determining what 
possibilities one will consider and for comparing them (components (a) and (c)). 
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Second, through language use, the child learns to contemplate a past event or absent 
object (Ibid., 104), which is a key for components (a) and (d); and, third, it allows 
persons who have never been present (and perhaps never will be) in the child’s 
immediate physical environment to exert influence on the child’s attentional 
development (104). I will return to this third point after discussing (y) and (z).  
 The last point regarding instrumental caregiving regards (x3) providing 
cognitive and motor functions that the infant/child has not yet developed. Much like 
what was discussed for (x1) and (x2), this provision helps determine what functions 
the child develops, especially with regard to the prefrontal processes. The 
instrumental caregiver and child participate in a variety of shared activities, geared to 
the child’s level of accomplishment (increasing in difficulty as the child progresses), 
in which the caregiver provides “frontal lobe functions for the child” (Wexler 109). 
These functions include “setting goals, selecting strategy, collecting necessary tools . 
. ., focusing and sustaining attentions, and executing fine motor” skills (107). Of 
course, goal setting, strategizing, and sustaining attention are all included in the 
components of choice ((a), (c), (d), and (f)). The caregiver may, for instance, utilize a 
toy in which different shapes are to be inserted into a box with holes of the same 
shape. The adult demonstrates the desired action, guides the child’s hand, encourages 
the child to perform steps of the activity by herself, and rewards the child for success 
(107-08). The same sort of steps might be taken in teaching a child to cook, weave, or 
utilize tools. The point is that the caregiver holds a plan (whether she is conscious of 
it or not) and integrates the child’s actions into it, even if the child has no notion of 
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the cognitive benefit. Through these types of activities, the caregiver’s frontal lobes 
become “functionally linked with the lower brain centers and sensory, motor, and 
association cortices of their . . . children” (109). And the child’s frontal lobe neural 
activity is developed and shaped in the process (109). 
 The second broad category of stimulation is (y) imitation. Imitative behavior 
is common in many species, but it is most common and most pronounced in people, 
perhaps due to the longer human maturation period (Wexler 113). Although the 
tendency to imitate is strongest prior to puberty (118), it remains an important source 
of behavior in adults—as pervasive fads, shifts in styles, and the “technique and 
impact of advertising” clearly demonstrate (116). With regard to development, 
Wexler explains that imitation is “a direct and concrete mechanism” through which 
the infant/child’s brain processes are shaped by the “particular mix of adult features, 
structures, and behaviors” that surround the child on a daily and ongoing basis (113). 
Imitation is an important factor in developing one’s inner world because it operates 
consistently throughout the period of development (and beyond) (115), it is crucial 
for language acquisition (117), and, most importantly for my purpose, it both utilizes 
and shapes the “frontal and parietal lobes” (114). The child imitates caregivers and 
siblings regarding the way these others feel, think, pay attention, and, in general, 
organize themselves and their activities in the world (121-122); thus, imitation 
significantly affects the neural processes and subsequent behavior of the child. The 
child’s imitation of others will then influence the kinds of things that she finds to be 
possibilities (components (a) and (b)) upon which to act. 
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 The last main avenue of stimulation is (z) play. For mammals in general, and 
humans in particular, play is an important part of cognitive development. For 
instance, when a rat pup is isolated and prevented from playing between the twentieth 
and forty-fifth days of life, the deprivation affects the pup’s cognitive capacities 
(Wexler 132). Play for merely an hour each day was found to protect against these 
cognitive losses (132). However, as Wexler points out, the affect of play on human 
cognition is likely to be much greater because people play for years not days and 
human play activities are much more widely varied. Moreover, human play behaviors 
are “primarily cognitive and essentially social” (133). As noted earlier, humans create 
much of the environment in which children develop, and this in turn affects children’s 
cognitive capacities. This, of course, holds true for the objects (i.e., toys), games, and 
situations of play as well. The imaginative component of play also serves the purpose 
of allowing the child to see past her concrete environment (component (a)) and to 
learn to participate in cultural processes and rules (Ibid., 135), which is relevant for 
component (b). 
 In explaining the impact of (x) instrumental caregiving, (y) imitation, and (z) 
play, Wexler has offered something of a success story for choice, at least in so far as 
sensory stimulation and nurture are concerned. Each of these broad avenues of 
stimulation affect the prefrontal cortex; and it is this area and its processes that both 
“regulate the activity of the brain itself” (Wexler 105) and, if the capacity is enabled, 
allow one to override the bottom-up functions in order to make a choice. As 
explained in section 2.2, the prefrontal cortex is something of a supervisor or 
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executive of the brain. The stimulation that is available in one’s environment 
structures this area (and many other areas) such that it “recreates in itself a 
representation of [that] environmental input” (40). Through (x), (y), and (z), the child 
develops an inner structure or inner world that largely conforms to the nature and 
complexity of the external stimulation to which the child is exposed (40). If the 
environment is sufficiently rich and complex; the neural structures and processes of 
choice will then be established. If the environment fails to provide, (as I will explain 
further below) entire “information-processing structures” atrophy (41).  
 Before turning to a not-so-successful story for choice, it is important to note 
the degree to which a person is dependent upon and vulnerable to sensory stimulation. 
The vulnerability is both physical and conceptual; one will not be entertaining many 
concepts unless the physical structure of the brain is intact and functional. And, of 
course, each child is thoroughly dependent upon her caregiver(s) for the initial 
stimulation and then upon many others throughout her childhood. But upon whom 
does the caregiver depend? As noted with regard to (x1), the caregiver does not go it 
alone; there are always others, either in her past or present, who influence the care 
that she gives the child. She certainly has the influence of her own past upon which 
she most certainly would act (perhaps with no intention of doing so at all). The 
caregiver’s own inner world and prefrontal functions were developed by someone 
else; and, since these prefrontal functions are the supervisory controls operating in her 
brain, she will use them to influence the child. If her early environment was enriched, 
she will have more to offer the child in her care. But is this the entire story? Is it just 
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that prefrontal functions are passed from caregiver to child in an endless chain? 
Consider the complexity, novelty, and technological advances that every culture 
experiences to at least some degree in the modern age. This type of complexity 
cannot be explained if we maintain that prefrontal functions are passed in this linear 
way. Other influences and interaction must be present. As Wexler points out, the 
caregiver has many influences upon her; she was, in her early years, molded by 
parents, caregivers, teachers, siblings, and friends; she has others who help care for 
the child or others who offer her advice on child rearing (Wexler 100). She is also 
influenced by her adult friendships and affiliations; she may read, watch television, 
listen to the radio, attend religious services, and so forth. All of these may impact her 
in such a way that she may bring them (consciously or not) to the activities by which 
she structures the prefrontal cortex of the child. Remember as well that the caregiver 
is not the only early influence. Before reaching maturity, the child herself will have 
contact with teachers, siblings, peers, and many others. Moreover, consider the 
content of (x2) and (x3). It is partly the use of human-made objects and artifacts (such 
as toys, musical instruments, and language (spoken and written)) that help to facilitate 
the process, and many people, both known and unknown to the child, have taken part 
in the creation of these objects. Through the daily activities of life, especially if the 
environment is rich with variety, the child is influenced (via her interaction with these 
objects and artifacts) by these others and the ideas that they helped make embodied in 
the objects. Countless others, in both direct and indirect ways, have an effect upon the 
child’s prefrontal development.  
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 In the success story, the instrumental caregiver facilitates, along with the 
child’s imitation and play activities, the development of the child’s prefrontal lobe 
which enables all sorts of mental abilities, including the neural processes involved in 
choice. However, it is not difficult to imagine different scenarios or even point to 
some existent contexts that would be less than conducive. Not every caregiver has the 
resources, knowledge, desire, and neural processes to facilitate development in this 
way. Clearly, if no one intervenes—that is, if no one cares for the child at all—she 
will die. But there are different qualities of intervention (using whether or not choice 
is enabled as a measure of quality). As such, I turn now to a discussion of the affect of 
sensory deprivation, enrichment, and some of the many possible scenarios in 
between.  
 In response to obvious ethical concerns, controlled experiments regarding the 
effect of sensory deprivation on human development cannot be carried out (scientists 
have studied the “natural” experiments of society, and these will be addressed 
momentarily); but experiments on non-human animals are instructive, in general, with 
regard to the effect of deprivation and enrichment. Animal models demonstrate that 
deprivation, with regard to a certain mode of sense, decreases an animal’s sensitivity 
to that type of perceptual object. Presumably, the neural circuitry that facilitates that 
type of perception atrophied. However, when scientists study the effect (on monkeys 
and cats) of a generally impoverished environment, in which input for all sense 
organs is significantly lessened though none is entirely deprived, they find the 
animals to “have smaller brains, with the greatest reduction in the cerebral cortex” 
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(Wexler 51). That the greatest reduction is seen in the cerebral cortex is important 
because the cerebral cortex includes many of the areas involved in the “higher” 
functions for cats, monkeys, and humans (including the prefrontal cortex). Studies 
have also shown that monkeys raised in merely “less enriched environments” (in 
contrast to more complete deprivation) perform poorly on tests “requiring planning, 
strategy, and the mental manipulation of information” (52). All of these employ the 
functions of the frontal lobe, and, in humans, they are important for components (a), 
(c), (d), and (f) of choice. However, monkeys raised in enriched environments “have 
increased connectivity among neurons” and perform quite well on the same tests (52). 
Notably, humans with frontal lobe impairment tend to perform poorly on similar tasks 
depending on the location/type of the impairment (53). Wexler explains that, for 
mammals, the 
survival of individual cells, the number of dendritic branches and 
synaptic connections among cells, the structural organization of cells 
groups, the functional response characteristics of individual cells, and 
the competence of neural functional systems all depend profoundly on 
the extent and nature of environmentally induced activation (58). 
 
As such, it is not simply that the brain (or its cells) contains some predetermined 
instructions regarding organization that becomes actualized through stimulation; 
rather, environmental stimulation actually shapes the brain both structurally and 
functionally (58)! 
 According to Wexler, there are at least three good reasons to believe that the 
animal models hold for humans as well. First, the length of time that it takes for 
humans to reach “sensory, motor, and cognitive maturity” is much longer than it is for 
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other mammals (Wexler 59); for humans, there is a longer period in which affectation 
may occur. Second, the animal models show the greatest positive or negative impact 
is sustained in the cerebral cortex and this is the region in which humans show the 
most brain growth when compared with other primates (59). Third, although 
scientists cannot do direct controlled studies on the effects of enriched and deprived 
environments on humans, they can and have done descriptive studies of “natural” 
societal experiments, and the results of these, as I will explain, consistently accord 
with the findings of the animal studies (60).  
 The first case I will consider involves profound global deprivation. During the 
1970s and ‘80s, some 100,000 children were “warehoused under extreme situations 
of neglect” in Romanian orphanages (Wilson 473). In a political decision to foster 
population growth, birth control and abortion had been banned. Many poor parents 
were unable to care for all of their children and relinquished some to institutions 
(usually within the first month of life). Conditions varied at different sites, but, in 
general, deprivation prevailed; there was a “lack of adequate nutrition, minimal 
interpersonal contact, and little to no sensory stimulation” (474). Caregiver to infant 
ratios were around 1 to 10, and hence the infants spent some 20 hours per day 
unattended in their cribs; for children past three, the ratio was about 1 to 20 (Chugani 
et al 1290). When the news broke, some families in the West adopted children out of 
the institutions. Upon adoption, researchers found that most of the children had 
significant cognitive and motor delays. Testing showed that most “were functioning 
at levels half their chronological age” (Wilson 475). Scientists began longitudinal 
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studies of the adoptees, and testing showed that, after care in the adoptive home, 
many of the children experienced improvements cognitively and psychologically (this 
testing was done at ages four and six (Beckett et al 697)). One drawback of this study, 
for my purpose, is that since the deprivation experienced was global, one cannot be 
sure how much of the children’s cognitive, social, and emotional deficits may be due 
to sensory deprivation (including a lack of nurture) and how much may be attributed 
to, say, malnutrition and lack of healthcare. Surely the children’s difficulties stem 
from all such factors. However, as researchers found that the effect of malnutrition 
“tended to be less, rather than greater, in those who experienced the most prolonged 
institutional deprivation” (Beckett et al 707), the influence of sensory deprivation was 
significant.  
 At this point in the study, researchers believed that the length of deprivation 
and extent of recovery were inversely related; the longer the persistence of 
deprivation, it was presumed, the less likely the child would be able to reach expected 
cognitive ability (Wilson 477; see also Beckett et al 697-98). However, when the 
children were tested again at age eleven, the outcomes were somewhat different than 
expected. Findings indicated that group 1, the children who were adopted from the 
institutions prior to six months of age, were the least effected (Beckett et al 705). 
They had scores on IQ testing that were “on average some 15 points” higher than 
those who were adopted later; moreover, their scores were comparable to those 
included in the control group (Beckett et al 705). The control group was made up of 
children from the same age group, who had experienced no neglect, and who were 
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adopted before six months of age from institutions or foster care within Britain during 
the same time period (699). That group 1 emerged relatively unscathed is something 
of a puzzle to researchers, but one proposed reason seems most likely. Although 
many areas of a new born infant’s brain are active from birth or within 2 to 3 months 
(determined via PET scan that displays glucose metabolism in various parts of the 
brain), the “frontal cortex is the last brain area to display an increase in glucose 
consumption” (Chugani 184). The different areas in the frontal cortex increase 
functional activity at various times between 6 and 12 months; the relative lack of 
harm, then, may be due to the fact that the cognitive and supervisory areas of the 
brain were not yet in a state of active development.  
 Unfortunately, children in the other experimental groupings (group 2 consists 
of those adopted between 6 months and 2 years and group 3 includes those adopted 
between 2 and 3 ½ years) experienced significant impact from the deprivation. The 
original improvement demonstrated by the latter two groups, during the earlier testing 
sessions, stagnated after age 6. Only those children who experienced the greatest 
cognitive impairment at age 6 made any notable gains by age 11 (Beckett et al 706). 
The average IQ score at age 6 was 86 for group 2 and 77 for group 3, while at age 11 
it was 86 and 83, respectively (702). And this was in spite of the fact that all attended 
school between ages 6 and 11 and all were adopted by fairly affluent people in Britain 
most of whom were dedicated “in their commitment to effective child rearing” (708). 
For the sake of comparison, it is instructive to note that the average score at age 6 was 
102 for group 1 and 105 for the control group, while at age 11 it was 101 and 105, 
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respectively (702; 100 is the mean IQ score and scores of less than 86 are considered 
borderline (Duyme et al 8790)). Thus, in so far as IQ score is positively correlated 
with a capacity for choice, one may conclude that persons who experience global 
deprivation between 6 months and 3 ½ years are significantly at risk with regard to 
developing a capacity for choice. 
 Two additional studies of Romanian orphans, who were adopted into families 
in the US, augment the study described above and strengthen the connection between 
deprivation and a risk for choice. In the first, the adoptees (at nearly nine years of 
age) appeared to be functioning at roughly the same level as the children who were 
adopted into British families. They exhibited the same types of cognitive and 
behavioral deficits and their test scores were similar (Chugani et al 1297). Behavioral 
and cognitive testing showed deficits in attention, “verbal and visual memory”, 
cognitive efficiency, and impulse control (1294). This study however focused not on 
cognitive testing but on the results of PET scanning which yields images of the 
brain’s functional processes. The researchers were concerned with glucose 
metabolism as an indication of degree of functionality. The results “showed 
significant regional decreases of . . . glucose metabolism bilaterally in prefrontal 
cortex, the medial temporal structures (including amygdala and hippocampus), the 
lateral temporal cortex, and the brain stem in orphans compared to the control group” 
(1295). That dysfunction occurred in the prefrontal cortex and hippocampus 
(involved in components (a), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of choice) and the amygdala 
(component (e)) further supports the notion that severely deprived persons are at risk 
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for choice. The second study indicates a possible reason for the adoptees continued 
difficulties with social attachments. Even after approximately three years in the 
adoptive homes, many children exhibited difficulties in “establishing social bonds 
and regulating social behavior” (Fries et al 17237); symptoms included insecure 
attachment with the adoptive parents, difficulty establishing friendships, 
indiscriminate friendliness, and willingness to wander off with strangers (17237). 
Recall from Wexler’s success story that emotional stability and the ability to self-
regulate (factors that are important for components (a), (c), (d), (e), and (f)) are 
dependent upon and established through a person’s initial bond with a responsive 
caregiver. Obviously, responsive caregiving is something that these adoptees lacked 
in their early years. Researchers found the Romanian adoptees to be deficient in two 
neuropeptides (vasopressin and oxytocin) that are “critical in the establishment of 
social bonds and regulation of emotional behaviors” (17237). Researchers postulated 
that the deficiency in the neuropeptides both resulted from neglect in the institution 
and partially explains the persistent social and emotional difficulties of the children 
(17237). Moreover, the children in these three studies are lucky in the sense that they 
were removed from the neglectful environment at a relatively young age; but they are 
few in number when compared to the some 100,000 who grew up in the institutions. I 
could find no systematic study of those who were not adopted. Anecdotal evidence 
indicates that some have received help from charitable organizations; others 
apparently live on the streets. 
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 The Romanian orphans offer a glimpse into the effect of deprivation on young 
children, but, as Wexler points out, even adults react negatively to sensory 
deprivation. Wexler considers multiple studies in which adults volunteered to 
undergo various levels of sensory deprivation for stipulated durations. After only one 
hour, most subjects began to complain that the experience was unpleasant (Wexler 
76); after 72 hours, participants reported seeing lights and shapes, as well as “objects, 
people, or animals” (80). Moreover, following the deprivation, researchers found the 
subjects “performance on more complex vigilance and cognitive tasks” to be 
impaired (80). Thus, while the developing brain requires stimulation for growth, 
integrity, and functional operation, the adult brain needs input in order to function 
properly (5). 
 I turn now to a study regarding sensory enrichment. This longitudinal study 
undertaken in the early 1970s, was intended to test whether “systematic, high-quality 
early education” could either prevent or reduce the “cumulative developmental toll 
experienced by socially defined high-risk children” (Ramey and Ramey 478). 
According to Craig T. Ramey and Sharon L. Ramey, children, who are at risk for 
developmental delays that are associated with high-risk socio-economic backgrounds, 
tend both to enter primary school less prepared and to experience more difficulties 
with school performance. Children who do not have a home environment that fosters 
learning experiences in the children’s early years “are likely to start kindergarten 
approximately 2 (or more) years behind their agemates” who come from more 
advantaged environments (475). Ramey and Ramey explain that developmentally 
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delayed children do benefit from attending first-rate kindergartens; however, they are 
“unlikely to be able to advance a full 33 developmental months in only 9 calendar 
months—that is, an amount sufficient to close the achievement gap” (476). In fact, 
since these disadvantaged children spend evenings, weekends, and summers in high-
risk environments, by the end of second grade, they are more likely to be 3.5 
developmental years behind their more advantaged classmates (476-477). The 
original developmental delay becomes amplified rather than diminished! These 
students then are “those most likely to become inattentive, disruptive, or withdrawn” 
(473); later, they are more likely “to engage in irresponsible, dangerous, and illegal 
behaviors” and are less likely to finish high school (473). Moreover, the phenomenon 
is not isolated. Ramey and Ramey are concerned because children “with major delays 
in language and basic academic skills . . . attend schools in every state; they are not 
concentrated in only a few large urban school districts or in desperately poor rural 
districts” (472). 
 The study involved “111 children in North Carolina”, all of whom were from 
low socio-economic backgrounds (Ramey and Ramey 478). All families had low 
income (“below 50% of the federal poverty line”); the mothers had low levels of 
educational and intellectual attainment (“about 10 years of education[,] . . . with an 
average IQ near 80”); and about 75% of the parents were unemployed and single 
(478). In order to isolate the effects of enrichment program, children in both the 
control and the experimental groups received adequate nutrition and “free or reduced-
cost medical care throughout the first five years of life” (478). Families received 
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social services such as referrals for housing assistance, job training, and mental health 
problems. (478). Children in the experimental group were enrolled in the (“full-day . . 
. , five days per week, . . . 50 weeks per year”) enrichment program by age 6 months, 
which they attended until kindergarten (478). The program sought to emphasize (1) 
encouraging the growth of the children’s exploratory behaviors, (2) mentoring their 
basic intellectual skills, (3) celebrating their developmental advances, (4) rehearsing 
and extending their new skills, (5) protecting them from “inappropriate disapproval, 
teasing, and punishment”, (6) communicating with them responsively and richly, as 
well as (7) guiding and limiting their behavior (473). Now, when these goals are 
compared with activities described in Wexler’s success story, many similarities are 
apparent. The teachers in the program sought to create a learning environment in such 
a way that the children would develop the emotional stability, the self-regulatory 
processes, and the cognitive and motor functions that are necessary for components 
(a), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of choice. Much like Wexler’s instrumental caregiver, the 
teachers’ activities were aimed to have an impact upon many of the cognitive, social 
and emotional processes that are involved in choice.  
 The results of the experiment clearly indicate the importance of sensory 
enrichment and nurture on intellectual attainment and the capacity for choice. At the 
beginning of the program, all children (including those in the control group) 
performed similarly and within normal range on cognitive testing (Ramey and Ramey 
480). However, from that point forward, “there was a precipitous decline in the 
control-group” performance, such that by 18 months of age, the children in this group 
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“were performing at the low end of the normal range” (480). At four years of age, 
only 45% of children in the control group had IQ test scores in the normal range, 
whereas “over 95% of the children in the treatment group [were] in the normal range 
of cognitive abilities at all tested ages” (481). Throughout the preschool period, “the 
treatment group averaged approximately 14 IQ points higher than the control group” 
(480). Researchers followed the children throughout the years in public schooling and 
into early adulthood. The experimental group continued to significantly out score the 
control group in math and reading; by the time the children were 15, only 12% of the 
experimental group, as opposed to nearly half of the control group (48%), were 
enrolled in special education classes (486). In early adulthood (age 21), 70% of the 
experimental group, in contrast to 40% of the control group, held skilled jobs or were 
enrolled in college (486). The implications for the development of the capacity for 
choice in this study are clear. Previous studies in the U.S. have demonstrated that 
maternal education and intellectual attainment level is strongly correlated with a 
child’s cognitive ability level (482). That is, children of mothers with less than a high 
school degree perform least well on cognitive testing (and have an “average IQ [of] 
around 85—the same average that appears in almost all inner-city schools throughout 
the United States”), while children of mothers who have completed high school, some 
college, and finally four years of college perform incrementally higher (482). Given 
that the average IQ score of the mothers in this study was around 80 and that most of 
them had not finished high school, the tentative positive correlation between IQ 
scores and a capacity for choice implies that these children were all greatly at risk 
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with regard to choice. The outcomes for the control group—the lower IQ, reading, 
and math scores—bore this out. The intellectual attainment of the experimental 
group, on the other hand, was greatly enhanced; and, given the fact that the study was 
controlled, one can be quite sure that it was the enriched environment and the 
intensive attention that made the difference for the young people in the experimental 
group. 
 Two additional adoption studies, when considered in conjunction with the 
enrichment study above, shed further light on the issue of environmental enrichment. 
Both of these studies deal with the association of socio-economic status (SES) with 
the IQ scores of adoptees; and since SES may negatively influence many factors—
such as the quality (or in some cases, quantity) of nutrition, healthcare, schooling, 
environment, and disposable income—these two adoption studies do not isolate the 
effect of environmental enrichment. However, this is not a great concern for my 
purpose for two reasons: first, because the effect of an enriched environment is 
certainly part of what is meant by improved or higher SES, and, second, because the 
other factors mentioned above are directly related to the other preconditions of 
choice. If IQ is positively correlated with capacity for choice and any of these factors 
impact what these two have in common (that is, working- and long-term memory and 
conscious manipulation of information), then these factors are relevant to choice.  
 The first study was concerned with the testing outcomes for children in four 
different scenarios: (1) those born into a low SES and adopted into a high SES, (2) 
those born into a low SES and adopted into a low SES, (3) those born into a high SES 
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and adopted into a high SES, (4) and those born into a high SES and adopted into a 
low SES. The children were tested at about 14 years of age (Capron and Duyme 553). 
The study demonstrated that the quality of the environment (defined by the parents’ 
SES) made a significant difference in the IQ scores of the children (553). Those in 
group (3) scored highest (average score: 119.6; range: 99-136), then group (4) 
(average: 107.5; range: 91-124), group (1) (average: 103.6; range: 91-125), and, 
lastly, group (2) (average 92.4; range: 68-116) (Capron and Duyme 553). If one 
considers the range of IQ scores for group (2), it becomes apparent that being born 
into and raised within a low SES can in itself put one at risk for choice. Given that 
those in group (1) scored, on average, some 11 points higher than those in group (2) 
(children who began life in a similar situation), it demonstrates that the factors 
included in the notion of SES have a substantial influence on choice. Moreover, 
consider the drop in IQ that is associated with beginning life in a high SES and being 
adopted into a low one. While either pre-natal or genetic factors do appear to make a 
difference, the study demonstrates that “improvement in performance is clearly 
caused by change—low SES versus high SES—in the postnatal environment” (553).  
 The last study I will discuss regarding enrichment also concerns the effect of 
the adoptive parents’ SES on the adoptees. The children in this study experienced 
abuse or neglect by their biological and/or foster parents during their early years and 
had been placed in multiple foster families and/or institutions before being adopted 
between ages 4 and 6 (Duyme et al 8791). Most of the biological mothers had 
experienced social disadvantages, such as single parenthood, joblessness, and 
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homelessness (8791). Prior to adoption, authorities tested the IQs of the children and 
they scored within the range of greater than 60 and less than 86 (8791). The adoptive 
parents were unaware of the children’s IQs prior to adoption (8791). For the study, 
the adoptive parents were divided into three socio-economic groups (low, medium, 
and high SES) according to the adoptive father’s occupation (8791). Results of IQ 
testing on the adopted children at age 14 showed that the average IQ gain for all of 
the children included in the study was 13.9 points; however, the SES of the parents 
was shown to make an important difference (8791). The children who were adopted 
into a low SES gained on average 7.7 points, while those adopted into middle and 
upper SES gained 15.8 and 19.5 points, respectively (8791). Since the average score 
prior to adoption was 77.6, the children who were adopted into a low SES would still 
score in the borderline range. Those who were placed into high SES situations scored 
roughly average. If one considers then the positive correlation between IQ and choice, 
while all of the children were originally at risk with regard to developing a capacity 
for choice, those who were adopted into a low SES (presumably, a less enriched 
environment when compared with the types of things that would more than likely be 
available to those in a high SES) continued to be at risk. Those fortunate enough to 
enter the more enriched (high SES) environment fared much better with regard to IQ 
and thus likely fared better with regard to a capacity for choice as well.  
 All of these studies—regarding deprivation, enrichment, and scenarios in 
between—demonstrate that sensory stimulation and nurture are preconditions of 
choice. Deprived circumstances, as I have discussed, fail to foster choice; over 
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pruning, smaller brain size, and/or impairment with regard to cognitive, emotional, or 
social functions significantly reduce the likelihood that a person will develop the 
requisite neural processes. Enriched environments, on the other hand, develop and 
enhance these same processes. Because controlled studies on humans are impossible, 
scientists cannot claim to know the precise impact of one type or degree of 
deprivation when compared with another. It is reasonable to suppose that effects 
show up on a continuum in which some contexts promote the neural processes of 
choice, while those at the other end do not. Numerous other possibilities exist in 
between. Presumably there is a threshold above which at least a minimal capacity for 
choice is enabled. Given the state of the research, this threshold will not be 
established with precision herein. With regard to IQ scores and their positive 
correlation with choice, the threshold would likely be above scores that are included 
in the borderline range. Adequate environments would then foster IQ scores that are 
above this cutoff. 
2.6: Precondition—Education 
We are free only if we know, and so in proportion to our knowledge. 
There is no freedom without choice, and there is no choice without 
knowledge,—or none that is not illusory. Implicit, therefore, in the 
very notion of liberty is the liberty of the mind to absorb and to beget 
(Justice Benjamin Cardozo cited in Kumar 239).  
 
 Wexler argues that education is “most appropriately seen as a human 
extension of play” (134); and, although if one took a poll of middle-school students in 
the U.S. they would likely beg to differ with Wexler’s position, education is most 
certainly an extension of the process of sensory stimulation and nurture that begins, 
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for many, in infancy. Education is a precondition of choice because, if it is done well, 
it further develops the neural processes of choice and provides content for one’s 
deliberations. In this section, I will discuss, first, what type of education is sufficient 
to enable one’s capacity for choice, and, second, one factor that may often impede the 
process of education—that is, stress and its corresponding higher levels of cortisol. 
Other factors that may impede the process of education as well as the development 
and/or maintenance of the neural processes of choice—such as violence, 
malnourishment, lack of sleep, and lack of overall health, will be addressed in 
sections 2.7 through 2.10.  
 Recall the definition of choice. For component (a), a person must be able to 
entertain multiple, and often non-physically present, possibilities. For (c), (d), and (f), 
she must be able to perform complex mental manipulations. Now consider (b). Each 
person has a subjective relation to different possibilities in her environment. That is, 
in order to consider something as a possibility, she must have been exposed to it or to 
something similar enough to extrapolate from the non-identical case for the present 
application, she must know at least some aspects of it or know how to find out about 
its aspects, and she must have an understanding that this possibility applies to her. 
That is, she needs content which applies to her own case.  
 But there is also the issue of novelty. Recall, from section 2.2, that action may 
be facilitated by both “bottom-up” processes—neurological sources of activity that 
are either (1) “purely physiological” or (2) “physiological sources mediated by 
conditioned associations” (i.e., learning) (Deacon 434)—and “top-down” processes—
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that is, “end-directed behaviors” (435)—that are a confluence of the many cognitive, 
social, and emotional processes that make up a capacity for choice. Now, not many 
activities, and certainly none that enable a person to fulfill particular non-trivial 
interests (like getting that important job, writing a dissertation, or understanding a 
person from another culture), can be carried out on the basis of (1). (2) is a more 
interesting case; these sources of behavior enable one to deal with what one has 
specifically already learned—that is, (2) allows one to do precisely what one has been 
conditioned to do. As a source of behavior then, (2) is useful if one’s environment is 
perfectly stable, if it contains no change or novelty. It might be, in fact, all one would 
need if one lived in, say, a traditional society that had no contact with the outside 
world (although novelty, perhaps in the form of famine or floods, could still occur). 
But if history is an indication, as soon as contact with people from other societies 
occurs, change and, thus, novelty appear and must be dealt with if one will be able to 
fulfill particular non-trivial interests. Since there likely is no such untouched society 
and since, even if there were, the rest of us deal with novelty (changing 
environments) all the time, the processes that comprehend and manage novelty are 
quite important. The capacity for choice, as a top-down function, is, in large part, a 
personal capacity to recognize, react to, and deal with novelty either in a way that is 
largely in keeping with one’s prior background or in a way that makes some sort of a 
break with previous experience. It is always a confrontation with novelty that calls the 
explicit or top-down functions of choice into play. 
 101
 And it is on the basis of experience—and to a large extent on the basis of the 
content one learned through the process of education—that one comes to recognize 
novelty or not. If a person is uneducated, it is possible that (i) she will take everything 
to be novel or (ii) that she will miss novelty when confronted with it. (i) is most likely 
to occur with children. One might argue for instance that it is partly the constant 
confrontation with novelty that structures the child’s developing brain (an enriched 
environment offers exposure to a variety of new (novel) experiences) and prepares it 
for future novelty, while a deprived environment fails to do so. (ii) is more likely in 
adulthood (this point is defended further in section 2.11). After one’s initial 
developmental period (early years, grade school, and high school), one is much more 
likely to miss novelty when exposed, especially if one has received an inadequate 
education and is unaware of it. Recall the example given in Chapter 1. I once had a 
chance to engage with a seemingly bright, but under-educated, woman in a 
conversation about a then current political race. Some twelve years prior, she had 
graduated from an inner city high school and had more recently completed training in 
cosmetology. When I suggested to her that I had heard on the news that a certain 
candidate was “ahead in the polls”, the woman questioned me: “Oh, you mean he gets 
to vote first.” The woman did not recognize that I was using, what was to her, a novel 
meaning of the word poll, because she lacked information—that is, content—about 
campaign polling activities. She had an inadequate subjective relation to the 
information at hand; she had not had exposure, and neither was she able to 
extrapolate from a non-identical case. Since her exposure to relatively mundane 
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information about the political process in her own country was limited and since she 
was unable to extrapolate from context or other known information, it is reasonable to 
assume that her experience and education had left her at risk for choice. 
 Another scenario is possible with regard to a person’s subjective relation to 
possibilities and information around her. A person may be taught that certain 
possibilities, while existent and applicable to some others, do not apply to her. One 
might argue that this is the case with many people around the world. Many girls, for 
instance, are taught only enough to complete household tasks when the cultural 
intersubjective conceptual understanding holds that women ought to work primarily 
or exclusively in the home. Another example would be the case in which children are 
taught religious doctrine that do not respect person’s as being capable of choice. 
Religious doctrines may encourage women to believe that they ought to be 
subservient to men, that a woman’s word is worth half as much as a man’s, that a 
woman ought only to get half of what a man gets in inheritance, and that women 
ought to accept such decrees without question. These notions, if internalized, may 
restrict a woman’s choices in that such notions may create for her a subjective 
relation to some possibilities that, for practical purposes, puts them out of reach. She 
will likely not find possibilities that are contrary to these doctrines applicable to her 
case. 
 Therefore, if education will be adequate to help facilitate a capacity for 
choice, it will be broad-based. It will include exercises that further develop the neural 
processes involved in choice. In addition to the basics (like reading and math), it will 
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include, for instance, practice at problem solving and separating off irrelevant 
information. It will develop attention span, as well as memory, planning, and 
strategizing. However, if education will adequately enable a capacity for choice, it 
will also impart at least a basic understanding of the knowledge (content) that human 
beings have, over the centuries, cumulatively amassed. Each person does not have to 
learn all things in depth. For instance, the young woman in the example above does 
not have to know all the intricate details of every obscure mathematical theorem; but 
in order to understand what is novel, both with regard to her situation and the 
situation in the world, she must know that such theorems exist and how to find out 
more about them if she needs/wants to do so. She is certainly going to have to know 
about the meanings of different words in her own language. One does not have to 
know how to speak and read every language; but if a person lives in a traditional 
society, she will be at a huge disadvantage in recognizing novelty (and hence be at a 
disadvantage for enacting her capacity for choice), if she is not literate and fluent in 
the language of the people in the non-traditional society with whom her society has 
contact. These people impact her world. She must know a bit of what they are about, 
as well as how to read their writings and communicate with them. These issues are 
important because, according to the most recent UNESCO statistics, about “one in 
five adults” is illiterate, and two-thirds of these are women, “while 72 million 
children are out-of-school” (UNESCO). Moreover, an adequate education must 
include the notion that all persons are choosers (or at least potential choosers). It will 
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teach children to respect themselves and others in this regard, in spite of the fact that 
cultural practices or religious doctrines may contradict this message.  
 One last condition must also be met. Consider the information regarding the 
preconditions of choice that has been presented thus far. A child needs 
micronutrients, stimulation in an enriched environment, nurture, and an education if 
she will develop the capacity for choice. In every case, others provide these things for 
her. Recall also that parents from disadvantaged environments tend to reproduce these 
same environments for their children. If the capacity for choice will be promoted, 
educators must address how it is that choice is enabled for another person. For 
instance, that many women of child bearing age in the U.S. are unaware of their 
potential children’s folate requirements sets up a scenario in which choice is likely 
not to be fostered. Their educators have done them a disservice in not imparting this 
information. As I will establish in the following sections, a large portion of the 
world’s people live in conditions that are insufficient to provide the preconditions of 
choice for their children and for themselves (recall that adults require on going 
attainment of the preconditions). Education should at least provide for them the 
information regarding what they should shoot for should their conditions improve. 
 I turn now to a discussion of stress, one of the many factors that can get in the 
way of education, in particular, and choice, in general. Under stressful conditions, 
humans (and many other animals) produce a stress hormone called cortisol. Cortisol 
is useful in some situations and for short periods of time; it, for instance, is part of the 
body’s flight or fight reaction that is necessary for self preservation. A problem 
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occurs, however, when stress is intense or chronic. The studies discussed below help 
to illuminate this problem. 
 Two studies indicate that enduring intense or chronic stress may significantly 
affect memory function—thus, stress has a negative influence upon many of the 
components of choice. Research on animals has shown that the high levels of cortisol 
that accompanies intense stress results in the animals having fewer connections 
among neurons, “loss of neurons”, as well as decreased neuronal regeneration in a 
section of the hippocampus (Bremner 798). This is in keeping with human studies 
that have demonstrated that people suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) have deficits or alterations in both declarative memory (remembering facts, 
lists, and so on) and nondeclarative memory (“memory that cannot be willfully 
brought up into the conscious mind, including motor memory such as how to ride a 
bicycle”) (Bremner 798).  
 J. Douglas Bremner conducted the two studies mentioned above. The first 
involved Vietnam combat veterans with PTSD and the second concerned adults who 
had been physically or sexually abused during childhood (800-01). Compared to the 
control group, the veterans were found to have “deficits in short-term verbal 
memory”, paragraph recall, “immediate and delayed recall,” and retention (800). 
Moreover, “an 8% decrease in MRI-based measurement of right hippocampal 
volume” was also found (800); that is, these subjects had suffered a physical 
reduction in the memory network of the brain. The childhood abuse victims were 
found to have “deficits in immediate and delayed recall and . . . retention, while 
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problems with their “short-term memory . . . were significantly correlated” with the 
previously suffered level of abuse (800). Tests demonstrated that these abuse victims 
had a “12% reduction in left hippocampal volume” when compared to controls (801). 
Since the hippocampus is one of the only brain regions that continues to experience 
neurogenesis (production of neurons), Bremner believes the difference in the location 
and extent of damage between these two groups may be due to the developmental 
stage in which the insult to the hippocampus occurred (801). Other types of stress 
(that are at least seemingly less traumatic) are associated with hippocampus 
impairment as well. For instance, high levels of cortisol and hippocampal atrophy has 
also been noted in patients with major depression (801).  
 The studies discussed above indicate that people who have undergone extreme 
stress, resulting in PTSD, have multiple memory deficits. This puts them at risk for 
nearly all of the components of choice. However, another study demonstrated that 
cortisone (a substance that is quickly transformed into cortisol) administered to 
normal and healthy subjects without PTSD interferes with some memory functions as 
well. The subjects viewed a list of German nouns for the explicated purpose of freely 
recalling as many words as possible 24 hours later (de Quervain et al 313). At the 
time of the free recall testing, they were given either 25 mg of cortisone or a placebo 
(313). The same process was completed again two weeks later (with a different set of 
German words) with subjects receiving whichever treatment they did not receive in 
the earlier test (313). The results showed significant impairment in free recall for 
subjects who received cortisol when compared to their own scores after receiving the 
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placebo (313). The study showed then that pharmacologically induced acute stress 
impairs “retrieval of declarative long-term memory” (313). Since the body produces 
cortisol in response to stress, presumably other (non-pharmacologically induced) 
stressful situations—such as “examinations, job interviews, combat[, or] . . . 
courtroom testimony” (314)—may produce similar results.  
 The findings of these two studies (above) are is quite relevant then to 
everyday life and its many stressors. Bremner points out, for instance, that many inner 
cities in the U.S. are “plagued by an epidemic of urban violence that affects our 
nation’s children on a daily basis” (802). Since the hippocampus is both very active 
during the process of learning and negatively influenced by stress, the stress incurred 
as a result of this daily violence likely adversely affects these children’s chances of 
receiving an adequate education. The same types of worries would be applicable to 
children (and adults) who live or have been raised in war zones or areas of violent 
conflict. A study showed, for instance, that “Lebanese teenagers with PTSD related to 
exposure to bombings and violence in civil war had deficits in academic 
achievement” when compared to subjects in control groups (Bremner 802). And, of 
course, either memory or educational deficits (or both) greatly put one at risk with 
regard to developing a capacity for choice. Educational psychologist, Kathleen 
Cranley Gallagher, is concerned because more mundane stressors, such as chronic or 
frequent hunger, may increase cortisol levels in school children, leading to problems 
with memory, self-regulation and “controlling negative emotions and behavior” in the 
school environment (15). Other researchers point out that the “life conditions . . . 
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associated with low socioeconomic status . . . and differences in emotional support in 
the home” create a stress response in children that explain “a significant portion of the 
variance in children’s verbal, reading, and math skills” even when other factors (such 
as maternal education, health, and nutrition) are taken into account (Nobel et al 78). 
Moreover, high cortisol levels are often found in children whose mothers are both 
depressed and of low socioeconomic status (79-80), and more intense stressors, such 
as violent home environments, are associated with lower IQ test scores in children 
(80).  
 Education is an important precondition of choice. Without it, the neural 
processes of choice may not fully develop and persons may lack the content that is 
necessary for their deliberations. If choice will be enabled, children must be taught 
both that people are choosers and the ways in which choice is enabled. And stress, 
one of many possible impediments to education, needs to be eliminated if children 
will receive an adequate education. 
2.7: Precondition—Absence of Violence 
 In the previous section, I considered the effect that high levels of cortisol (due 
to intense or chronic stress) may have on human memory. Bremner’s studies indicate 
that violence—in the form of combat or the experience of abuse—is implicated in this 
type of offense to choice. This section will deal more directly with the phenomenon 
of violence, because research studies have exposed three interrelated ways in which it 
has a negative impact on choice: (i) exposure to violence is strongly associated with 
decreased activity in a region of the prefrontal cortex, making such exposure a 
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specific affront to the witness’ capacity for choice; (ii) persons who witness violent 
acts become more prone toward carrying out violent acts in the future, creating more 
offenses to choice for themselves, victims, and witnesses; and (iii) other offenses to 
choice (such as, poor attachment to caregivers, punitive parenting techniques, and 
exposure to lead in childhood) also often foster situations in which violence becomes 
more probable. (i) and (ii) relate primarily to reactive aggression (also called 
impulsive or affective aggression)—that is, violence that is “initiated without regard 
for any potential goal” (Blair 199). In general, persons are conditioned toward 
reactive aggression by extensively viewing violence or by developing/existing within 
“harsh, threatening and unpredictable” environments (Qouta et al 232); though, as I 
will explain, even short exposures to virtual violence (i.e., violent media) have been 
shown to have a negative impact on the neural processes of choice. (iii) concerns, to 
varying degrees, both reactive and instrumental aggression. Instrumental aggression 
is violence enacted purposefully or “instrumentally to achieve a specific desired goal” 
(Blair 199); it tends to develop in situations in which there is a breakdown in moral 
socialization (202), where a person is “encouraged to use aggression as a way of 
achieving his or her goals” (Qouta et al 232). I will discuss these three issues in turn. 
 Regarding (i), a recent clinical study indicates that exposure to violence is 
associated with decreased activity in the lateral prefrontal region of the brain, 
specifically the right lateral orbitofrontal cortex (ItOFC). This area is responsible for 
managing “context-dependent regulation of behavior” (Kelly et al 4), including cases 
in which a person needs to “suppress or change” her behavior “based on changing 
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external cues” in the social environment; it is also involved in the detection of one’s 
own or another’s social norm violation (4) and—in conjunction with the “amygdala, 
anterior cingulated cortex,” and other interconnected regions—in regulation of 
emotion and reactive aggression (Davidson et al 591; see also Kelly et al 4-5). As 
such, this area is important for components (d) and (e) of choice.  
 Researchers utilized fMRI technology to test the impact of “violent, fearful, or 
neutral” clips from “mainstream commercial motion pictures”—either depicting 
realistic physical violence (such as, “shootings, stabbings, and other kinds of physical 
assault”), “strong facial expressions of terror without the presence of an explicit 
aggressor or threat”, or “non-aggressive physical interactions, such as dances or 
sports”, respectively—on subjects who viewed the media in a controlled clinical 
setting (Kelly et al 1). Results of the study indicate that the subjects experienced three 
neural responses to the violent context that have a negative impact with regard to 
choice. These responses did not occur with regard to the fearful or neutral contexts. 
Specifically, repeated exposure to the violent stimuli was accompanied by: first, an 
attenuation of activity within the ItOFC, indicating impaired top-down or explicit 
control in suppressing, changing, regulating, or inhibiting behavior according to 
context-dependent external social or environmental cues; second, a “decrease in the 
functional interaction between [ItOFC] and the amygdala”, indicating impaired 
emotional control and regulation; and, third, an increased response in the neural 
“network downstream of the amygdala” (Kelly et al 1) that is related to motor 
planning and “initiation of actions” (3-4), indicating that one who witnesses violence 
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has increased tendency to act without the inhibitory influence of the ItOFC. The 
offense to choice is then clear. The experience of violence puts one at risk for 
components (d) and (e) of choice because witnessing violence initiates decreased 
activity in the prefrontal cortex, decreased communication between this region and 
the emotional network of the brain, and an increase in an area that is responsible for 
action undertaken without the supervisory control of the prefrontal cortex. Violence 
encourages a neural response that circumvents action based on explicit neural 
functions and encourages activity based on conditioned or implicit processes. It 
promotes action in the absence of the neural processes of choice.  
 Regarding (ii), research also indicates that persons who witness and/or 
experience violence become more prone toward carrying out violent acts in the 
future; this, in turn, creates more offenses to choice for the one enacting the violence, 
the victims, and other witnesses. In general, viewing violence in a virtual or actual 
context appears to promote reactive aggression; however, one study that focused on 
Palestinian children who witnessed severe military violence and destruction indicates 
that the children also became prone toward instrumental aggression and aggression 
enjoyment. I will consider first the impact of media violence and then that of actual 
violence.  
 A recent survey of the research regarding violent media and aggression in 
viewers/users confirms a positive link between the two no matter what type of 
research method was employed (Anderson and Bushman 2377). The effects of such 
media on behavior is not minor; “they are larger than the effects of calcium intake on 
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bone mass or of lead exposure on IQ in children” (2377). Of course, it is unlikely that 
violence has a single cause; researchers tend to “view violence as the end result of 
multiple risk factors that may include a biological vulnerability—either genetic or 
created in the prenatal environment—that may be brought out or reinforced by the 
social environment” (Holden 580). Even in chronically violent individuals, at least 
half of the risk for violence can be attributed to environmental factors (580). 
Environmental risk factors include (but need not be limited to) exposure to virtual or 
actual violence (in the home or neighborhood), childhood neglect, low socioeconomic 
status and/or parental education level, some psychiatric disorders, and low IQ 
(Huesmann S6; Moretti et al 385; Johnson et al 2469; Holden 580; Copeland et al 
1668). As such, many of the risk factors for violence are the same as many of the risk 
factors to choice in general; however, since witnessing violence is both an offense to 
choice and a significant risk factor for further violent behavior, the phenomenon 
deserves prominent consideration. 
 The study cited above (with regard to point (i)) indicated that witnessing 
media violence is accompanied by a threefold offense to choice; however, since the 
neural responses that accompany this offense have, in previous studies, been 
“associated with greater reactive aggressive tendencies,” researchers correlated the 
subjects’ “right ItOFC response magnitudes with” answers on an aggression 
questionnaire (Kelly et al 3). Results demonstrated that less activity in the right ItOFC 
was “characteristic of those individuals with greater reactive aggressive tendencies” 
(3). This result “was unique to the violent condition”; that is, the correlation did not 
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hold regarding subjects’ reactions to fearful or neutral media (3). Even for “less 
aggressive subjects,” activity in the right ItOFC diminished until it “became 
comparable to [that] of the more aggressive subjects, whose responses were 
consistently small” (3). Of course, exposure to violent media is likely not “a sufficient 
catalyst for the emergence of criminal aggression” (Kelly et al 5; otherwise, given the 
level of violence that is common in American mainstream media, most of us would 
be violent criminals); however, when persons have been conditioned toward violence 
via multiple risk factors, the impact of media violence is sufficient to be significant 
among them. 
 Other studies confirm that exposure to violent media increases the likelihood 
of violent behavior. For instance, “early habitual exposure to media violence in 
middle-childhood predicts increased aggressiveness 1 year, 3 years, 10 years, 15 
years, and 22 years later in adulthood, even controlling for early aggressiveness” 
(Huesmann S10).17 Researchers studied a group of children for three years during 
middle childhood; the results of a follow-up 15 years later indicated that children who 
ranked in the highest quartile for viewing violent media during middle childhood 
carried out considerably more violent acts in adulthood than those who had viewed 
less violence:  
11% of the males had been convicted of a crime (compared with 3% 
for other males), 42% had “pushed, grabbed, or shoved their spouse” 
in the past year (compared with 22% of other males), and 69% had 
                                                 
17 Since violent behavior during childhood “is a much weaker predictor of higher subsequent viewing 
of violence”, it is very unlikely that the positive association “between aggression and violent media use 
was primarily due to aggressive children turning to watching more violence” (Huesmann S10).  
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“shoved a person” when made angry in the past year (compared with 
50% of other males). For females, 39% of the high-violence viewers 
had “thrown something at their spouse” in the past year (compared 
with 17% of the other females), and 17% had “punched, beaten, or 
choked” another adult when angry in the past year (compared with 4% 
of other females) (S10). 
 
Other studies regarding media and aggression have yielded similar results (see 
Johnson et al). Moreover, the counterpart of virtual violence—that is, actual 
violence—has significant impact as well. 
 Empirical research indicates that witnessing actual violence encourages 
reactive aggression and possibly instrumental aggression; just as viewing violence in 
a virtual format tends to increase aggression, so does “growing up in an environment 
filled with real violence” (Huesmann S6). A study among British males incarcerated 
for violent offenses indicated that childhood conduct disorder, interparental tension, 
and interparental violence “were each associated with adult social violence, whereas 
the strongest predictors of adult partner violence were . . . childhood physical abuse, 
interparental violence and family violence” (Hill and Nathan 334). Another study 
found that, girls who witness their mothers’ aggression toward the latter’s intimate 
partners are “significantly more aggressive toward friends”, as are boys who witness 
their fathers’ aggression in a domestic setting (Moretti et al 385). When either sex 
child observes mother’s violence toward her partner, the former also exhibits “higher 
levels of aggression toward their romantic partners” (385). Other studies demonstrate 
the unfortunate impact of witnessing or being victimized by military violence. 
Researchers found that Croatian preschoolers who observed warfare and atrocities 
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demonstrated no discernable increase in aggressive behavior during the preschool 
years; however, at a 10 year follow-up, “the children and adolescents exposed to 
severe war trauma in preschool age showed higher level of aggressive behavior than 
less exposed” children (Qouta et al 232). Another study found increased aggression 
“among Israeli preschoolers . . . who witnessed [a] terrorist attack” (232). 
 Two studies focused on the effects of war and exposure to violence on 
Palestinian children. The first (study A) was conducted during a period of relative 
calm in 1997 and the second (study B) was carried out during a period of intense 
violence and unrest in 2005. Study A found that “exposure to severe military violence 
was associated with higher levels of aggressive and antisocial behavior” for children 
of all age groups (Qouta et al 239-40). Younger children demonstrated a higher level 
of aggression than older children when they experienced direct victimization (236). 
This study also found that “supportive and non-punitive parenting practices” 
mitigated against a child’s tendency toward aggression, even if the child witnessed 
violence or was severely victimized (240; this point was not addressed in study B). In 
study B, children who witnessed severe military violence not only exhibited a greater 
tendency toward reactive violence, but also increased levels of proactive violence and 
aggression enjoyment (240); and, interestingly, direct victimization “was not 
associated significantly with any of the three child aggression measures” (239). 
Instead, and this result held for both studies, “it was the witnessing of atrocities 
toward others that was decisive for child aggression” rather than victimization (241).  
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 The argument with regard to (i) is that a person who observes virtual violence 
(witness 1 or W1) experiences an offense to her personal capacity for choice. Due to 
obvious ethical concerns, the impact of real or actual violence cannot be tested in a 
clinical setting; thus, it is not possible to determine whether the same offenses to the 
neural capacity for choice are present with actual violence. Chances are, however, 
that they do occur, given that virtual experience is not likely to have more influence 
than actual experience; the reverse makes more intuitive sense. Moreover, it appears 
that witnessing violence is the deciding factor and this is present in both the virtual 
and actual contexts.  
 The point with regard to (ii) is that when W1 observes violence, W1 is 
encouraged to enact violent behavior in other situations; thus, W1 is more likely to 
create an offense to choice for others (i.e., W2, W3, W4, and so on). But the tendency 
to act violently in itself points to the fact that a personal offense to neural processes of 
choice as occurred. Consider. The issue being discussed here is not a tendency to act 
aggressively only when a threat is present; an aggressive response in the face of a 
violent threat indicates that the organism is functioning normally. Rather, the present 
issue is that “experiments unambiguously show” that witnessing violence in a virtual 
context raises the risk of aggressive behavior immediately afterward—for 
“preschoolers, elementary school children, high school children, college students, and 
adults” (Huesmann S10)—no matter whether such action is conducive to the 
environmental context or not. And there is ample evidence that exposure in childhood 
increases the risk of violence in all contexts during adulthood. But aggression that 
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does not serve to protect the organism is indicative of “dysfunctional emotion 
regulation” (Qouta et al 242); as such, it indicates that an offense to component (e) of 
choice is present. 
 Neither is the issue solely that children (and to some extent, all people) imitate 
what they see. This is of course true, since imitation exerts a powerful force upon the 
structure and functionality of the brain (see section 2.5) and children have a 
“tendency to mimic whomever they observe” (Huesmann S8). However, there are 
also two more extensive worries. First, by observing “family, peers, community, and 
mass media” throughout childhood, the child develops social scripts that will later 
“automatically control social behavior once they are well learned” (S11) and schemas 
for understanding the world (S8). When violence becomes a conditioned part of the 
child’s script, violent behaviors may be “imitated long after they are observed” (S8); 
moreover, “extensive observation of violence has been shown to bias children’s world 
schemas toward attributing hostility to others’ actions” (S8) whether or not these 
actions are in fact hostile. Secondly, after repeated exposure to violent media, 
negative emotions, that are at first automatically experienced by the viewer, “decline 
in intensity” (S8). The “child becomes ‘desensitized’” toward violence and “can think 
about and plan proactive aggressive acts without experiencing negative affect” (such 
as, increased heart rate and perspiration and emotional discomfort) (S8). Violence can 
become a normal part of the person’s social scripts and schemas that can be acted on 
without personal distress. The point is that viewing violence conditions a child toward 
violence; given her implicit neural circuitry, she will have a tendency toward enacting 
 118
aggressive behavior. Since kids in the U.S. spend roughly to 3 to 4 hours a day 
watching television, with about 60% of programming containing violence (40% 
heavy violence) (S8-S9) and since the majority of kids in the U.S. play video games 
and “94% of games rated (by the video game industry) as appropriate for teens are 
described as containing violence” (S9), many young people in the U.S. may be at risk 
for components (d) and (e) of choice. 
 Regarding (iii), other types of offenses to choice may also foster violence in 
individuals who experience the offense. And, as is the case with point (ii), these 
individuals may then undertake aggressive actions that offend choice for witnesses or 
those subjected to the aggression. My intent here is not to list all possible offenses to 
choice that foster aggression; rather, I will consider three examples: the effect of (x) 
poor attachment to caregiver(s) and/or a breakdown in moral socialization, (y) 
punitive and/or aggressive caregiving, and (z) exposure to lead.  
 Researchers have linked the first of these offenses to choice, (x) poor 
attachment to caregiver(s) and/or a breakdown in moral socialization, to bullying 
behavior in children and adolescents. In section 2.5, I considered what I called a 
success story with regard to caregiving and choice. The story demonstrates the ways 
that caregiving has an effect upon whether a person will develop a capacity for choice 
and the Romanian orphans’ story illustrates what may happen in the stark absence of 
such instrumental caregiving. Other scenarios are also possible when the early 
interaction between child and caregiver are in some way inadequate. The instrumental 
caregiver helps to develop the structure and functionality of the infant/child’s brain, 
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including the supervisory controls and emotional stability. Recall that it is through 
consistent, calming, and repetitive interaction with one’s caregiver that one begins to 
develop self-regulation and emotional stability (Wexler 199). These things are of 
course crucial aspects of choice; however, bullying behavior—that is, a certain type 
of instrumental aggression—may begin to develop in the child when there is an early 
deficiency in this type of interaction between a child and her caregiver. Studies show, 
for instance, that nearly two-thirds of bullies are insecurely attached to their 
caregivers (Monks et al 583; while roughly the same number of victims are securely 
attached (585)). Researchers postulate that “an insecure attachment profile may 
provide an individual with the initial motivation to be aggressive”, since those who 
suffer with insecure attachment “may behave particularly aggressively as a reflection 
of the internal working model of attachments” (583). Although a caregiver/child 
relationship in which the latter is poorly attached is possible under different 
circumstances, the outcome is extremely probable under conditions of neglect. This is 
relevant for many young people in the U.S., since, in 2006, approximately 581,000 
children were victims of neglect and another 59,700 were victims of emotional or 
psychological abuse (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services iii). But early 
interactions with one’s instrumental caregiver not only foster self-regulation and 
control, they also help the child develop the emotional stability in general and the 
social emotions, such as sympathy and empathy, in particular. However, male 
children, who bully frequently, “were found to be deficient in both affective and total 
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empathy” (Jolliffe and Farrington 547),18 while those who bully violently 
demonstrated low “total empathy” (540). That is, research indicates that bullies tend 
to be adept at both theory of mind (the capacity to understand others’ mental states) 
and cognitive empathy (the capacity to understand others’ emotional states) (Gini 535 
and 536). However, bullies tend to “disengage self-sanctions and justify the use of 
aggressive behaviors” (536) such that they either are not bothered by others’ distress 
or are deficient in the capacity to vicariously experience others’ emotions (Jolliffe and 
Farrington 540). Research suggests that instrumental aggression, such as bullying, is 
“related to a breakdown in moral socialization” (Blair 202). Either “there has been a 
lack of . . . formative learning experiences”—that is, learning not to harm others by 
“either personally committing . . . or viewing another commit . . . a moral 
transgression and then being ‘punished’ by the aversive response of the victim’s 
distress”—or the “neuro-cognitive architecture mediating moral socialization is 
dysfunctional” (202). In either case, the amygdala (part of the emotional network of 
the brain) is involved and one who is deficient with regard to empathy (or any 
emotion on the spectrum) is at risk with regard to component (e) of choice. Thus, 
while bullies do not appear to be significantly at risk for component (d)—that is, they 
appear to enjoy significant cognitive and social skills (Monks et al 573)—the research 
                                                 
18 Empathy is generally defined as “an affective trait”—the capacity to “experience the emotions of 
another person”—a “cognitive ability”—the capacity to understand “the emotions of another 
person”—and as a combination of the two (Jolliffe and Farrington 540). Thus, when one is deficient in 
affective empathy, one is it not necessarily deficient in cognitive empathy as well.  
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indicates that some bullies—specifically, bullies who transgress frequently or 
violently, are deficient in empathy and are, as such, at risk for component (e). 
 As was noted with regard to point (ii), when a person has a tendency to 
behave aggressively, she will also have a tendency to offend others’ capacities for 
choice. This is evidenced by the cognitive and emotional states of the victims of 
bullying as well as those of persons who alternate between bullying and victim 
behaviors (bully-victims). While bullies advocate more “normative beliefs that [are] . 
. . tolerant of antisocial behaviour” (Marini et al 559), indicating that they have 
developed social scripts and world schemas that include acceptance of aggression, 
victims are less inclined to do so. However, victims were much more inclined toward 
“difficulties related to anxiety, depression and self-esteem” (551), indicating that they 
too may be at risk for component (e) of choice. Moreover, while bully-victims share 
the victims’ tendency toward depression, they may also experience an array of 
difficulties including:  
internalizing problems, peer rejection, a relative lack of close 
friendships, greater acceptance of deviance, less supportive and 
involved parents, [and] less optimal temperament characteristics such 
as hyperactivity and negative emotionality and reactive aggression 
(552).  
 
The offense to the victims’ and bully-victims’ capacities for choice, at the hands of 
the bully, is then clear. 
 The second and third offenses to choice, (y) punitive and/or aggressive 
caregiving and (z) exposure to lead, also create situations under which persons are 
conditioned toward aggression and violence. For instance in one study, caregiver 
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practices that included “punitive interactions”—such as, threatening and yelling—
were associated with the child’s “oppositional, hyperactive, [and] aggressive” 
behavior as well as depression, while “physically aggressive” caregiving “specifically 
predicted child aggression” (Sheehan and Watson 245). Many other studies have also 
confirmed this association between “[a]ggressive behavior in children” and “harsh, 
physical punishment used as parental discipline” (245). The only discernable positive 
outcome of this type of caregiving is “immediate compliance by the child”; all other 
outcomes are negative (245).19 Moreover, researchers have located a “reciprocal 
effect” between child aggression and aggressive discipline; that is, while the former 
has been shown to predict the latter, a use of the latter has also been shown to predict 
an increase in the former (253). But, as I have pointed out in the other cases, since 
children who are subject to punitive and/or aggressive caregiving have a greater 
tendency to enact violence against others and since witnessing (or experiencing) 
violence is a direct offense to the witnesses’ capacity for choice, the initial offense to 
choice tends to beget another.  
 A similar scenario exists with regard to exposure to lead during childhood. 
The absence of exposure to lead is clearly a pre-condition of choice, because lead 
exposure during childhood is associated “with volume loss in considerable portions of 
the prefrontal cortex,” specifically in the “ventrolateral prefrontal cortex . . . as well 
as the anterior cingulated cortex . . .” in adult male subjects (Cecil et al 0743-0744; 
                                                 
19 Some research suggests that “aggressive discipline is used more frequently and is less harmful (at 
least in terms of subsequent child aggression) in minority (particularly African American) households” 
(Sheehan and Watson 253).  
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female subjects did not present with significant volume loss). “[W]hite matter 
degeneration and volume reduction in . . . gray matter” have been documented in 
adults exposed to lead in a work environment (Bellinger 0690). Lead exposure is also 
associated with impaired “general intellectual and executive function,” “attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder,” impulsiveness, antisocial behavior, aggression, and 
violence (Cecil et al 0742-0745). Thus, since lead exposure is linked with decreased 
volume in the prefrontal cortex and impaired cognition and behavioral control, 
exposure puts one, particularly males, at risk for components (a), (c), (d), and (e) of 
choice. 
 However, as noted, exposure increases the risk of antisocial, aggressive, and 
violent behavior in the one exposed. One longitudinal study demonstrated that 
exposure to lead during childhood (determined by “blood lead concentrations” of 250 
children that were sampled at select intervals from birth to six years of age) is 
“associated with higher rates of total arrests and/or arrests involving violence” 
(Wright et al 0732). Participants in the study were raised in areas of Cincinnati, Ohio 
in which housing was known to be contaminated with lead (0732). When the 
subject’s criminal records were examined in early adulthood (subjects were between 
19 and 24 years of age), “[a]pproximately 55% of participants (62.8% of males, 
36.3% of females) had at least one arrest” (0735). Of the 800 arrests that researchers 
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identified in the records, 108 or 14% “were for violent offenses” (0735).20 Thus, in 
addition to putting persons at risk for choice, lead exposure during childhood 
increases the risk of antisocial, aggressive, and/or violent behavior in adulthood. 
Subsequently, those who witness or experience this violence are also put at risk for 
choice. 
 Thus, research demonstrates three interrelated ways in which violence 
negatively influences choice; that is, (i) exposure to violence is accompanied by a 
decrease in activity in the area of the prefrontal cortex that is responsible for changing 
behavior in context, detecting social norm violations, maintaining emotional stability, 
and suppressing reactive aggression, (ii) witnessing violence increases the risk of 
subsequent violent acts being perpetrated by the witness (creating additional offenses 
to choice), and (iii) other offenses to choice (such as, poor attachment to caregivers, 
punitive parenting techniques, and exposure to lead in childhood) also often foster 
situations in which violence becomes more probable. As such, the existence of 
violence both puts persons at risk for choice and at risk for violence; the absence of 
violence and the factors that promote it are then pre-conditions of choice.  
2.8: Precondition—Adequate Nutrition 
 In section 2.4, I discussed five micronutrients without which the neural 
processes of choice may not even get off the ground. In this section, I address the 
effects more generally of malnutrition and food insecurity. Worldwide some “146 
                                                 
20 The other percentages were as follows: “90 (11%) involved theft or fraud, 216 (28%) involved 
drugs, 35 (5%) were for obstruction of justice, 211 (27%) were related to serious motor vehicle 
offenses, 35 (5%) were for disorderly conduct, and 82 (11%) other” (Wright et al 0735). 
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million children under five . . . are underweight” and undernourished (experience 
“insufficient food intake” to the point of hunger); they are short for their age, 
dangerously thin, and/or experience a deficiency in necessary micronutrients (Unicef, 
Nutrition 5). They are at great risk for cognitive and emotional deficits, disease, and 
death; hence, they are also greatly at risk with regard to developing a capacity for 
choice. Nearly three quarters of them reside in 10 countries: India, 57 million; 
Bangladesh, 8 million; Pakistan, 8 million; China, 7 million; Nigeria, 6 million; 
Ethiopia, 6 million; Indonesia, 6 million; Democratic Republic of the Congo, 3 
million; Philippines, 3 million; and Vietnam, 2 million (Unicef, Nutrition 5). Of 
course, socioeconomic status makes a huge difference regarding who is subjected to 
hunger, because, “on average, children living in the poorest households are twice as 
likely to be underweight as children living in the richest households” (10). According 
to the most recent estimates, every year “undernutrition contributes to the deaths of 
about 5.6 million children under the age of five” (3). 
 During 2006 in the United States, 12.1 percent of the population—that is, 
35,500,000 people—“lived in food-insecure households” (the heads of these 
households reported either uncertainty or inability regarding sufficient food 
acquisition); 12,600,000 of them were children, and 430,000 of these children resided 
in households ranked very low with regard to food security (Nord et al 15). Again, the 
trend in industrialized countries with regard to socioeconomic status (SES) and food 
security is clear. Studies consistently indicate that food availability and quality are 
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positively correlated with SES (Ricciuto and Tarasuk 186)—that is, people in the 
higher SES groups consume more nutritious food (194).   
 Consider then the effect of these nutritional deficiencies and disparities upon 
the capacity for choice. From the neurological perspective, severe malnutrition is 
associated with decreased myelination (Levitsky and Strupp 2214S) and decreased 
interconnectivity in the hippocampus (2215S). Recall that myelin surrounds and 
insulates axons (part of the neuron) which allows for faster conduction of impulses 
and signals. A decrease in myelin is important then for choice, since a myelinated 
axon transmits “information at considerably higher speeds than” those that are 
nonmyelinated (2214S). Given that presumably large amounts of information must be 
quickly processed during components (a), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of choice and given that 
memory is involved in each of these as well, the degree of myelination and 
hippocampus interconnectivity are certainly relevant.  
 Moreover, research has shown that severe malnutrition is also associated with 
testable deficits in cognitive capacity (Liu et al 598). One study involved 1,559 
children (from Mauritius), 22.6% of whom were determined, according to four 
criteria (vitamin B2 or A deficiency, protein malnutrition, protein-energy 
malnutrition, or anemia), to be malnourished (Liu et al 594). The other 77.4% served 
as the control group (594). The children were given cognitive testing at ages 3 and 11. 
The study found the malnourished children had deficits in cognitive capacity at both 
ages and that the deficits largely remained constant over the 8 year span of the study 
(597). Moreover, at age 11, findings indicated the extent of the deficit was associated 
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with number of criteria manifested. For instance, IQ scores decreased (on average and 
when compared with the control group) 3.3 points if one criterion was present, 9.0 
points for two, and 15.3 points when three (or more) were manifest (598). This was in 
spite of the fact that researchers controlled for 14 confounding factors, such as 
parental education level, marriage status, age, and health (597).  
 Another study demonstrated the positive impact of protein-energy 
supplementation on malnourished children. All of the children in the study, made up 
of two groups aged 12 months and aged 18 months, were malnourished (Pollitt et al 
S88). The children were given one of three nutritional supplements: supplement E 
was “a source of high energy and micronutrients”, M “was a source of low energy 
and micronutrients”, and S “was a source of low energy” (S81). The latter supplement 
functioned as the control. Those who received E among the 12 month old group 
“walked at an earlier age, had higher [cognitive] scores . . . and showed more mature 
social-cognitive and emotional regulator behaviors” (S80) (positively influencing 
components (a), (c), (d), (e), and (f)) when compared with those who received M or 
S). Those in the E group showed increased vocalizations and play behavior and 
decreased fussing (S89), which would better enable them to take advantage of 
whatever stimulation their environment has to offer. Results were similar for the 18 
month old group, in that those who received E showed improved social cognition and 
better regulation of emotions (S80). 
 Mild to moderate malnutrition is also linked, though perhaps indirectly, with 
deficits in cognitive, social, and emotional processes. Since mild to moderate 
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malnutrition most often “covaries with a host of other developmental risk factors,”—
such as, a higher risk for disease and illness, “inadequate psychosocial rearing” (a less 
enriched environment and interactivity with others), and environmental stressors, 
(Wachs 2246S)—it “appears to be a necessary but insufficient condition” for 
producing cognitive and behavioral deficits (2245S and 2247S). The mildly 
malnourished child is, for instance, less likely to interact with her environment (her 
activities and exploration are curtailed) and less likely to interact richly with her 
caregiver(s) (2246S). That is, the mildly malnourished child may not interact with her 
instrumental caregiver (recall Wexler’s success case) if she has one and may not 
undertake the imitation and play that help to develop her prefrontal capacities. She 
will also be less likely to reap the full benefit of whatever educational opportunity is 
afforded by her environment. For instance, “higher intake of energy and total protein” 
(2247S), as well as higher intake of calcium  and vitamin B-12 (2248S), are 
associated with “higher levels of toddler mental performance and symbolic play” 
(2247S); moreover, calcium is linked with more attention seeking in female school 
aged children, and vitamin B-12, vitamin B-6, calcium, and copper are all associated 
with higher activity levels in school aged males (2248S). Other studies show that 
children with high levels of calcium are less likely to incur cognitive impairments 
when exposed to lead, and high zinc levels may make children less susceptible to 
such impairment from “high body-cadmium levels” (2249S). Thus, better nourished 
children have, on several counts, a lower risk with regard to developing a capacity for 
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choice. They are more likely to obtain enrichment from the environment and they are 
less likely to experience cognitive impairment.  
 Even for adults, short term nutritional deficiencies have a negative impact 
upon the capacity for choice. Researchers studied a group of adults voluntarily 
undertaking a 12 to 16 hour fast. When compared with tests of the same individuals’ 
capacities during non-fasting, the results indicated that the participants had significant 
“memory and verbal deficits” in the midday, whereas “visual spatial deficits were 
more pronounced later in the day” (Doniger et al 812). Moreover, general deficits in 
accuracy were significant for both problem solving and nondeclarative recognition 
memory (812). However, one might argue that problem solving, especially in the case 
where novelty is present, is precisely the moment of choice. Thus, even a short-term 
nutritional deficiency may negatively affect the maintenance of a previously 
developed capacity for choice. The good news is that, with only a few exceptions 
(such as the issues of myelination and hippocampus connectivity mentioned above), 
the effects of malnutrition seem to be in large part reversible (Levetsky and Strupp 
2213S). This is an important finding given that millions of people in the world—such 
as those who live in conditions that fail to provide and those who suffer from eating 
disorders—are undernourished. 
2.9: Precondition—Sleep 
 Sleep deprivation has been shown to negatively affect all three types of 
neurological processes—cognitive, social, and emotional—involved in a person’s 
capacity for choice. Without sleep, people have difficulties in forming new memories 
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(whether they are tested behaviorally or neurologically) and in consolidating 
memories and making general inferences from previously learned information; they 
also show deficits in maintaining socially adequate responses to frustration and in 
maintaining an effective emotional response to aversive stimuli. I will discuss the 
impact of each briefly and in turn.  
 Many studies “have demonstrated the need for sleep after learning for the 
consolidation of memory” (Yoo et al, “Deficit” 385). Findings indicate that sleep 
“plays a critical role in  . . . procedural learning” and substantial evidence points to 
the fact that sleep is essential for “conditioned learning in animals and declarative 
memory in humans as well” (Walker and Stickgold 126). That is, subjects 
demonstrate a deficit in retaining learned material if subsequent sleep does not occur. 
In one such study, “[p]articipants learned . . . individual premise pairs (. . . A>B, 
B>C, C>D, D>E, and E>F)” until they were proficient in reporting them from 
memory (subjects were not informed about the possible inferences embedded in the 
pairs) (Ellenbogen et al 7723). The subjects were divided into four groups; some were 
tested, for inferential ability regarding the information, after twenty minutes (group 
1), while others were tested after 12 hours and no sleep (group 2), and 12 hours with 
sleep (group 3). Group 1 made inferences roughly the same as would be expected if 
their responses were merely given by chance (7725). There was no significant 
difference between groups 2 and 3 regarding the ability to make an inference across 
one degree of separation (that is, the ability to infer one hypothetical syllogism 
(B>D)) (7725). However, only 69% of group 2 were able to infer two degrees of 
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separation (B>E), whereas 93% of group 3 were able to do so (7725). Thus, first, only 
those experiencing a “prolonged consolidation delay . . . demonstrated relational 
binding” of the pairs, creating the capacity to make “successful transitive inference 
judgments” (7725); and, second, those whose delay included sleep incurred a 
significant inferential advantage. These findings regarding sleep and human cognitive 
functions have, of course, significant implications for choice. Memory is necessary 
for nearly all the components and the capacity to generalize from learned material is 
imperative for component (d). Additionally, a person is at risk for all the components 
of choice if she has not learned content that is relevant to the choice at hand. 
 Other studies indicate that prior sleep loss is also associated with deficits in 
encoding new memories. One study found both behavioral and neurological 
impairment in subjects who had lost only one night of sleep; they were “awake during 
day 1, night 1, and day 2” before being presented with new information to be learned 
(encoded) (Yoo et al, “Deficit” 385). The control group slept normally. Both groups 
were then tested for recognition retention on the fourth day to allow the experimental 
group to recover from their sleep loss (385-86). Results indicated that the 
experimental group had, on average, a “19% deficit” in recognition (386). At the level 
of behavior, they had “less enduring memory representations” (386). A neurological 
deficit was also apparent through fMRI testing. The experimental group experienced 
both “impairment in hippocampal activation” (386 and 387) and decreased activity in 
“the right dorsal-middle lateral prefrontal cortex” (388). With regard to the latter 
(recall that the prefrontal cortex is involved in all “higher” cognitive processes), 
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researchers proposed that the experimental subjects experienced a “failure of higher-
order associative binding at the time of encoding” due to impairment of the prefrontal 
cortex (389). The subjects were not it seems making the types of associations that 
facilitates holding the information in memory. 
 A third study demonstrated that sleep deprived persons exhibit deficits in 
maintaining socially adequate responses to frustration when compared to their own 
tendency to manage frustration in a non-sleep deprived state. The researchers in this 
study point out that the prefrontal cortex, the part of the brain that is responsible for 
inhibiting socially inappropriate behaviors, shows significantly reduced activity (as 
measured by glucose metabolism) within as little as 24 hours without sleep (Kahn-
Greene et al 1434). Their goal was to demonstrate what two nights of sleep loss 
entails behaviorally with regard to this inhibitory activity. Participants were twice 
shown (once at base-line and once after sleep deprivation) cartoons in which one of 
two characters was experiencing a frustrating situation (1435). A caption was 
supplied for the first character, but the second caption bubble was blank, and 
participants were told to fill in the blank with their first response (1435-36). Given the 
participants own responses at base-line, after sleep loss, they were much more likely 
“to direct blame or hostility outward toward people and objects in the environment” 
and were much less likely offer responses in which a “character apologizes or offers 
amends in order to alleviate the problem” (1438). Since the experiment was designed 
to extract responses from participants that were, as much as possible, in keeping with 
how they would perform in real life under sleep deprived conditions (1436), the study 
 133
demonstrated that sleep deprived individuals experience difficulty in behaving in 
socially appropriate ways and in inhibiting aggressive and hostile responses to 
frustration (1440). This finding is important for component (e), and may have 
implications for (d) as well. 
 Lastly, a fourth study showed that sleep deprived persons have deficits in their 
capacity to maintain an effective emotional response to aversive stimuli. The subjects 
in the study were assigned to either an experimental group (awake from day 1 through 
night 1 and day 2 at the point of testing) or a control group (not sleep deprived) (Yoo 
et al, “Human” R877). During fMRI brain scans, all were shown “100 images from a 
standardized picture set” that ranged from “emotionally neutral to increasingly 
aversive” (R877). Recall from section 2.2 that having an effective emotional response 
(component (e) of choice) involves neural activity in both the amygdala (especially if 
the stimuli in question is aversive (R877)) and the prefrontal cortex (among other 
brain regions); the former processes “emotionally salient information,” while the 
latter exerts “an inhibitory, top-down control” of the former (R877). The study 
demonstrated that while all subjects had “similar amygdala activation . . . for the most 
neutral pictures,” those who were sleep deprived exhibited over 60% more amygdala 
activation when viewing aversive pictures than those who had slept (R878 and R877). 
Moreover, the experimental group demonstrated significantly less “connectivity 
between the amygdala and the MPFC” (medial-prefrontal cortex) than non-sleep 
deprived persons; instead, those deprived of sleep showed greater connectivity 
between the amygdala and the “autonomic-activating centers of the brain” (R878). 
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That is, the connectivity was with the areas responsible for functions over which one, 
in general, has little control—especially if the prefrontal cortex is not inhibiting 
action. Since sleep deprived persons have more activity in the amygdala and 
decreased connectivity between the amygdala and the prefrontal cortex, it is quite 
unlikely that they would be capable of having (e) an effective emotional response.  
 Sleep, then, is an essential component for developing and maintaining a 
capacity for choice, because our cognitive, social, and emotional neural processes are 
dependent upon sleep. We all know that significant stressors (e.g., exams, financial 
worries, or the death of a loved one) can cause sleepless nights and whenever such 
loss of sleep occurs, we are, for some period of time, at risk with regard to choice. 
But there are also cases in which access to sleep is infringed upon in a more 
systematic way. For instance, during war, one side (or both) may specifically attack 
or bomb the other side (perhaps even civilian communities) during the nighttime 
hours, specifically preventing most, if not all, of the community from obtaining the 
sleep that is requisite for choice. In many cases of war, women are a target for rape, 
perhaps especially at night; moreover, even if such a traumatic event occurred during 
the day, it certainly has the potential to affect subsequent sleep. Whenever such 
events occur, choice is being systematically infringed.  
2.10: Precondition—Overall Health 
 Choice requires that one be able to override or inhibit internal stimuli 
(especially component (d)), but, when the body is in poor physical health, inhibiting 
this stimuli may be difficult or impossible. Moreover, if disease is prominent during a 
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child’s period of development, she may not be able to partake of the environment and 
education in the way that develops the processes of the prefrontal cortex. Some 
instances of disease are, at least at this point in human history, not within human 
control. However, many diseases that are preventable—those that could be controlled 
or eradicated through proper health care, immunizations, clean water, and adequate 
sanitation—negatively influence people’s capacities for choice around the world on a 
daily basis. For instance in 2004, approximately “1.4 million children under five died 
from the six major vaccine-preventable diseases” (Unicef, Immunization vii). 
Globally, there are some “27 million unvaccinated children” (ix); more than 8 million 
of them reside in India, more than 3.5 million in Nigeria, and nearly 5 million in 
Pakistan, China, and Indonesia combined (ix). In many countries (Vanuatu, Papua 
New Guinea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Haiti, Central African Republic, 
Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Somalia, and Nigeria), “less than half of all 
infants are vaccinated” (viii), and this is in spite of the fact that immunization is “one 
of the most . . . cost-effective ways of ensuring that children survive their early years” 
(vii). 
 Lack of clean water and adequate sanitation also contribute the global disease 
burden. Currently, about 1 billion people (roughly one-sixth of the world’s 
population) do not have access to adequate drinking water; another 2.6 billion lack 
adequate sanitation (Unicef, Water and Sanitation 1). And more than 1.5 million 
children die each year from disease related to one of the two (1). Of course, nearly all 
of them live in developing countries. Moreover, in both developing and industrialized 
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nations, it is nearly always the case that rates of “morbidity and mortality are higher 
amongst the poor than the rich” (Armelagos et al 761). Poor women are more likely 
to have babies of low birth weight, which puts the children at a greater risk for 
cognitive and learning problems (Reichman 97-98), as well as mental retardation 
(Case and Paxson 155; Reichman 94). Poor children in developing countries “are 
known to scavenge” for necessities, which exposes them to contaminated water and 
food, disease, and environmental toxins (chemicals, for instance, that have been 
transferred from the industrialized nations) (Suk et al 237). And poor children, in 
general, are more likely than children from affluent families to have “asthma, 
frequent headaches, heart conditions, kidney disease, epilepsy, digestive problems, 
mental retardation, and vision and hearing disorders” (Case and Paxon 156). All of 
these conditions curtail one’s ability to inhibit stimuli (components (a), (c), (d), and 
(f)) and/or one’s chances of receiving adequate stimulation and/or education. As such, 
overall health is a prominent precondition of choice. 
2.11: Key Concepts 
Before proceeding, I must make clear that I do not pretend to have captured a 
full list of the pre-conditions of choice. There are at least three reasons why this is the 
case. First, many other factors—such as drug and alcohol abuse, eating disorders, or 
chronic or extreme pain—may get in the way of choice. Second, the scientific 
research reviewed above is ongoing; future research may reveal factors (e.g., 
additional vital nutrients) that will need to be added to the list as information is 
discovered. As such, at any given moment, a complete list may be impossible to 
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provide. And, third, humans, like all of the world’s creatures, are evolving within 
their environments. Thus, it is at least conceivable that human potentiality could 
change as well, in which case the list of the pre-conditions would change accordingly. 
Still, I have attempted to delineate the main factors that, according to current 
scientific research, may hinder choice.  
Recall Beauvoir’s notion of human ontology from Chapter 1. Human ontology 
was described as an account of the phenomena that show up upon examination of 
human life. I explained that, for Beauvoir, it functions as an implicit thought 
experiment through which one attempts to get at factors that all humans have in 
common. However, I proposed that, instead of relying on this type of thought 
experiment, a pragmatic approach would be to undertake an analysis of the physical 
and conceptual factors that influence choice and structure experience. The foregoing 
scientific examination of the pre-conditions of choice was part of this endeavor (the 
remainder of the analysis will be taken up in Chapter 3). I also explained in Chapter 1 
that Beauvoir’s notion of having an apprenticeship in freedom is related to (although 
not the same as) my account of the pre-conditions. Beauvoir maintained that a 
person’s capacity for choice could be hidden from her view; that is, that given the 
conditions of a person’s facticity (physical and/or conceptual environment), it is 
possible, and even likely (in some situations), that she might not know of, or not 
know the scope of, her capacity for choice—and, hence, her capacity for freedom. On 
Beauvoir’s account, if someone is left to wallow in ignorance, the goal is to set her 
“in the presence of [the] freedom” that she already has (Ethics 98). I have argued 
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(specifically, in the discussion of education (section 2.6)) that this may be the case in 
some instances; ignorance is certainly not conducive to a capacity for choice. 
However, ignorance is not the only issue. There are many different situations in 
which humans are at risk for choice and many factors must obtain for a particular 
person if she will develop a capacity! Thus, the appropriated version of Beauvoir’s 
theory expands upon the notion of having an apprenticeship; it is only if one receives 
the pre-conditions that one will have the requisite neural processes and content. With 
regard to being a chooser, a person will be considered to be in a state of well being if 
and only if she has received the preconditions in sufficient amount throughout 
development and in an ongoing basis during adulthood. Attainment of the pre-
conditions is a continuous process. However, just as different persons may have 
different genetic predispositions such that they require different amounts of the pre-
conditions, so too may different persons require different amounts of them in 
adulthood and as they enter old age.  
 Throughout this chapter, I have introduced several notions that are key to the 
arguments that will be presented in Chapter 4. As such, I want to revisit these notions 
to make explicit their relation to my project. They are: trivial and non-trivial interest, 
novelty, the development of an inner world (i.e., conditioned neural processes) 
including both implicit and explicit neural systems, the importance of choice to the 
notion of humanity, interference and interdependence, and one’s prior interest in the 
pre-conditions of choice. 
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 I noted first off that each of us has needs and wants that constitute, for each, 
interests. A quick survey of one’s own behavior and extrapolation from the 
observation of others should bear this out. Most want at least the basics, such as an 
income adequate to sustain life. Many want more than the basics, such as luxury 
goods, prestige, and power. There are, of course, many different possible scenarios. 
But the fact is that we need and want things (and situations) and we go about trying to 
obtain them—that is, we attempt to fulfill particular interests—through engagement 
with others, concepts, and objects in the world (the interdependent structure of 
engagement will be addressed further in Chapter 3).  
 Now, I have mentioned (in sections 1.5 and 2.1) that people have particular 
non-trivial interests. As such, I need to explain the difference between trivial and non-
trivial interest. Recall that the executive functions that feature large in the neural 
processes of choice are “automatically activated” when implicit neural processes are 
insufficient to deal with the information presented in the environment (Geary 215). 
That is, the neural processes of choice, as explicit or top-down processes, come into 
play when a person is presented with what is to her a novel situation. Accordingly, I 
define trivial interests as those that may be fulfilled without confronting novelty, 
while fulfilling non-trivial interests involves, in every case, recognizing, reacting to, 
and dealing with novelty (the notion of novelty is explained further below). Thus, 
since the neural processes of choice are invoked by confrontation with novelty, 
fulfilling any given particular non-trivial interest will involve the neural processes of 
choice; implicit processes are sufficient for attainment of trivial interest. What will 
 140
count as novel for particular persons will not necessarily be the same as for others. As 
I noted in section 2.6 and will examine further below, the capacity to recognize 
novelty will depend upon the state of one’s neural processes and the extent of the 
content that one has at one’s disposal.  
 I distinguish three types and two sources of novelty. The three types of 
novelty—objective, intersubjective, and subjective—have their origin in one or both 
of the two sources—human interaction and evolutionary forces.21 Objective novelty 
regards the case in which, with regard to all humans, new objects, concepts, and 
practices are present (‘no one has had prior experience with x’); the intersubjective 
regards what is new for a given culture or cultural sub-group (‘no one in culture y or 
cultural sub-group z has had prior experience with x’); and the subjective regards 
what is new for a given person (‘person a has not had prior experience with x’). For 
instance, when the U.S. dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima during World War II, 
the situation was objectively novel; that is, no one on earth had had prior experience 
with atomic weaponry during warfare. Individuals and groups had to extrapolate from 
non-identical previous experience to deal with the aftermath. A similar point may be 
made with regard to global warming. None of us has had first hand experience with 
prior rising global temperatures. It is an objectively novel problem. Moreover, if a 
solution is forthcoming, it will also be novel (innovative) and be both arrived at and 
implemented intersubjectively, lest many of us be unable (due to rising sea levels and 
                                                 
21 There is another possible source of novelty—an extra-atmospheric occurrence (such as, the 
interaction of other objects in the solar system (e.g., asteroids) with our planet)—that is much less 
common than the other two sources. As such, this scenario will not be considered herein. 
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erratic weather patterns) to fulfill our interests. When Cortés and his party arrived at 
the shore of what is now Mexico and initiated contact with the Aztecs, all concerned 
experienced intersubjective novelty. Neither group had had prior experience with the 
other; however, as history demonstrated, the Aztecs were at a distinct disadvantage in 
their dealings with Cortés. They lacked knowledge of Cortés’ intent and of European 
invading forces in general. They were unable to extrapolate from prior experience in 
order to foresee the possibility that their way of life might be decimated. Since they 
lacked this content, they were hindered in their capacities to deal with novelty, to 
make choices, and to continue to fulfill their particular interests (their pursuit of both 
trivial and non-trivial interests was curtailed). When my under-educated friend 
(mentioned in section 2.6) was confronted with the word ‘poll’, she was confronted 
with subjective novelty. This word and its multiple meanings were present (and 
common) within her culture, yet her own prior experience had left her at a 
disadvantage in determining at least one of its common meanings. Her presumed 
interest in effective communication was not fulfilled. One might also experience this 
type of novelty by traveling to a new city and attempting to navigate the roadways 
and subways there. Whether one is up to dealing with these possibilities (getting from 
point A to point B) depends upon her particular neural processes and content. 
 Novelty is, of course, everywhere around us, and it most often has its source 
in human interaction. Novel situations develop when cultures meet (and, more often 
than not, clash) or when, say, one philosopher utilizes another’s writings for a place 
to begin her work or when she asks for a critique from another in order to develop a 
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new thought or theory. It becomes present when a computer programmer receives 
complaints from end-users about the functioning of a program and subsequently 
begins to innovate to solve the problem. It occurs for other (non-U.S.) cultures when 
goods either conceived of or manufactured by U.S. firms show up in their market 
places. It occurred for Indians when McDonalds was opened in India and for 
Mexicans when Taco Bell opened in Mexico. Global climate change, the novel 
concern that potentially affects us all, has also resulted from human interactivity. 
Examples abound. From these and similar interactions, new concepts, words, objects, 
technologies, environmental situations, and so forth come to affect our lives. Novelty 
may also have its source in evolutionary forces, though these biological innovations 
appear to occur at a much slower rate than do the outcomes of human interactivity. 
The point is that novelty, especially the first type, is objectively inescapable. It 
actually is around us. As such, each of us, no matter the state of our neural processes 
or the extent of held content, will be confronted with it. Novelty is a part of our 
world. 
 As explained in section 2.5, one’s neural processes and content are thoroughly 
dependent upon environmental input (Wexler 39). To a very large degree, we are the 
sum total of our interactions with the world. If one has nourishment and sleep, and an 
absence of stress, disease, and toxins, then one is better situated to reap the benefit of 
whatever stimulation/nurture and education are available in one’s environment. Of 
course, the stimulation, nurture, and education must themselves be adequate to further 
develop the executive neural systems, and it is through all of these things combined 
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that one comes to have adequate personal resources. Socio-economic status itself 
greatly predicts whether one will receive some preconditions, such as nutrition and 
education; but education (which requires the other pre-conditions) greatly predicts 
one’s capacity to change one’s socio-economic status. If, for instance, a person is ill-
nourished during her period of development, she will later be at a disadvantage in 
obtaining nourishment and education. If she is under-educated, later she will be at a 
disadvantage if she wants to improve her life through education. Her neural processes 
were not optimally developed in her youth. Presumably, at least some of these 
obstacles may be overcome. If the neural systems in question have not atrophied due 
to nutritional or stimulatory deprivation, there remains a possibility of recovery. 
Although in most areas of the brain we do not generate new neurons (one such 
exception is the hippocampus), we can develop new connections between neurons 
throughout life in response to the demands of the environment. Thus, for instance, if a 
person is merely under-educated, with sufficient help, she may be able to further 
develop the neural pathways and learn the content that are required for choice; 
however, this scenario becomes less and less likely if she has also been malnourished, 
subjected to violence or abuse, systematically deprived of sleep, or exposed to toxins.  
 Whatever the environment has afforded a given person, she has developed 
what Wexler termed an inner world that was cultivated throughout the process of 
development. This is because the brain “recreates in itself a representation of 
environmental input” (Wexler 40), no matter what that input may have been. The 
earlier discussion of the pre-conditions of choice (sections 2.3 through 2.10) 
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demonstrates that the pre-conditions need be present in order for a capacity for choice 
to be part of one’s inner world; but, an inner world of some sort will be actualized in 
any case (at least when the environment provides such that a person persists in her 
existence). As I have explained throughout this chapter, each of us begins with a 
genetic potential and we become what we are through the interaction between that 
potential and the surrounding environment; this is true for all of us. Through this 
interaction, those who persist come to be persons with certain unique qualities. This is 
because the interaction—with one’s caregivers, family, teachers, friends, and so on—
affords each of us different experiences (Wexler 40). That is, a person comes to have 
a particular inner world made up of certain kinds of neural processes and content in a 
way that is dependent upon what this interaction has afforded her.  
 What we come to be and what we come to learn is, especially in our early 
years, beyond our control (Wexler 143). As I explained earlier, the brain is 
structurally and functionally shaped—that is, conditioned—through the interaction 
between genetic potential and the environment, and, of course, both the implicit and 
explicit systems are developed through the process. However, when the prefrontal 
cortex reaches maturity (sometime between 20 and 25 years of age (242)), a different 
situation emerges. At this point, a person’s “internal structures select and value 
sensory input that is consistent with them” (155). Studies have shown, for instance, 
that people prefer external stimuli that are consonant with their internal structures. 
We tend to “aggregate into affiliative networks with other like-minded individuals” 
(145), with regard to political alliances, religious and club memberships, and so forth; 
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we tend to fill-in “incomplete or ambiguous stimuli” with “information from internal 
sources” (150); and we have pleasant or unpleasant emotional reactions to stimuli 
merely based upon familiarity or unfamiliarity, respectively (151-158). This is why 
(as noted in section 2.6) a mature person, who lacks education, is more likely to miss 
rather than recognize novelty when she is exposed to it. She is taking the world, as far 
as she can, to reflect her inner world. Having been exposed to fewer types of things 
and fewer distinctions, she attempts to make everything fit within fewer categories. 
The one who is most likely to recognize novelty then is the one who has experienced 
an enriched environment made up of many different kinds of objects, people, and 
experiences. She will be making finer distinctions regarding her environment and she 
will be more likely to recognize anything that is incongruent with her varied 
experiences. Moreover, the notion that there can be and are new things will be part of 
her content. In short, she has more to work with. 
 Three types of scenarios seem possible. First, (A) the implicit systems may be 
conditioned such that one can recognize novelty (of any type), and call into play 
adequately conditioned and developed explicit systems that are capable of reacting to 
and dealing with novelty. Second, (B) the implicit may invoke the explicit, but the 
latter may be inadequate. Or, third, (C) the implicit may be unable to recognize 
novelty such that the explicit systems are not invoked (in this case, it is likely that the 
explicit systems would also be inadequate). If a person has had the pre-conditions of 
choice and thus also has the cognitive, social, and emotional neural processes 
involved in choosing, she has been taught to think in a way that is, as much as 
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possible, non-dependent. To be sure, as Wexler points out (40), there is no case in 
which one’s neural processes are entirely separate from (that is, independent of) the 
environment, but, when one has reached maturity, there are greater and lesser degrees 
of dependency. A person with a capacity for choice can conceptually remove herself 
from her immediate environment in order to project herself into different possible 
futures; she can extrapolate—given her neural processes and content—to another 
non-identical or, perhaps, even radically different case; she has an effective capacity 
to change her activities or her environment in order to fulfill particular non-trivial 
interests. So while her neural processes and thought will never be independent, in that 
they in every case derive from her interaction with her environment, they need not be 
dependent either.  
 Persons in the second and third scenarios ((B) and (C)) are not so well 
situated, because, in either case, they act purely from the implicit neural systems. 
They are fully prepared to do exactly what they have been trained to do during their 
period of development, but they lack the capacity to extrapolate and go beyond. One 
might object though that these persons have preferences and certainly select them. 
They determine, for example, whether or not to get up and walk across the room and 
whether to eat spaghetti or pizza for dinner (among other things). Are they not 
making choices? Not according to the definition of choice set out in section 2.2. 
Instead, such a person is selecting a preference from among objects and activities 
with which she is already familiar. We all (even those of us who have a capacity for 
choice) engage in preference selection on a daily basis. In such cases, novelty is not 
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present. Here, a person need only utilize her implicit neural systems to carry out 
whatever task is before her. Preference selection is then sufficient to fulfill particular 
trivial interests, but that is all. Where novelty is present, a capacity for choice (not for 
preference selection) is required to fulfill particular non-trivial interests. 
 Since many factors affect development, many different outcomes are possible 
within these three broad types. A person who has experienced intense deprivation 
with regard to nutrition and nurture (and who thus experiences corresponding 
cognitive deficits, social difficulties, emotional disturbances, and responses to stress) 
will be in very different place with regard to choice than either a person who has 
received most of the preconditions but who also experienced physical abuse in her 
home or another for whom all the preconditions except adequate educational 
exposure are present. While all three are disadvantaged, one presumes that the latter 
person is better off. Since so much is involved, it will be best to conceive of the 
multitude of possibilities as being on a continuum, with non-survival on one end and 
a full capacity to innovate in the face of novelty at the other. The threshold for choice 
will then lie somewhere between the two, although somewhat closer to the latter 
(choice is not at the end of the continuum because a capacity for choice concerns 
dealing with novelty which need not be the same as innovating when it is present). 
For heuristic purposes, I distinguish five areas on the continuum (as science advances, 
finer distinctions may become possible).  
 Area 1 includes those situations in which the pre- or post-natal environment 
fails to sustain life or where little more than what is necessary to sustain life is 
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present. This area includes, then, those with neural tube defects and those who die 
young from lack of one or more of the preconditions; it also includes those who 
experience early global deprivation, mental retardation due to early micro-nutrient 
deprivation, and disabling disease that prevents most interactions with the 
environment. These people either will not develop a capacity whatsoever for choice 
or they are severely at risk and are most unlikely to do so; they will also be limited 
with regard to preference selection and attainment of trivial interest—that is, their 
daily activities will likely be limited—given the conditions under which their 
development occurred. 
 Area 2 involves those situations where many of the preconditions are present 
but certain key ingredients, that facilitate both one’s neural processes and educational 
opportunities, are missing. People in this area may be suffering, for instance, from 
chronic mild malnutrition, intense or chronic stress, the effects of child abuse, the 
fallout of situational violence, and/or systematically inflicted lack of sleep. Two 
issues are apparent here. First, it is important to note that the research indicates that 
merely being from a low socio-economic background puts one at risk for some of 
these things. And, second, it does not appear possible, given the current state of the 
neural research, to make the desired distinctions within this area. By my estimation, it 
includes far too many possibilities. For instance, surely one who has experienced a 
relatively short episode of intense stress is better off with regard to choice than 
another who has been exposed to such a stressor for an extended period of time (the 
age at which one experiences the stressor may also be relevant). The problem is that 
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there does not at present seem to be a way to compare whether someone who suffers 
from chronic mild malnutrition is better or worse off than someone who is chronically 
exposed to violence. As such, area 2 includes people who may be severely to 
moderately at risk for choice and who will likely be able to fulfill many more trivial 
interests through preference selection than those in area 1.   
 Area 3 consists of two kinds of conditions. First, it includes those situations in 
which all of the preconditions are present except for adequate education. It seems to 
me that a person from this category would be significantly better off than a person 
from either area 1 or area 2, because presumably many of the neural processes 
involved in choice will be present and active, though perhaps not sufficiently 
developed. What this person lacks is practice at utilizing these neural pathways (such 
practice literally grows the pathways) and content for her deliberations. She may even 
be able, to a small extent, to deal with certain kinds of novelty, those instances that do 
not stray too far from that which is familiar, especially if she can attempt to dispel 
whatever form of novelty confronts her. Second, area 3 also involves cases where a 
capacity for choice has been enabled (all the preconditions have been present during 
development), but the current environment, during adulthood, does not allow for 
maintenance of it. Presumably, once appropriate conditions are restored, the capacity 
will be as well. As such, persons in this area are only mildly at risk for choice. 
Moreover, what they will be able to attain through preference selection will be 
significantly more than persons in either areas 1 or 2, since their environment has 
provided significantly more for them. 
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 Areas 4 and 5 include those situations in which all of the preconditions have 
been provided throughout development and, moreover, continue to be present in 
adulthood for maintenance of the capacity. Thus, not only do these persons have well 
developed implicit systems, they also have a full capacity for choice. I maintain a 
distinction between the two areas because they are separated by the degree to which 
the persons involved are prepared to deal with novelty. Persons in area 5 are fully 
prepared to innovate when confronted with new or complicated situations; they are 
able, via interaction with others and the environment, to devise new concepts, objects, 
and procedures that may be implemented by themselves and others. Those in area 4 
are more likely to imitate what those in area 5 have implemented, but are able to do 
so in an effective way. Of course, then, persons pass from area 4 to 5 and back. A 
person who is prepared to innovate in one context of life will likely imitate 
adaptations that others have created in other contexts. The point is that persons in 
areas 4 and 5 are capable of innovating and/or adapting to novelty. They have a fully 
developed capacity for choice and are, as such, fully capable of attaining both their 
trivial and non-trivial interests. Alternately, the people in areas 1 and 2 are more 
likely to miss novelty when they are confronted with it; they will be restricted to 
preference selection and attaining only the trivial interests that were addressed during 
development. Although those in area 3 will be able to attain more trivial interests, 
they are more likely to be ill-equipped to deal with novelty even if they are aware of 
its presence.  
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 I turn now to the notion of humanity that has so far been left implicit in what 
has been presented. As I pointed out in section 2.2, the executive neural processes—
that result from the potentially well developed and well connected prefrontal cortex—
and mental functions—such as, amplified and sustained attention, extensive working 
and long-term memory, inhibition of irrelevant stimuli, simulation of multiple 
possibilities, putting oneself in the place of another, and responding effectively to 
emotional stimuli—involved in the capacity for choice are unique to humans. While 
non-human animals have intricate and highly developed neural processes that are 
well-suited to facilitate these animals flourishing in their own niches, non-human 
animals seem to be restricted in general (via the types of neural functions at their 
disposal) to considering their own physical state and the actual or potential physical 
context around them (Deacon 426). Humans, on the other hand, have, by virtue of 
their genetics, a potential capacity to conceptually detach from their physical 
surroundings. That is, on earth only the human has the capacity (if it is enabled) to 
escape concrete thinking in order to build mental models that include multiple non-
physically present possibilities at once. And this capacity not only makes the human 
unique, it also opens to her the possibility of freedom. She can think of and do 
something radically different than the options present in her immediate environment 
(she can, for instance, forego many daily opportunities in order to focus all of her 
energy upon obtaining a distant goal, such as traveling to a distant continent, 
obtaining a degree in higher education, or writing a book). And this capacity is the 
reason why she has the dignity of self-determination. Moreover, as I have argued, 
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these neural processes are how we get along in the world—that is, fulfill our non-
trivial interests—and how we adapt to an ever changing environment and/or change it 
to suit ourselves. Since the neural processes of choice are what makes us unique, are 
what enable the possibility of freedom and the dignity of self-determination, and are 
how we come to be able to flourish in an increasingly novel environment, these 
processes also are the core of our humanity. The capacity for choice is the essential 
component of humanness itself.  
 The notion that humans are dignified in that they are choosers is central to the 
tradition of liberal philosophical theorizing. Thus, many readers may intuitively 
accept the argument presented above. Still, before proceeding, I will consider two 
objections to the argument. First, the notion of uniqueness, one might argue, is not 
strong enough to provide grounds for a lofty notion like humanity. Surely we have 
other unique qualities, such as the capacities for reason and communication through 
symbolic language, that are just as well suited to uphold the notion. Second, what if 
humans possessed some other unique attribute, like a genetic potential to acquire the 
capacity to balance chairs on their noses? Should we then take it that chair balancing 
is the core of our notion of humanity? Certainly, we do have these other unique 
qualities, but we have four good reasons—namely, (1) that choice is a unique 
capacity, (2) that it enables the possibility of freedom, (3) that it defines dignity via 
self-determination, and (4) that it functions as our primary adaptive strategy—to 
accept choice as the appropriate candidate. Neither of the other two options 
(rationality and symbolic communication) accord with all four of these reasons.  
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 The philosopher, whose domain of study precisely is reasoning, has 
historically separated the rational or cognitive portion of what I call choice (usually 
ignoring the emotional and social aspects of it) and divorced it from its evolutionary 
purpose of enabling adequate functioning in the world. In separating off cognition, 
this philosopher (for instance, Kant) considered reason as an end in itself and forgot 
its quite practical origin. This is perhaps fine as long as the philosopher would also 
remember that the emotional and social neural processes are a significant part of 
functioning in the world. Many philosophers (such as those who study practical 
and/or strategic reasoning) recognize that while the human reasoning capacity may 
well be unique, it cannot alone enable freedom and define dignity; first, because 
every potential action is run past the emotional system of the brain before the action 
is executed (component (e)), and, second, because there are always others who figure 
into our mental models (component (d)). That is, in order to determine the best course 
of action for myself, I always have to take into account the possible actions of others. 
Freedom and the dignity of self-determination require the emotional and social neural 
processes as much as they do the cognitive. So while, cognition is an important part 
of our adaptive strategy, it alone cannot suffice.  
 It may also be possible to argue (perhaps even successfully) that language use 
is part of what makes humans unique, that the use of it over the millennia has helped 
develop the abstract reasoning and social neural processes involved in choice, and 
that it is a significant part of our adaptive strategy. Terrence Deacon, for example, 
argues for all three of these points (among other things) in The Symbolic Species. 
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However, even if one concedes all three points, one problem remains. Language use 
does not in itself explain the dignity of self-determination. Although we may find 
dignity in our ability to speak, human dignity requires the notion of being non-
constrained. If I hold a person in chains or if I subject her to slavery, it is first and 
foremost her dignity I offend, because she takes herself to be a person who could do 
other than my bidding. She can, via the processes I have delineated throughout this 
chapter, come to be a non-dependent thinker and she finds dignity in this possibility. 
Our own neural processes find dignity in the notion that they are potentially 
unconstrained via the capacity to plan and execute a non-dependently determined 
course of action. So, while language use may be intimately connected to the capacity 
for choice (many of the neural processes involved in language are also those active 
during choice), it does not satisfy all of the criteria laid out above.   
 But what of the second objection? If balancing chairs were a unique attribute 
of humans, would it not thereby also be a candidate for the explanation of humanity? 
In formulating this objection, the philosopher is using cognition (part of what makes 
her human) to assess the suggestion. Chair balancing only looks like a silly 
substitution for the core of humanity, because cognition is subjecting the substitute to 
its own criteria of judgment. That is, if chair balancing were a unique attribute of 
humans in general in virtue of our genetic predispositions and were central to our 
evolutionary adaptation, we would have developed a multitude of neural processes 
that support the practice. It would not look silly, but instead like a sensible mode of 
activity, just as now the suggestion that reason is central to humanity looks sensible to 
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the philosopher. Our own neural processes make it appear so! But as noted above, it 
is not the case that one type of neural function facilitates the human’s unique capacity 
for freedom, dignity, and adaptation to novelty. The neural processes that support 
emotional and social behavior must also be included. 
 A person who has received the pre-conditions of choice enjoys great 
advantage in her day to day activities in the world. Her unique potential has been 
enabled; she has the capacity to be free and to live in a dignified way; she is well 
situated to recognize, react to, and deal with novelty as she unavoidably confronts it 
in her environment. A person who has not received the pre-conditions, on the other 
hand, experiences great disadvantage. Her unique attribute, her very humanity, is 
offended; her potential is thwarted. To her detriment, she will have difficulty with or 
no capacity for making choices; she may not even recognize novelty in her 
environment, however unavoidable such a confrontation may be. She is ill-equipped 
to fulfill her own non-trivial interests, and her attainment of trivial interest may be 
limited. If she will develop a capacity for choice, she will need significant help. But 
in this aspect of her condition is she any different than one who has received the pre-
conditions? 
 There is not one single person who has received the pre-conditions that did so 
on her own. All of us require help. That is, each of us requires active interference 
because we are born into and develop within an interdependent world (the notions of 
inactive interference and interdependence will be addressed in Chapter 3). Consider 
the case of a new born just entering the world. She has before her as many potential 
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outcomes as all the different scenarios I have discussed in this chapter and more. She 
has the potential to incur neural tube defects, mental retardation, cognitive deficits, or 
difficulties with regard to theory of mind from a deficiency in micronutrients; she 
may receive adequate or inadequate stimulation, nurture, and education, or none at 
all; she may or may not experience stress, malnutrition, sleep, disease, and sanitary 
environmental conditions. She may come to have the neural processes of choice; she 
may be constrained to preference selection. She begins with a potential trajectory 
toward each and every scenario. The thing that makes the difference is active human 
interference! Obviously, if no one actively interferes at all, she will, unimpeded, 
follow a trajectory toward death. If someone obstructs the path toward this potential 
outcome by giving her nutritious food, care, and an education, she is set on the course 
toward becoming a chooser. The point is that in every case, no matter what potential 
is actualized, interference is required. She will not become anything on her own. Even 
her thoughts (content) are dependent upon her environment. If a person persists in her 
existence, interference happens. The question regards its quality. 
 This child is physically and conceptually vulnerable; she is utterly dependent, 
as are all of us in our youth. Shall we say, for instance, that it is the responsibility of 
the caregiver(s) to provide for all of her needs? Of course, there really is no case in 
which the caregiver does this by herself. Being able to give the pre-conditions is 
dependent upon having first received them (recall that persons project their internal 
structure onto the world). If one can facilitate for another the pre-conditions of 
choice, countless others—caregivers, siblings, extended family, friends, and so on—
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have intervened in her life. And, at least in modern society, many more people are 
involved. One relies on the farmers not to deplete (via overuse or chemicals) the 
nutrients from the soil so that the food that is produced will be life sustaining. One 
counts on manufacturers to produce non-toxic and safe goods. One depends upon 
teachers and school administrators to impart useful and accurate information. One 
utilizes objects, including the concepts that are embedded in those objects, in 
everyday life as well as in helping another to develop. These objects, as discussed at 
length in section 2.5, strongly influence the child’s (and to some extent, the adult’s) 
neural processes. Moreover, in learning language, innumerable others impact the 
child’s thought. That is, all of us are part of an interdependent web of 
interconnections and interactions that either provides for each the pre-conditions or 
not. No caregiver ever provides or fails to do so on her own. 
 We each have numerous non-trivial interests on an on-going basis because 
novelty is objectively a part of life. As such, we have a prior interest in the pre-
conditions of choice. And since we need the pre-conditions throughout adulthood, 
this prior interest is unceasing. Thus, we also have a prior interest in all these others 
who interfere in our lives and either help or hinder our chances at receiving the pre-
conditions. Through no fault of their own, millions upon millions of people in the 
world have been left without access to one or more of the pre-conditions. Their very 
humanity is thereby offended. They are at best capable of preference selection and 
attainment of trivial interest. The many scientific studies discussed throughout this 
chapter demonstrate that intervention in these situations is possible. We can create 
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situations in which the pre-conditions are available to everyone. The question is 
whether we have a reason (perhaps even a moral imperative) to do so.  
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Chapter Three: The Conditions of Choice and the Impact of Culture 
3.1: Introduction 
 I have shown, in Chapter 2, how one comes to obtain the pre-conditions of 
choice. Each of us is initially entirely dependent upon others in the process; each has 
no say whatsoever in what others do for us or regarding what they are able to do 
given the knowledge and resources (or lack thereof) previously provided for them. If 
one receives the pre-conditions, one becomes increasingly capacitated in obtaining 
them for oneself and providing them for others in the future and also becomes more 
and more likely to develop a capacity for choice. Barring currently non-preventable 
genetic malformities, all of us have the potential to develop a capacity for choice. But 
for many, this potential has not been or will not be actualized, because millions upon 
millions of people live without some or many of the pre-conditions. And, since choice 
is the core of the notion of humanity, these persons’ humanity or personhood is 
thereby offended. This is, at least prima facie, a problematic situation, since what they 
lack is active human interference and since those of us who enjoy an actualized 
potential only do so because of the interference we have received. Part of the issue is 
that persons whose potentials have not been actualized will be at a disadvantage in 
fulfilling their own non-trivial interests—that is, in conceiving of, recognizing, and 
dealing with novelty in their daily engagements with the world. While the prior 
chapter was concerned with certain features of the environment whose presence or 
absence affect a human’s neural processes of choice, this chapter will focus on an 
analysis of the structure of the impacting environment. The issues that will be 
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addressed are: engagement and its overwhelmingly symbolic attributes; an argument 
against the idea that persons are or can be self-reliant; as well as an analysis and 
description of intra-cultural interdependence, the conditions of choice, and inter-
cultural interdependence.  
3.2: Engagement and Symbolic Interpretation/Contribution 
Engagement (or what Beauvoir called disclosure), recall from section 1.5, is 
the interpretation and contribution of objects and/or signification throughout the daily 
activities of life. It is a basic description of what people do in every culture and every 
situation around the world. As such, it is part of the structure of human experience in 
general. On a practical level, engagement is the on-going activity of life—
communication with others, obtaining what one needs or wants (such as the pre-
conditions), caring for oneself and one’s dependents, and so forth—through which 
each attempts to fulfill her particular trivial or non-trivial interests. These 
engagements are part of what it takes to get along in the niche humans fill on earth. 
We work, play, cooperate, compete, and converse and, in doing so, we create the 
objects present in and the concepts relevant to human life. In any action or inaction, 
one interprets some object and/or signification that is present to one’s neural 
processes and contributes in response some further object and/or signification. Since 
interpretation occurs on an ongoing basis as one perceives the environment, 
determines what is there, and how it will be understood, how any particular person 
engages will depend upon what neural processes and content she has at her disposal. 
The nature of her engagement is then dependent upon what she has experienced and 
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been exposed to in her background (such as the pre-conditions of choice). The 
signification or meaning that a person projects is an outward expression of the 
interaction between her inner world—the neural processes and content that were 
cultivated during the process of development and which she cannot help but 
employ—and situations in the external environment. Her response is then affected by 
whether or not the internal and external environments cohere or conflict (this notion 
will be addressed further in section 3.4). 
It is important to understand that any response at all (even, as I will explain, 
inactivity or an apparent lack of response) is a contribution. It is clear that a 
contribution occurs when a response is active; for instance, persons contribute when 
they create objects via cooking, carrying out hobbies, manufacturing, creating 
artwork, and so on. Each of these activities contributes both some object and some 
meaning. That is, in each case, such a creation includes some projection of 
signification (meaning or concept) on the part of the creator (and on the part of the 
perceiver). It is not possible to contribute a physical object without adding meaning as 
well; one cannot produce a piece of art without affirming, denying, adding to, 
altering, or somehow making reference to some previously created object or meaning. 
However, it is possible to project a concept into the environment without adding some 
new object. When I behold a work of art, pausing in front of it for a shorter or longer 
period of time, indicating that I find it worthy of my attention or not, I project the 
signification that accords with my activity (or apparent inactivity) without producing 
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any new object. Whether I create, behold, ignore, or altogether avoid the artwork, my 
action or inaction projects some signification.  
More mundane examples may be useful. Perhaps a stranger stops me on the 
street to ask for directions. In responding, I interpret the request (the words that this 
other has uttered) and I contribute both my response (the directions) as well as the 
signification that helping this stranger (and strangers in general) is worthwhile. If I 
ignore the request, I contribute something quite different; I may indicate, for instance, 
that I believe that my immediate goals (e.g., getting to the store or work on time) are 
more important than this person or helping others. If I witness two children playing 
ball on a warm sunny day in the park and I do nothing but watch their activity with a 
contented facial expression, I project into the world a signification that says I approve 
of and perhaps enjoy watching their activity. If I, on the other hand, intercept the ball 
and throw it into a nearby pond, my actions express disapproval of the children’s 
game. The precise reason for my action, presuming that it was undertaken 
purposively (I didn’t catch the ball while inadvertently stretching my arms to reduce 
fatigue and then sneeze, accidentally propelling the ball into the pond), may not be 
obvious; but, at the very least, my actions express some sort of personal displeasure 
with the children’s activity. Perhaps I also demonstrate that within my inner world I 
have developed a dislike of children, games, or play. If their caretaker then throws me 
into the water after the ball, she expresses both a disapproval of my actions and an 
internal disposition not to tolerate any bullying of those in her care (and maybe 
others). If she is not the children’s caretaker but is merely passing by and undertakes 
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the same action in response to mine, she displays an intolerance of bullying in 
general. If she merely gazes at me as I appraise my deed (if she displays no anger, 
frustration, or bewilderment at my action), she offers her tacit approval. Likewise, if, 
after just happening upon the scene, I witness one child attack or bully the other and I 
attempt to stop the child’s actions by yelling “hey, stop that”, my action expresses 
disapproval of bullying. If I watch the scene with a worried facial expression, my 
action indicates both my disapproval and an apparent belief that further action will be 
ineffective or unjustified. If I ignore the children and/or display no discomfort while 
watching, I offer my implicit assent.  
These examples provide evidence that inaction as well as action (including 
words and facial and bodily movements) project meaning; both add signification to 
other actions and events in the world. I will return to this notion again in section 3.4. 
The main point for the moment is that each activity or inactivity makes a conceptual 
contribution for two reasons: first, because each activity or inactivity expresses a 
preference selection or choice (depending upon what neural processes and content the 
person has at her disposal and whether novelty is present), and, second, because 
humans are such that they interpret actions and inactions as having such meaning (if a 
given person is the only one present, she still interprets her own action). The first 
point has been largely covered in section 2.11. When a person undertakes an action or 
not, she does so based, in part, upon her inner world. Many of her actions/inactions 
are preference selections; some, if she has had the pre-conditions, are choices. 
Whatever she does or does not do will be largely in keeping with the potentiality of 
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her own internal structures. The second point above has not yet been fully addressed. 
As such, I will briefly consider what type of interpretation is most common to 
humans, why this is the case, and what that entails regarding the structure of 
engagement (interpreting and contributing).  
Following Terrence Deacon, I differentiate three types of interpretive 
processes that correspond to the three types of signs (described in the next paragraph 
below) distinguished by Charles S. Peirce.22 Peirce defined a sign as “[a]nything 
which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an object to which itself 
refers (its object) in the same way” (“Signs” 239); that is, a sign determines an 
interpretant to assume a relation to the object in the same way that the sign itself is 
related to the object. According to this definition, there are three components to every 
sign: the object under consideration, the sign which refers to the object, and an 
interpretant which is a particular sort of response to the sign. As Deacon explains, the 
interpretant is the process that enables one to determine what the sign refers to 
(Deacon 63). That to which the sign refers will be dependent upon the type of 
interpretive process that is present in the response to the sign. The song of a bird, for 
instance, may be a sign to another bird of the same species that the former is ready to 
mate; for a cat, the same song may be a sign indicating a potential meal in the 
vicinity; whereas, for a person, the song may call to mind previous experiences of 
bird songs, it may point to an annoying creature that often or periodically makes a 
                                                 
22 Peirce was a philosopher and scientist who is often referred to as the founder of American 
Pragmatism. 
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noise that precipitates waking from a peaceful sleep, or it may, perhaps, symbolize 
the beauty of nature. The different interpretations of the sign depend upon the 
different processes that are present for the bird, the cat, and the human, and this, of 
course, is determined to a large degree by the type of physical apparatus the being in 
question has with which to carry out the interpretation. 
As noted above, Peirce distinguished three broad types of signs: the icon, the 
index, and the symbol (“Signs” 239), and a sign can be all three depending on the 
capacity of the interpretant (for instance, in the example above, the same person may 
have, within a second or two, entertained all three of the noted interpretations which 
correspond to the three types of signs). An icon is a sign which represents in virtue of 
a similarity between the sign and its object (Peirce, “Neglected Argument” 270; 
“One, Two, Three” 181). As Deacon explains, “pictures of all kinds are iconic of 
what they depict” (Deacon 71), but the resemblance need not be visual. Iconic 
interpretations may be of scents, sounds, textures, and tastes as well. When the 
human, in the example above, determined that the bird song was similar to other bird 
songs she had previously heard, she interpreted the sign (bird song) as an icon. The 
second type, an index, is a sign that represents in virtue of a stable representation 
(Peirce, “Neglected Argument” 270)—via co-occurrence or by physical or temporal 
contiguity—such that the sign is taken to be indicative of the object. A thermometer 
indicates the temperature much like a windsock does the direction of the wind 
(Deacon 71); a paw print on the ground suggests that an animal has previously passed 
by. Deacon points out that most “forms of animal communication have this quality, 
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from pheromonal odors (that indicate an animal’s physiological state or proximity) to 
alarm calls (that indicate the presence of a dangerous predator)” (Deacon 71). Three 
of the interpretations in the bird song example above—the second human response as 
well as the responses assigned to the bird and the cat—are also indexical. The bird 
song indicates a potential mate, dinner, and irritation for the bird, cat, and human, 
respectively, due to previous and repeated associations. The family dog scratches at 
its bowl to express its desire for food, because food has been repeatedly served in the 
bowl; if food is instead consistently served in a pile in the corner, the indexical 
association between the food and the bowl will be lost and the dog will (after some 
time) cease scratching on the bowl. Lastly, for Peirce, symbols are signs “that 
represent their [o]bjects essentially because they are so interpreted” (“Neglected 
Argument” 270); that is, a symbol represents its object in virtue of convention or 
agreement (whether implicit or explicit). This is the case with the last human 
response in the bird song example; the person in question takes the song to symbolize 
her conception of the beauty of nature. It is also the case with many (if not most) 
other human actions and inactions. Speech is always symbolically interpreted (unless 
it is directed at a being (such as a dog) that lacks the ability for symbolic 
interpretation), as are written words, business contracts (my signature is a symbol of 
my willingness to fulfill the contract), marriage contracts, and nearly all other cultural 
artifacts. A marriage certificate symbolizes the union of two people (although the 
exact specifications of that union may be different in different contexts), a religious 
ceremony symbolizes a group’s shared beliefs, and an assigned grade may be said to 
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symbolize the achievement or perceived effort of a student. A person’s silence (for 
instance, sitting quietly in a corner) during a social gathering (i.e., inactivity with 
regard to cultural expectations within the situation) may be interpreted by others as 
signifying the person’s snobbery, shyness, or ineptitude in social situations, 
depending on the neural processes and content of the interpreters (others at the 
gathering) and other signs that may be obtained from the context or situation.   
Cultural artifacts, objects, activities, inactivities, events, and situations gain 
meaning from the tacit or express agreement that they shall have such meaning or 
signification, and they are interpreted as such because humans—the beings who have 
developed an inner world that includes the symbolic significations in question—are 
the interpreters! As Deacon explains, the human species is predisposed toward 
symbolic interpretation for the same reason that people can, under certain 
circumstances, develop a capacity for choice. That is, many of the same neural 
processes that facilitate choice also enable symbolic interpretation. Humans have a 
relatively easy time dealing with symbols when compared to non-human primates 
(studies of chimpanzees have shown that primates can be taught to use symbols in a 
limited way (Deacon 401)), due to the human’s “disproportionately enlarged . . . 
prefrontal cortex and a shift in connectivity favoring prefrontal connections in other 
[neural] systems” (255). A well developed prefrontal cortex enables a person to 
understand and manipulate “higher-order associative relationships” (264), and this 
capacity to hierarchically categorize is essential for an efficient use of symbols. The 
process by which a person’s inner world is developed was considered at length 
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throughout Chapter 2. What happens to a person during development actually 
structures the functional processes of her brain. Then, since symbolic interpretation is 
dependent upon these functional processes, people raised in enriched environments 
may have greater capacities for symbolic interpretation (they may generate and 
understand more of it), while those from disadvantaged environments may have lesser 
capacities. However, as Deacon points out, barring those of us who are completely 
neglected during our early years, most of this variation is above the threshold 
necessary for the acquisition of some symbolic interpretive capacities (412). For 
instance, nearly all of us, including many of those with genetic malformities and even 
most of the Romanian orphans, are capable of speech. Then, although people are also 
usually quite capable of interpreting iconically and/or indexically, since humans are 
such that they tend to interpret symbolically, their contributions—made up of the 
intended signification put forth by the conveyer and the signification received by the 
interpreter—will also tend to be symbolic in nature. In general, we see the world from 
a symbolic/conceptual point of view, in which every activity, inactivity, and object 
has some signification or meaning. 
Culture itself may be defined as a shared evolving system of meaning (Staub, 
Psychology of Good 289; see also Strauss and Quinn 10), such that members of a 
culture will tend to agree on a range of possible interpretations regarding what is 
present in their environment. This is because people not only develop within and 
internalize cultural significations during their period of development, they also, 
through their contributions throughout their lifetimes, change cultural meanings 
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across generations (Rogoff 37); that is, people and the varied and multiple influences 
of culture mutually create each other (37). However, while people in every culture (or 
sub-culture) share meanings, their significations are not necessarily shared across 
cultures. For instance, when a person in the U.S. clenches her fist and extends her 
thumb upward, she symbolizes her approval of some action or event, while in most 
parts of the Middle East the same gesture signifies an expletive. At this point in the 
analysis, it is clear, however, that people all over the world do have at least two things 
in common: first, they are meaning interpreters and contributors and, second, they 
accord importance and prominence to their own symbolic understandings (this latter 
point will be addressed again in section 3.6).  
As I will explain (in section 3.4), these shared systems of evolving 
significations create a conceptual interdependency within communities, such that a 
meaning contributed by a given person may come to affect the others who share her 
system; some contributions may also have significant consequences for choice. 
Moreover, since, in the modern world, members of different cultures necessarily 
come into contact (people, products, and ideas now cross cultural boundaries and 
national borders on a daily basis) a novel type of conceptual interdependency (born of 
sharing ideas and the conflict that often happens during contact between the different 
types of inner worlds created in different cultures) also occurs. This latter type of 
interdependency will be discussed in section 3.6, but first I will need to address the 
notion of self-reliance (since some version of it is held in many sub-cultures of the 
U.S. and in most Western cultures) in order to show that those who take the concept 
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of self-reliance to be applicable to the self are actually part of an interdependent web 
of actions, objects, and signification. 
3.3: Self-reliance versus Interdependence 
 In the U.S. (and other Western cultures), adults tend to acknowledge the fact 
that as children they were dependent; they could not have supplied, for instance, their 
own food, clothing, and schooling. However, upon reaching adulthood, people tend, 
in general, to think of themselves as being self-reliant; they see themselves as 
independent persons who rely upon their own resources, judgments, and capabilities. 
They tend to try to instill the same respect for self-reliance in their children. Middle-
class parents in the U.S. often “report that it is important for a child’s developing 
independence and self-reliance to sleep apart” from parents which is said to help 
“reduce the baby’s dependence” (Rogoff 195). The American adolescent is culturally 
encouraged to separate from her parents in order to “‘stand on [her] own two feet’ 
and be self-made” (194). However, adults in many other cultures and communities 
hold a notion of themselves that is quite contrary to this conception. In Japan, for 
instance, “great attention is given to continued reciprocity and primary ties with 
family” (194); their general view is that “cosleeping facilitates infants’ transformation 
from separate individuals to be able to engage in interdependent relationships” (198). 
Others, such as the Kaluli of Papua New Guinea, have a view of themselves as being 
both connected and autonomous. Since they value both, they cultivate in children a 
“responsibility to coordinate with the group” while giving them “the freedom to do 
otherwise” (202). In the U.S., children are taken as dependent creatures that must, 
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eventually, separate; in Japan, they are believed to be independent beings that must be 
brought into the fold; in Papua New Guinea, children must be taught a balance 
between interdependent and autonomous behaviors. It would seem then that there are 
many concepts available by which to organize people’s understandings of the 
relations between them. A group may organize themselves around a concept of self-
reliance, connectedness, or something between the two.  
 However, my goal in this section is to deconstruct the concept of self-reliance. 
I argue that, no matter the conception that persons in different cultures may hold 
regarding the status of their relatedness to others, all persons are, in fact, 
interdependent, where interdependence is defined as a need for tacit and/or express 
coordination with others for conceptual understandings, physical necessities, and 
possessions. Alternately, dependency is defined as reliance upon another or some 
particular set of others for conceptual understandings, physical necessities, and 
possessions; and self-reliance is, then, defined as relying only upon the self in 
attaining these things. Moreover, I demonstrate that a person who maintains that she 
is self-reliant in this respect commits a performative contradiction. In section 2.11 I 
argued that persons, who have/have had the pre-conditions, have a capacity to think 
and act in a way that is non-dependent. That is, a person with choice can conceptually 
remove herself from her immediate environment in order to extrapolate beyond the 
conditions in which she finds herself and beyond the concepts being employed by 
those around her. Thus, if the deconstruction of the concept of self-reliance is 
successful, it does not entail that any person is necessarily dependent. Persons with 
 172
choice are non-dependent even if it can be shown that self-reliance (as defined above) 
is a concept that is inapplicable to any human activity/inactivity.  
 I begin by considering a descriptive example, constructed by Claudia Strauss 
and Naomi Quinn. I should note that these authors’ purpose in providing the example 
(to offer a descriptive example in social-psychology) is very different from my own 
purpose in using it. Strauss and Quinn explain how the members of an American 
middle-class nuclear family may come to have the conceptual understanding that they 
are, and should be, self-reliant and that others should be as well. Through their own 
up-bringings, the fictional parents in the example, Paula and Michael, have come to 
hold the notion that self-reliance is appropriate and desirable (Strauss and Quinn 112-
113). That is, via their interaction with parents, teachers, television, clubs, friends, 
and so forth, Paula’s and Michael’s inner worlds have come to include a strong belief 
that persons should undertake action/inaction that is interpreted (by themselves and 
by others in their cultural group) as being consistent with the concept of self-reliance. 
Thus, the first thing to note, and this is clear from the analysis in Chapter 2, is that 
neither Paula nor Michael nor any other person in a similar situation has acquired the 
concept of self-reliance on her own. Many others have instilled this very public and 
shared notion within them during their period of development. Strauss and Quinn 
point out that when young people frequently encounter concepts (such as the 
desirability of self-reliance, certain religious beliefs, or particular political 
affiliations) at home, summer camp, “day care, school, and extracurricular activities . 
. .” (the point being, in nearly all of the settings with which they come into contact), it 
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not only reinforces the perceived truth and importance of the notion in question, it 
“also broaden[s the] . . . definition” of the concept (Strauss and Quinn 119). The 
encountered notion then becomes an extremely important part of the affected person’s 
inner world (112-120);23 and, as Wexler points out, persons experience discomfort or 
distress when they entertain information that conflicts with the internal structure that 
was cultivated in them during development (Wexler 170 and 201). We tend to 
aggregate with others who, through their behavior and words, exhibit similar inner 
worlds, utilize information from our inner worlds to make sense of “incomplete or 
ambiguous stimuli”, and prefer objects, actions, people, and events merely if they are 
familiar and cohere with the representations we hold within ourselves (145-158). That 
is, we feel an affinity with other persons who exhibit, via their actions/inactions, a 
belief in and an acceptance of concepts that are the same as or similar to the concepts 
we hold. 
 Strauss and Quinn refer to this phenomenon as “elective affinity” (120). In 
this example, Paula and Michael, recreate and reproduce, both intentionally and 
unintentionally, the “patterns of experience”, from their own upbringings, in order to 
instill similar beliefs/concepts in the next generation (112-113). They gravitate 
toward “rhetoric and products that appeal to their understandings about self-reliance”, 
reject the notion that “we live in an interdependent world or that we must help the 
poor”, and only provide support for institutions and politicians that invoke these same 
assumptions (120). They select objects and activities, both for themselves and for 
                                                 
23 Strauss and Quinn use the word “schema” (112-120) instead of inner world or internal structure. 
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their children—such as backpacking, reading “Nancy Drew books”, and watching 
“television programs such as Little house on the prairie and the continuous stream of 
movies such as Home alone (and more recent ones . . .)”—that  “celebrate . . . and 
confirm” the value they place on the concept of self-reliance (120). One might note 
that, in doing so, they also tacitly disconfirm, both for themselves and for their 
children, any values that appear to be inconsistent with the value they place this 
concept. 
 In considering this description of the way in which Paula and Michael have 
acquired, maintained, and re-generated the notion of self-reliance, an important point 
becomes clear. That is, they did not, at any point during the process, do it on their 
own. They utilized all sorts of media and objects that embody ideas cultivated and put 
forward by other people, and they utilized these ideas to affirm and facilitate those 
they already held within their inner worlds. They did not rely upon themselves; 
instead, they relied upon a multitude of cultural influences, upon which their notion of 
self-reliance is interdependent, in order to nourish, affirm, and propagate their and 
their children’s belief in the concept of self-reliance. Because they acted with tacit 
(though perhaps not explicit) coordination with many others for their conceptual 
understanding, Paula’s and Michael’s notion of self-reliance and the activities they 
undertook to support it are shown, in fact, to be quite conceptually interdependent.  
 Moreover, since the concept of self-reliance means (in part) relying upon the 
self for conceptual understandings, Paula and Michael’s activities are actually 
inconsistent with the notion of self-reliance. They commit, via their actions/inactions, 
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a performative contradiction. They act on a concept that means ‘I rely only on 
myself’; yet, in doing so, they tacitly rely on many other people. And that is because 
humans are, in every case, interdependent with others regarding our conceptual 
understandings; we come to have concepts, both in childhood and adulthood, due to 
our interactions with others and the environment. Accordingly, we are affected by the 
concepts of others; we take up the concepts of others into our inner worlds and these 
concepts influence our understandings, significations, and activities. And what would 
be the case if one did not do so? One who does not take in and act on the concepts of 
others is a non-functioning, illiterate, mute blob of flesh; she is dead. Even the 
Romanian orphans took up the concepts of their “caretakers”; unfortunately, the only 
concepts to which they were exposed were ones like ‘I (or we) do not respond to the 
cries and needs of institutionalized children’. The orphans learned such concepts and 
their brains developed accordingly. 
 Consider whether Paula’s and Michael’s activities were physically self-reliant. 
Of course, the analysis in Chapter 2 has shown that their conceptual and physical 
well-being is dependent upon the actions of many others in their past. As adults, we 
can only maintain, diminish, or improve upon the physical health and capacities that 
others began for us. But Paula and Michael are part of a web of physical 
interdependency in many other ways. Presumably, they have jobs they perform and 
thus rely upon others to pay them (their employers, in turn, rely upon Paula and 
Michael to produce some product or service). Paula and Michael use these funds (via 
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an interdependent financial system)24 to buy the many physical objects—food, 
housing, clothing, backpacks, televisions, movies, books—involved in carrying out 
the activities that maintain and promote the notion of self-reliance. But it is likely 
that, in every case, someone else (or many others) created or manufactured these 
objects. If the parents cook food from scratch, the ingredients were grown by others 
(if grown in a home garden, the seeds, plants, and fertilizers likely came from the 
store); if they built the house themselves, the materials were manufactured by others. 
Others made the material for their backpacks and sewed them. The parents rely upon 
these others not to have included toxic materials that might one day damage the 
health of their children. In the same way, they rely upon farmers to not deplete or 
contaminate the soil (via overuse or chemicals) so that the parents may give healthy 
and non-toxic food to their children. Of course, others made the television, wrote the 
books, acted in, directed, and produced the television shows and movies. In this way, 
Paula and Michael exist within a web of people and activities with which they tacitly 
coordinate in order to attain their physical necessities and possessions; as such, they 
are physically interdependent. If they deny this, once again they commit a 
performative contradiction. All the people they implicitly relied upon are both 
conceptually and physically interdependent within the same web.  
 In arguing that Paula and Michael (and all the rest of us) are conceptually and 
physically interdependent, I do not mean to imply that any one of us is necessarily 
                                                 
24 The United States economy is, for instance, greatly influenced by the opinions of investors and the 
spending patterns of consumers. 
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dependent (although via circumstance, many people—for instance, children and the 
elderly or those with diseases, severe autism, or Down’s syndrome—are dependent). 
The inapplicability of the concept of self-reliance does not entail dependency. As I 
explained in section 2.11, if a person has had the pre-conditions of choice, she will 
have a capacity to think in a way that is non-dependent; that is, such a person may, 
during her deliberations, utilize the concepts she obtained from others and her 
environment, but she need not be constrained by them. When novelty is present, she 
will have the capacity to extrapolate—given her neural processes and content—to 
another non-identical or, perhaps, even radically different case. The utilized concepts 
are not hers alone. She is not conceptually self-reliant. But she can add something; 
that is, she can make a non-trivial contribution (one involving novelty). Thus, while 
there is no case in which she is self-reliant, her engagement with and in the 
interdependent context can be substantial.  
 But perhaps all of the relevant scenarios have not been entertained. Consider 
then an extreme case: that of a hermit who lives high atop a mountain. Perhaps, at age 
20, she broke away from her family and society and hiked into the wilderness, 
carrying only what she could hold on her person. She has had no contact with any 
human since. She cut down trees and fashioned them into logs to build her home. She 
grows or gathers her own fruits and vegetables and makes her own tools that she uses 
for hunting. She has no reading materials, no television, and no radio. She does not 
appear to be part of the web of interdependency that is described in the example 
above. Surely she is self-reliant. One might point out, however, that there are two 
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significant ways in which she is not. The first regards the environment in which she 
and all the rest of us live. While she does not utilize the objects produced in modern 
society (except those she took with her), she will still receive impact from many of its 
practices. If a nearby society allows over hunting of game, dinner may be hard for her 
to come by. As global warming continues, drought may ensue and water may become 
scarce for her (alternately, she may be inundated with rain). Depending on where she 
is, smog may hang about her home. The second way in which she is undeniably 
interdependent involves her past. If she is able to do the things described above, it is 
because she has had the pre-conditions of choice (including an education regarding 
how to survive in a difficult environment). Novel situations would surely come her 
way and she would have to innovate to deal with them and survive. Thus, like the rest 
of us, she would at each moment be in an interdependent relationship with each of the 
multitude of influences in her own past.  
 We exist in a conceptually and physically interdependent context whether or 
not we want to acknowledge it and whether or not we want to create concepts and 
organize ourselves in ways that help us to believe otherwise. And this is the case for 
all people in any culture around the world. People implicitly or explicitly coordinate 
in order to provide for their conceptual understandings, physical necessities, and 
possessions. But existing in an interdependent context and understanding that we do 




3.4: Intra-Cultural Interdependence 
 In section 3.3, I argued that, although one can be non-dependent if one’s 
capacity for choice is enabled, it is never the case that persons are self-reliant. I also 
introduced the notion of interdependence. We are interdependent because we must 
coordinate with others, in a tacit or express manner, in order to acquire the concepts 
relevant to and the objects utilized in daily life, and the mode of this coordination is 
engagement—the (generally) symbolic interpretation and contribution of 
signification. Because we exist in an interdependent context, we also impact each 
other. This section will offer further analysis of the affectation that can and most 
often does occur due to our conceptual interdependence. Specifically, I will focus on 
the way in which the concepts held by some can come to be efficacious in helping to 
determine the behavior of others. For heuristic purposes, I will discuss the relevant 
impact with regard to those who share a culture (impact for those who do not will be 
addressed in section 3.6). With regard to intra-cultural conceptual interdependence, I 
will offer eight reasons in support of the Interference Thesis (IT) which holds:  
A person can be (and often is) affected by others who share her culture 
or sub-cultural groups, because whatever types of 
activities/inactivities that are often undertaken by members of the 
culture, that do not meet with sufficient disaffirmative active 
interference, will tend both to continue and to propagate. This is 
because, due to active affirmative interference and quasi-active 
affirmative interference, these activities and inactivities will come to 
impact and change other members of the culture/sub-culture, who, in 
turn, will have a tendency to act upon them.  
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The IT—a thesis regarding human action, inaction, and interaction—might be 
considered as analogous to Newton’s first law,25 because the IT holds that the types 
of activities and inactivities that are common will continue unless they receive 
adequate opposition (or force). Then, given this aspect of intra-cultural 
interdependence, any concept, including those that denigrate choice or humanity, can 
come to be a common cultural concept upon which to act. Of course, concepts that 
esteem choice may become common via the same avenue. Persons with choice need 
not be constrained by either type of concept; the concern is, as I will explain, that 
those without choice are constrained by two sets of interference and that persons with 
choice will tend to abide by group concepts unless novelty is present. A particular 
sort of cultural concept (the group self-concept) also affects whether persons with 
choice are able to enact choice, but that will be addressed in section 3.5. Before 
proceeding, I will define several terms—those utilized in the IT above, such as 
culture, group, sub-group, interference (three types), cultural concept, impact, and 
change—that are important features of the analysis. 
 And in section 3.2, I argued that, in general, human action and inaction are 
accorded symbolic meaning (determined by convention or agreement) because 
humans are such that they tend to interpret symbolically, and I stipulated that culture 
will be taken to be a shared evolving system of meaning. Those who share a culture 
(whom I will call a group) take actions, inactions, objects, situations, and events to 
                                                 
25 Newton’s first law holds: “Every body perseveres in its state of being at rest or of moving uniformly 
straight forward, except insofar as it is compelled to change its state by forces impressed upon it” 
(Cohen, 152).  
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have certain sorts of meanings (given by what is possible within the system) because 
they are in implicit or explicit agreement with others in their group that it will be 
such. Group members need not, and often do not, share all meanings; rather, it is the 
system that is shared. Sub-groups (sub-cultures) are sets of persons within the larger 
culture/group who share more specific meanings. A group or sub-group may develop 
around the notions of “ethnicity, religion, nationality, race, family, political affinity, 
or in other ways” (Staub, Psychology of Good 14). Many groups/sub-groups develop 
a combination of explicitly stated rules and implicit beliefs, values, norms, and/or 
mores that help to organize or guide members’ affiliation with other members, but 
other groups develop merely with regard to the implicit. A university has explicit 
regulations, for instance, as does the Catholic Church, but both have implicit norms as 
well. Members of groups/sub-groups that have developed regarding race or other 
informal affiliations, on the other hand, are generally guided by implicit 
understandings. Actions, inactions, objects, and so on can (and often do) have 
different significations in different cultural and sub-cultural contexts and the 
meanings accorded in these contexts may be both rich and intricate. I will not be 
concerned here with these intricacies, but instead will deal only with the notion of 
consistency. That is, for any given meaning, the set of other significations with which 
it is consistent will be said to affirm the meaning; those that are inconsistent will be 
said to disaffirm it. Since persons act or refrain from acting according to the 
significations or concepts they hold, action and inaction will be said to affirm or 
disaffirm—that is, in some fashion interfere with (impede or obstruct that with which 
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it is inconsistent)—some other meaning accorded to another action, inaction, object, 
and so on. 
 Earlier (in section 2.11) I explained that all of us require active interference in 
order to live and obtain the pre-conditions of choice (for instance, if no one actively 
interferes with a new born, she is on a path toward certain death). Here, I elaborate on 
this notion of interference and distinguish three types: affirmative active interference 
(AAI), disaffirmative active interference (DAI), and inactive or quasi-active 
interference (QAI). AAI is activity that actively affirms the concepts (meanings or 
significations) included in one’s and/or another’s inner world(s) and/or cultural 
understandings (defined below) regarding the activities, inactivities, objects, and so 
forth within the environment (e.g., telling a child “good job” in order to affirm her 
actions, watching children play ball in the park with a contented facial expression, or 
buying Girl Scout cookies in order to support the activities of the Girl Scouts of the 
USA). DAI is activity that disaffirms such concepts and/or cultural understandings 
(e.g., telling a bully to “stop that”, intercepting the children’s ball and throwing it into 
a nearby pond, or casting a “no” vote on a bill that will prevent homosexuals from 
marrying). Inactivity, as I explained via examples in section 3.2, also has an 
affirmative function, because humans are such that they interpret inactivity as having 
such meaning. The idea is that if a person observes or knows of some action/inaction 
and does nothing, she indicates that she takes that action to be appropriate or at least 
that she believes it is not worth her time to actively intervene. Inactivity is tacit 
approval. Then, since, as I will explain further below, undertaken activity has a 
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tendency to be repeated unless actors experience disaffirmation (for the moment, 
think of a child who will continue to get into the cookie jar unless her activity is 
actively disaffirmed or the fact that if action is not taken to stop violence in American 
schools, it will, all else being equal, continue to occur), an absence of DAI actually 
affirms specific concepts and actions and/or the general tendency toward some type 
of action. As such, QAI affirms in a way that is very similar to AAI. Both AAI and 
QAI offer an implicit disconfirmation of whatever is inconsistent and both affirm the 
status quo. DAI works opposite of AAI and is required if a change in a course of 
action/inaction will occur.26  
 When many of the people of a culture (or sub-culture) interpret an activity, 
inactivity, object, etc. in the same (or in a similar) way, that interpretation, as a 
concept, will constitute a cultural (or sub-cultural) concept or understanding. I define 
impact as the effect that any of the three types of interference has upon the inner 
world of a given person and/or a cultural concept. Impact results from the 
confirmation (through AAI or QAI) or a disconfirmation (via DAI) of a previously 
held concept, and thus is accompanied by change either within people’s inner worlds 
(they come to hold an understanding in a way that is stronger or less strong as a result 
of interference and impact) or with regard to objects, activities, inactivities, etc. in the 
                                                 
26 This is not to say that DAI must be dramatic (or violent) to be effective. Recall, for instance, from 
section 2.5 that merely directing a child’s hand helps to guide her behavior (as well as to develop her 
prefrontal neural structures); a caregiver does not have to slap her hand to get the job done. Likewise in 
the adult public world, in many situations peaceful protest is more likely to be effective than violent 
protest. This is because violent action affirms violence. While violence may be necessary in some 
cases, even then it is likely that peaceful disaffirmation could have been effective if it was undertaken 
earlier. 
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environment. That is, people’s interpretations of such things may alter or people may 
alter the objects, activities, and situations themselves, so that they accord with the 
relevant impact. Change may or may not be easily ascertained.  
 I turn now to a discussion of the eight reasons—supported by information 
gained from social psychology and psychiatry/neuroscience—offered in support of 
the IT. That is, I will explain why a person, as a member of a group and sub-groups, 
experiences interference, impact, and change during the course of daily life such that 
she is likely (and overwhelmingly likely if she has not had the pre-conditions) to act 
in accordance with the cultural/sub-cultural concepts with which she comes into 
contact. The degree of likelihood is to a great extent determined by whether or not a 
person has a capacity for choice. Without this capacity, a person is ill-equipped to 
create, conceive of, recognize, and deal with novelty. She is not going to be 
extrapolating from observed behavior and cultural concepts in order to come up with 
novel ways of doing things. She will be constrained to follow others in her group/sub-
group. If group/sub-group understandings and behavior change too much, she will 
have difficulty in adapting. The person with a capacity for choice, on the other hand, 
is not so constrained. She can conceive of and undertake activities/inactivities that are 
different from those enacted by others (or not) when novelty is present. Of course, 
merely having such a capacity does not imply it will be used. A person with choice 
can follow others utilizing mere preference selection (and she will unless novelty is 
present); she can also do so by choice. At the end of this section, I will consider 
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further the role that having a capacity for choice may have in mitigating against the 
tendencies described in the IT.  
 The first point (in support of the IT) regards the ways in which humans both 
come to be and come to know themselves. That is, groups create people and people 
create groups (Rogoff 37), such that personal identity is dependent upon the group 
and sub-groups to which a person belongs (Staub, Psychology of Good 352). Social 
psychologist, Ervin Staub27 distinguishes three types of identities—personal, social, 
and group self-concept (352)—that intermingle and coalesce. Personal identity refers 
to “the ways in which individuals answer the question, Who am I?” (352) and the 
attributes that are a part of a person’s inner world that due to interpersonal experience 
was not shared by others. Much has been said thus far about how a person acquires an 
inner world; many cultural, sub-cultural, and interpersonal influences (that is, AAI, 
QAI, and DAI from others) have contributed to her internal structures. Social identity 
concerns “the extent to which individual identity is . . . connected to . . . the group” 
                                                 
27 Staub’s life-long work focuses on how persons and groups come to act in violent (evil) or caring 
(good) ways. In the following analysis, I do not assume Staub’s definitions of good and evil; rather, my 
project seeks to establish that what is consistent with choice is moral and that what is inconsistent with 
it is immoral. I do, however, utilize Staub’s work to isolate and describe general tendencies in personal 
and group behavior. Staub received his Ph.D. from Stanford University in 1965; he has taught at 
Harvard, Stanford, the University of Hawaii, and the London School of Economics and Political 
Science; he is currently Professor of Psychology at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. “He 
has worked in varied projects in field settings, including the development of a training program for the 
State of California after the Rodney King incident to reduce the use of unnecessary force by police, 
teacher training to create classrooms that help children become caring and non-violent, a project in 
Amsterdam to improve Dutch-Muslim relations, a project in New Orleans to promote healing and 
reconciliation in the wake of Katrina, a project in Western Massachusetts to train school children in 
active bystandership in the face of aggressive behavior by their peers towards other peers, and since 
1998 varied projects in Rwanda, working with communities, national leaders, journalists, as well as 
radio dramas and other educational programs in Rwanda, Burundi and the Congo, to promote healing, 
reconciliation and the prevention of new violence” (“Ervin Staub”). 
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(352). As I discussed in section 3.3, groups and sub-groups may have different ways 
of organizing people’s understandings of the relations between them. These 
interdependent notions, translated into AAI, QAI, and DAI, then impact the way that 
person’s understand themselves. Lastly, the group self-concept refers to the way that 
members of a group or sub-group “perceive and experience their group” (352). They 
may take themselves, for instance, to be strong, weak, hardworking, or relaxed, when 
compared with other groups. As Staub explains, the first two types of identity gain 
content from the third, such that a person’s answer to the question “Who am I?” is 
informed by her interactions with other individuals and sub-groups; in turn, the third 
type of identity is maintained by the content of the other two (352). Since part of what 
persons act on are the notions of themselves that they have obtained through the AAI, 
QAI, and DAI of others, they have a bias toward engaging in the same types of 
activities that other group/sub-group members do. 
 The second reason concerns the fact that each of us is at every moment in an 
interdependent relationship with each of the multitude of personal and cultural 
influences from which we have received interference and impact. A person has to use 
the past and present as a springboard toward the future, because her actions, in every 
case, stem from the interaction between the structures and meanings within her inner 
world and the cultural objects and significations around her. That is, she must use her 
internal structures in conjunction with cultural/sub-cultural concepts in order to do 
anything. She cannot use the internal structure of another; she has no immediate 
access to it. She cannot use concepts with which she is completely unfamiliar. While 
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cultural contributions to thought are omnipresent and critical, they are easily ignored. 
James Wertsch offers a helpful example on this point. He asks the reader to consider a 
multiplication problem (343 x 822). Normally, if a person is asked to display her 
calculation, it would look something like this (Wertsch cited in Rogoff 278): 
   343 
   822 
   686 
           6,860 
       274,400 
       281,946        
Wertsch’s question is this: was it really the reader who provided a solution to the 
problem?28 In order to “‘see the force of this question’” consider how the solution 
might be arrived at without “‘placing the numbers in the vertical array used above. 
Most of us would be stumped at this point’” (278-79). And that is because the 
“‘spatial organization, or syntax, of the numbers . . . is an essential part of a cultural 
tool without which we cannot solve this problem’” (279). Wertsch suggests that the 
appropriate response to the question regarding who solved the problem is, “‘I and the 
cultural tool I employed did’” (279). Note also that countless people over the 
centuries contributed to the utilized method (it is built upon counting and adding) and 
many other people contribute to the context during development in which a child 
learns to multiply (the child was fed, clothed, nurtured, and stimulated to get her this 
far). The number of people involved is enormous. Each person utilizes what is 
available at the moment; that is, she uses what others have largely constructed, both 
                                                 
28 If so, the reader would be conceptually self-reliant in her calculation, although not in what it means 
to multiply two numbers. 
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with regard to her internal structures and the external world. It is what she has to 
work with. As such, at any given moment each person is experiencing significant 
impact via the AAI, QAI, and DAI contributed by many other people and she is 
engaging in behavior that is influenced by it.  
 The third and fourth points stem from the fact that, as adults, people prefer 
actions, inactions, objects, other persons, and so on merely because they are familiar 
and thus consistent with their internal structures. During childhood, a person’s neural 
structures are quite flexible (Wexler 143 and 171); young persons have the ability to 
adapt to whatever the situation is in their environments (even the subdued cognitive, 
social, and emotional processes exhibited by the Romanian orphans was the outcome 
of an adaptation). Children are, however, disadvantaged (when compared to adults 
with choice) with regard to changing or acting on environmental input. As a person 
reaches adulthood, her neural processes become more fixed (143 and 171).29 Change 
within her inner world, at this point, becomes less likely, but by no means impossible.  
 As a result of this, she will, in general, act on the world in one of two ways; 
the ramifications of her behavior correspond to the third and fourth reasons. One 
possibility (the third reason) is that, since her “internal structures select and value 
sensory input that is consistent with them” (Wexler 155), she attempts, as far as she 
can (that is, until she is confronted with DAI that cannot be ignored), to take the 
world to be consonant with her inner world (143). She tends to ignore, discredit, re-
                                                 
29 I take it that entry into adulthood is a gradual process that becomes complete as a person’s prefrontal 
cortex reaches maturity (some time between the ages of 20 and 25 (Wexler 242)). 
 189
interpret, and forget discordant information (169) and alters her “perception and 
experience of the external world” according to her structures (143). In short, she 
treats other people as if they fit her world. When she behaves toward others as if they 
had her structures, she often elicits a response that is consistent (Wexler 143; Staub, 
Psychology of Good 244). Studies show, for instance, that treating others as if they 
were aggressive or competitive evokes from them an aggressive or competitive 
reaction (Staub, Psychology of Good 106 and 244). In another study, researchers 
treated subjects as if they were expected to be helpful; when the expectation was 
clearly defined, 100% of the subjects responded in kind (88).30 Thus, in many cases, a 
person’s behavior toward others constitutes effective interference that will often be 
followed by impact and change in the other. This person’s actions also impact and 
change her own subsequent behavior. Since her actions were effective, she has 
performed AAI for herself. She is affirmed in her belief that other people are 
aggressive, competitive, helpful, and so on; she will be more likely to treat others in a 
similar manner in the future. 
 Rather than treating others and situations in the world as if they fit her 
structures, she can (when she has experienced sufficient DAI from others) act on the 
world to change it. This is often the case with young people entering adulthood. 
Wexler explains that, even though interpersonal experiences create differences 
between persons, broad cultural concepts impact many young people in a similar way 
                                                 
30 When researchers altered the conditions of the study and were ambiguous regarding the expectations 
that were conveyed to the subjects, many fewer acted to help the person in distress (Staub, Psychology 
of Good 88-89). 
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and create generational cohort sub-groups who share many sub-cultural 
understandings and symbolic interpretive processes (142). To the extent that this sub-
group’s structures are in agreement with the cultural concepts of previous 
generations, they may act to maintain what is already present. If the cohort 
experiences discordance, they may attempt to enact DAI in order to alter “events in 
the external . . . world in such a way as to increase the likelihood that subsequent 
events will be consistent” with their inner worlds (143). Remember that each 
generational cohort group has been influenced via many sources, only some of which 
were manifest for their parents’ generation. Moreover, since inter-cultural contact has 
become common in the modern era, due to travel, immigration, and mass media and 
communication, some of this interference likely derived from influence from other 
cultural groups. Then, when individuals and whole cohort sub-groups reach maturity 
and act on the world in an attempt to make it consonant with their sub-cultural 
concepts, to the extent they succeed, they create novel cultural and sub-cultural 
concepts upon which others now must act. Others, in previous (if still living) or 
subsequent generations, must react, via AAI, QAI, or DAI (or perhaps some 
combination of them), depending upon whether these new concepts cohere or conflict 
with their own internal structures. The events during the 1960s and ‘70s in the U.S. 
are a recent and clear example. Young people (cohort sub-groups of flower children, 
war protesters, civil rights advocates, and feminists) sought to change the concepts 
upon which anyone could act. The end of the Vietnam War, the Civil Rights Act, and 
the Second Wave of the Women’s Movement attest to a substantial success. Current 
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trends in society—for example, the erosion of support for affirmative action and 
feminism and the rise of fundamentalist Christian concepts—indicate that significant 
DAI has occurred in response. In any case, the novel concepts projected by a 
generational cohort sub-group both alter the rearing environment for the next 
generation (ensuring that the cycle will continue) (Wexler 6) and impact and change 
others who share the culture.  
 The fifth reason in support of the IT regards the case in which a person selects 
(according to preference selection or choice) the sub-groups to which she will belong 
(membership in some sub-groups are not a matter of selection). As a person reaches 
adulthood, since she has been affected by the interference of so many persons (all of 
whom belong to sub-groups), she holds many cultural and sub-cultural concepts, 
some of which may create in her a tendency to select one sub-group while others 
incline her toward others. The point is that since she selects sub-group affiliations on 
the basis of her internal structures (Wexler 167, Staub, Psychology of Good 17-18) 
and since she desires consonance between her inner and external worlds, she will 
select groups that tend to provide AAI or, at least, QAI in support of her previously 
held concepts. She will, in turn, provide the same function for other sub-group 
members. There will be a tendency, then, for all members of the sub-group to both 
hold stronger to these beliefs (impact) and act more often in accordance with them 
(change). A recent string of suicides in Japan demonstrate this type of affectation. 
According to Japanese officials, internet sites—that is, self selected online sub-
groups—are encouraging the suicides. The sites tell people how to kill themselves by 
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mixing different household cleansers and detergents and releasing toxic fumes into a 
closed space (for instance, a car or bathroom). Site users are told to post signs 
warning others to stay away. At least thirty suicides by this method occurred in the 
first four months of 2008. In one case, a 14 year old girl failed to seal her bathroom 
window; 90 people in her apartment complex were sickened by the fumes (“Girl’s 
Suicide”).31
 Sixth, as Staub explains, groups and sub-groups tend both to “socialize and 
resocialize” their members (Staub, Psychology of Good 18; see also Wexler 168) 
according to the evolving understandings of the group/sub-group. When persons act 
on the explicit or implicit concepts held by the group, they learn from their own 
actions (Staub, Psychology of Good 7 and 303). Persons provide interference and 
impact and evoke change for themselves that accord with notions held by the group. 
In this way, concepts held by other members become part of the individual’s inner 
world, because it is difficult to experience “participation in an activity as alien. 
People begin to see their engagement as part of themselves” (326). If, for instance, 
people perform helpful acts, they begin to see themselves as helpful; they also begin 
to see those who have been helped as worthy of it (326). People “observe their own 
actions and draw inferences” from them (326). Their views of themselves and others 
change. If persons either perpetrate harm against another or merely watch harm 
inflicted without doing anything to stop it (that is, if they merely perform QAI), the 
                                                 
31 In 2006, 32,155 people in Japan committed suicide, “giving the country the ninth highest rate in the 
world” (“Girl’s Suicide”). 
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same sort of scenario evolves (327-28). It is inconsistent to view the other as 
unworthy of harm while either inflicting or watching it. People are thus more likely to 
devalue the victim and value themselves more as one who dishes out the appropriate 
response to an unworthy person (328). The point is that when we act in accordance 
with understandings of others in our sub-group, we learn from our actions (again, we 
affirm or enact AAI for such understandings for others as well); and, due to this 
socialization process, members become more and more likely to undertake actions 
that are consistent with the group’s/sub-group’s concepts (326).  
 Seventh, for many persons, group and sub-group affiliations are so important 
to personal identity, that they may alter their “beliefs and perceptions in order to 
remain in agreement with the attitudes and behavior of other group members” 
(Wexler 170). This may be especially the case when a person has joined the group in 
order to satisfy a previously unfulfilled need, such as the need for security or the pre-
conditions of choice (Staub, Psychology of Good 17).32 For example, a person who 
was not necessarily inclined toward violent behavior may join a gang in order to gain 
security and support in obtaining the pre-conditions (an attempt to get access to food 
and clothing in an environment that does not support attainment of them) (17). “Once 
a member, if the gang engages in violence, this person is likely to participate due to . . 
. her connection to the other members and commitment to the [sub-]group” (17). 
Rather than severing ties with other sub-group members—at the risk of internal 
                                                 
32 Staub’s definition of the basic need for security includes the need for, what I call, the pre-conditions 
of choice (see Psychology of Good 56). Staub discusses several psychological needs, but he takes the 
need for security to be most fundamental (61).  
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dissonance and/or ostracism for non-compliance to group rules and norms (Wexler 
167)—persons experience interference and impact from others. They tend to change 
accordingly. Avoidance of dissonance is important because people experience 
distress, and sometimes dysfunction, when their inner worlds cannot be reconciled 
with external reality (170); self-alteration is more effective for the organism. Since 
persons also feel distress from ostracism (think of the stress and upheaval involved in 
losing one’s job or the loneliness of being cast out of an implicitly formed sub-group, 
such as a high school clique, for not dressing according to what is “in”), the threat of 
dissonance and ostracism are powerful socializing forces which often equate to the 
experience of interference, impact, and, change.  
 The last reason I will offer in support of the IT is that individuals rely upon 
and utilize the interpretations of others as a ground or test for their current beliefs. 
Persons are, of course, most likely to look to other members of their group/sub-group 
for the information that either affirms (AAI) or disconfirms (DAI). As Staub explains, 
in order to function (that is, engage) effectively, “we must perceive reality as 
accurately as possible” (Staub, Psychology of Good 87). In order to do so, people 
“check their reactions by comparing them to others’ behavior” (87), and rely upon the 
comparison such that “[e]ven a sense of sanity seems dependent on . . . perceiving 
and interpreting events as other people do” (87). That is, we, in reality, need the 
reactions of others in order to make sense out of the world. Thus, a person tends to 
absorb the “worldview propagated by the group” (14) or sub-group; then, as noted 
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multiple times above, she experiences interference and impact and has a significant 
tendency to change according to group expectations. 
 Three additional considerations are also significant. First, it is important to 
point out that the eight reasons that lend support to the IT display the dynamic 
mechanisms involved in many persons sharing a culture. The processes described are 
ongoing and they involve (at least to some extent) every person and sub-group that 
make up the largest cultural group. Interference is everywhere, because we all are, at 
nearly every moment, providing it in one way or another. Second, recent research 
indicates that a concept upon which to act may travel through a sub-group as if it 
were contagious; for instance, studies have shown that social network dynamics have 
a significant impact upon the incidence of obesity and smoking behaviors in the U.S. 
Researchers “evaluated a densely interconnected social network of 12,067 people 
assessed repeatedly from 1971 to 2003 as part of the Framingham Heart Study” 
(Christakis and Fowler 370). The study kept track of the social ties between the 
participants and found that “people are strongly influenced by those in their social 
sphere” (Hodes qutd. in Fox, 1). Take 2 persons: A and B. If, in the study, A noted B 
as a friend and if B became obese, the chance that A would become obese increased 
by 57% (and by 71% if A and B are the same sex); if both reported the friendship, 
either had a 171% increased risk if the other became obese (Christakis and Fowler 
376). Researchers also found that social dynamics impact smoking behavior. Take 
three smokers: “A, B, and C. A and B are friends, and B and C are friends, but A and 
C do not know each other. If C quits smoking, the chance that A will quit goes up by 
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30 percent, regardless of whether B also quits” (Christakis qutd. in Fox, 2). Influence 
was significant between spouses, siblings, friends, and co-workers; when one in the 
category quit smoking, the other or another was 67%, 25%, 36%, and 34%, 
respectively, more likely to quit as well (2). Moreover, when researchers considered 
who quit and when, they found that “people quit in domino effect until almost the 
entire group of family and friends did not smoke” (Cox 1). And third, in many cases, 
group/sub-group members need not be immediately present to each other for 
interference, impact, and change to occur. I, for instance, have experienced significant 
interference from many scholars in writing this chapter, without being in the physical 
presence of or personally conversing with a single one (it came in the form of reading 
and referring to their work). We experience impact from members of our group/sub-
group through modern media and mass communication. The Japanese suicide sub-
group members, for instance, only communicate in a virtual context. A recent spate of 
recorded beatings in the U.S., that either were or were intended to be posted online, 
demonstrates that the persons providing interference need not be present to those they 
impact. On March 30, 2008, eight teenagers in Florida taped their brutal beating of a 
16 year old girl. Over the five weeks that followed, five more beatings were recorded 
in different parts of the U.S. In most cases, witnesses to the beatings could be heard 
or seen encouraging (providing AAI for) the aggressors as was the case with the 
Florida tape. That the attacks were recorded for the purpose of posting them online 
indicates that the attackers were utilizing shared concepts to guide their actions. 
Cultural and sub-cultural concepts are embedded in our television shows, movies, 
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video games, music, and so on and all of these are media by which interference is 
conveyed. Televangelists, for instance, persuade their viewers to donate (collectively) 
millions of dollars each year. Television, radio, and magazine advertising are 
interesting incidences of the phenomenon. In these cases, an explicit group forms (an 
advertising firm or a department within the manufacturers company) with the sole 
purpose of learning the concepts held by different sub-groups in order to persuade 
them to consume. If the advertiser can project the notion that all members of the sub-
group are buying a product or that they will “be better” or be better off if they do so, a 
new concept that supports buying the product will become a sub-cultural 
understanding. The interference by the advertiser may constitute manipulation or 
coercion if it is known that many or all members of the sub-group have not had the 
pre-conditions of choice (as I will discuss below, such persons may be significantly or 
totally constrained by the interference they receive from other group/sub-group 
members). A more sobering example involves media that depicts violence. Recent 
studies (that were noted in section 2.7) show that the impact young people experience 
from watching violence on TV and in movies is positively and strongly associated 
with a greater tendency to commit violent crimes in adulthood. Thus, there are many 
instances in which immediate personal contact with members of one’s group/sub-
group is not necessary for affectation to occur.  
 In view of this analysis, what can be said for choice? I only spoke above in 
terms of tendencies, but when taken together, do the eight reasons that support the IT 
entail that persons are constrained by the actions of others? The analysis showed that 
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each person has at least two categories of interference to which she is subject. She has 
her own inner world (which, of course, is in every case developed through 
interpersonal and group interaction) and the current meanings she receives through 
interference from the other members of her group and multiple sub-groups. However, 
if she has a capacity for choice, she will be able, when novelty is present, to utilize 
this interference (that embodies many concepts) in order to extrapolate and possibly 
move beyond to an understanding that is based upon, but not fully dependent on, these 
two sets of interference. She will be able to think and behave in a way that is non-
dependent, however interdependent she will always remain.  
 If a person does not have this capacity or if it is not fully developed, she will 
be, to a greater or lesser extent (depending on how many of the pre-conditions she 
received), constrained by the two sets of interference. One can use experience from 
daily life to understand this sort of constraint. Some children and teenagers, for 
instance, are in a similar situation in that, even if they will come into a capacity for 
choice when they mature, they seem excessively influenced by sub-group pressure, as 
two recent incidents attest. In one case, between six and nine third graders (they were 
all either eight or nine years old) at Center Elementary School in Georgia planned to 
attack their teacher because she had admonished one “for standing on a chair” 
(Bynum); they brought with them a steak knife, duct tape, handcuffs, and a paper 
weight, among other items, with which to carry out the deed. They were quite 
organized (one student was to cover the windows and another was to clean up after 
the attack). Now, while it is possible that one or even a few of these children has 
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learned to solve problems through violence, surely not all of them has. One presumes 
that those who have not become so disposed were persuaded by the dynamics of their 
sub-group to participate (specifically via some or all of the eight tendencies discussed 
above). In another case, a teacher at a Baltimore school alleges she was attacked by a 
student, while many other students (presumably, those in the student’s sub-group) 
cheered the student on, providing sufficient AAI to affirm the student’s action (a 
video of the attack later “showed up on MySpace” (“Teacher Says”)). Luckily, other 
teachers exerted DAI in order to stop the attack, but AAI certainly played a role in the 
student’s actions. 
 Many adults—those who have not received the pre-conditions and who lack a 
capacity for choice—will be in a similar, though perhaps more permanent, position 
when it comes to being constrained by interference. Recall from section 2.11 that, 
since a lack of different pre-conditions affects people in different ways, people’s 
circumstances may be placed on a continuum (areas 1 through 5). Those who have 
been severely deprived (area 1) will likely be entirely constrained by the two sets of 
interference. Most of those in areas 2 and 3 likely will be as well; however, some in 
the latter category may be only partially constrained. They may be able to recognize 
and deal with novelty, in order to break away from the influences of groups and sub-
groups, if the situation does not differ greatly from what they have previously known. 
Such a person may then be able to extrapolate from cultural concepts in some 
instances. For instance, maybe she will recall from her own experience, that she cried 
out from pain inflicted by another. Then, if she can make a small but momentous 
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mental leap, she may realize that the cry emanating from the teacher being attacked is 
the same sort of thing. Instead of providing AAI for the attacker, she may exert DAI 
instead. A person from area 4 or 5 may, in fact, act in a way that is consistent with 
her group’s and sub-group’s concepts; she will be most likely to do so when other 
members’ actions/inactions affirm the concepts she holds in her inner world. In that 
case, novelty is not present for her and she will merely need to utilize preference 
selection. However, when novelty (perhaps an inconsistency between her previously 
held concepts and those of her group or a concept put forward by another group 
member that she had never before considered) is present—that is, when she 
experiences DAI due to the activities of others—she need not be constrained to do so. 
She has a capacity for choice. She is, thus, non-dependent and capable of 
extrapolating from and moving beyond the concepts she holds internally and those 
embodied in the behavior of others. I will argue in section 4.4 that these group 
dynamics can under certain circumstances—when sub-groups are left without the pre-
conditions of choice and/or when cultural or sub-cultural concepts denigrate choice—
put many other persons in the group at risk for choice. Since persons without choice 
are constrained by their inner worlds and the interference they receive from others, 
there can be significant consequences to failing to help provide others within one’s 
group with the pre-conditions of choice. 
3.5: The Conditions of Choice 
 I have addressed, thus far, many factors that affect whether a person will 
develop a capacity for choice. Part of what I have argued is that we do not become 
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capacitated without considerable interference from others. That is, if a person 
develops this capacity it is because she has received the appropriate kind of care from 
a group or sub-group; she must have been nurtured, fed, educated, and so on or she 
simply will not have the neural processes involved in choice and the content needed 
for her deliberations. In each case, the concepts a person utilizes in her deliberations 
either are or are derivative of cultural/sub-cultural concepts and these concepts did 
not derive from thin air. Each has an historical context to which a multitude of 
average people and scholars have contributed. But the last two sections point to 
another side of the issue. Not only are we not self-reliant, we also receive 
interference—resulting in impact and, often, change—from others on an ongoing 
basis. We are part of groups/sub-groups and other members help to determine our 
actions. Thus, others can restrict a person’s choice, even if that person has a capacity 
to choose.  
 Consider the case of Nazi Germany. The dominant Nazi cultural concepts held 
that it is appropriate and desirable to persecute and kill Jews and homosexuals 
(among others). Surely many Germans (that is, sub-group members of the German 
population) held notions that were inconsistent with these concepts, but relatively few 
undertook disaffirmative active interference to stop the Nazis or to save the 
persecuted. Some of those who failed to help—that is, those who offered QAI for the 
Nazis—remained inactive out of fear for their own safety. But another reason is that, 
in order enact DAI, helpers “had to distance themselves from their group” (Staub, 
Psychology of Good 314). Staub explains that often helpers belonged to sub-groups 
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that were marginal with regard to the larger group or that held “strong moral and 
humanitarian values” that were inconsistent with Nazi concepts (314). These factors 
helped them to choose action that was inconsistent with concepts being employed by 
the group at large. For most others, deviating from dominant group concepts was too 
difficult, due to some or all of the eight reasons that were offered in support of the IT, 
in addition to fear of retaliation. Those, who did not deviate, offered AAI or QAI on 
behalf of the Nazi concepts.  
 Not every choice is as dramatic as helping to determine whether another 
person lives or dies. Moreover, not every choice involves separating from the group. 
A person with a capacity for choice may choose to abide by the cultural/sub-cultural 
concepts that are present in her environment. She may encounter, for instance, a novel 
concept and determine in her deliberations that the concepts being employed around 
her are the best avenue to take. But this is an easy choice. My concern in this section 
is with things that get in the way of enacting choice, that is, when cultural conditions 
are such that meaningful choice is not possible or when the cost of a given course of 
action is so high that to take it would be to incapacitate oneself with regard to choice. 
In these cases, a person is faced with choosing what is inconsistent with either the 
informal or formal institutions set up by her group or sub-group.  
 Having a capacity for choice greatly increases a person’s chances of 
employing non-dependent thought such that she need not be constrained by group 
concepts. However, in this section, I consider what types of cultural concepts are 
conducive to choice such that they allow persons the leeway to deviate from informal 
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and formal cultural institutions without extensive personal cost to the particular 
chooser. Informal institutions concern implicit norms or group self-concept, a notion 
introduced in section 3.4, and the formal regards the political laws or the explicit rules 
to which group members are subject. Of course, since in many cases the former 
(perhaps a religious doctrine) becomes enshrined in the latter (law), the two 
categories should not be taken as entirely distinct or separate. When both types of 
institutions respect members as choosers, members will be said to live within the 
conditions of choice. The conditions of choice result from a multitude of actions and 
inactions that are consistent with and promote choice for particular human beings and 
that are manifest at a group or institutional level. Persons, who have a capacity for 
choice and who live within the conditions, will be said to have an ability to choose. 
That is, such a person is able to knowingly and purposefully utilize her capacity to 
enact choice—its use is not impeded and she is not compelled, via incapacity, 
ignorance, cultural constraint, and/or force, toward revealing and contributing trivial 
or limited objects and/or significations, in the present or in the future—and she will 
have the best chance of fulfilling her non-trivial interests. She exists in a state of 
freedom. 
 In section 3.3, I argued that there are many ways to organize people’s 
understandings of themselves, and I offered three examples: middle-class Americans, 
who see themselves as self-reliant; the Japanese, who tend to view themselves as 
extremely connected; and the Kaluli of Papua New Guinea who view members of 
their group as both connected and autonomous. Staub distinguishes three types of 
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group self-concepts—individualist, embedded, and connected (Staub, Psychology of 
Good 354)—that correspond to these three examples, respectively. Recall that group 
self-concept (GSC) is of key importance to persons who share a culture because the 
other two types of identity (personal and social) gain content from the GSC. One 
might consider the GSC to be similar to a story that a group creates in order to 
explain the group’s identity to its members and to other groups. Of course, details of 
the story evolve throughout the life of the members and throughout the existence of 
the group.  
 As a heuristic device, I offer the stir-fry analogy. I have argued that persons 
are interdependent because they must coordinate, in a tacit or express manner, for 
conceptual understandings, physical necessities, and possessions. I have also argued 
that persons receive impact on an ongoing basis from others in their group/sub-
groups. That is, persons take up the concepts of others and change—come to hold 
prior concepts in a way that is stronger or less strong—due to this interference. One 
way to understand these phenomena is to think of group members as being vegetables 
in a stir-fry; the sauce is the system of meaning that the members share. As the stir-
fry simmers, the vegetables take on, to some extent, the flavors in the sauce; they 
also, depending on their own characteristics, change the flavor of the sauce in return. 
All vegetables are impacted by the interaction, but since the sauce is thin and mild, no 
vegetable that has a strong flavor is smothered or changed completely. Vegetables 
that either lack flavor or are extremely porous are inundated by the flavor of the 
sauce. Persons with choice are like strong flavored vegetables; they maintain their 
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unique qualities (their inner worlds) and contribute novelty as they are tossed about in 
the mix. If their flavor is sufficiently strong, they can change the sauce (meanings in 
the system) in their area of the pan (sub-group level) or even throughout (group 
level). Persons without choice are like flavorless porous vegetables; they can be 
pulled any which way according to the impact they receive and they are unable to add 
anything novel to the sauce. No matter a person’s capacities, we are all in the stir-fry. 
In what follows, I will relate the three different types of GSC to this analogy, to the 
way in which the different GSCs shape people, and to whether people, subsequent to 
the shaping, are more or less likely to be able to go against group norms and cultural 
concepts—that is, whether they will be able to enact choices that embody concepts 
that are inconsistent with these notions. 
 The members of groups who hold an individualist GSC (IGSC) tend to view 
themselves as autonomous beings who “stand on their own” and “effectively fend for 
themselves or their families” (Staub, Psychology of Good 354; see also 534). They 
tend to deny the existence of the kind of intra-cultural interdependence I described 
above. With regard to the stir-fry analogy, their story maintains that the vegetables 
are laid out on a huge platter with none touching the next. They acknowledge the 
sauce (lest they would also need to deny language and communication), but they take 
themselves to be relatively unaffected by its presence. According to their story (to 
borrow Daniel Dennett’s word), they are “self-makers” (Freedom Evolves 277; I will 
address Dennett’s position on moral choice after the main arguments in Chapter 4).  
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 So what might the affect of this story be upon the choices of those who live 
within an IGSC? The issue is that because the IGSC tends to deny the extent and 
importance of the connections that exist between persons, persons in such cultures 
may find it difficult to turn to the group for support. However, as Staub points out, 
they still, along with all other people in the world, have a need for connectedness 
(Staub, Psychology of Good 534).33 In times of difficulty (such as economic hard 
times during which some of the pre-conditions may be hard to attain), persons with an 
IGSC are more likely to become frustrated (534) and blame themselves for their 
difficulties. The prominence of this view may be compounded when the IGSC 
includes concepts like “capable persons provide for themselves” (like Paula and 
Michael do in the example given in section 3.3) or when sub-group concepts, like 
“the world is a just place”, intermingle with the IGSC (just world notions are 
prominent features of some religious doctrines and if the world is just, persons, no 
matter their circumstance, get what they deserve).  
 The impact on choice, though, is different for different persons within the 
IGSC, depending on whether their capacities for choice have been enabled and on the 
context in which the choice/preference selection is taking place. Recall that person’s 
circumstances may be placed on a continuum (areas 1 through 5). The IGSC is 
conducive to choice for most persons from areas 4 and 5, unless another is 
specifically attempting to disable their capacities for choice (see below). These 
                                                 
33 In so far as the need for connectedness is a cultural concept, it may be a less central need for those 
with an individualist GSC (Staub, Psychology of Good 534). However, since connectedness is also a 
basic human need, it will not be absent.  
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persons have the capacity to innovate, to effectively utilize the innovations of others, 
or both. They can manage most of what comes their way and may even innovate in 
order to find novel ways to fulfill the need for connection. These, and other 
innovations, are generally tolerated (or even encouraged) by the IGSC. Some will 
likely recognize their interdependence and create situations in which this aspect of 
life is respected. Persons from area 1 will not fare well with regard to choice 
regardless of their GSC. And, while the IGSC group likely will not produce more 
persons in area 1 than other types of groups, the IGSC group may produce more than 
is necessary. Recall that many area 1 cases are preventable; but, since the IGSC 
encourages persons to stand alone and provide for themselves, persons without choice 
may not have the resources to enable choice for another and may not be able to obtain 
those resources in adequate amount from others in the group. And one must have 
choice in order to enable it for another. Persons from areas 2 and 3 will, most likely, 
become the most frustrated and experience the most personal difficulty when 
economic hard times hit. They will not have the capacity to innovate and will not be 
well suited to fully take advantage of the lead that those from areas 4 and 5 might 
demonstrate. Their frustration may even increase due to the innovation initiated by 
those with choice. Without the neural processes and/or content involved in choice, 
people from areas 2 and 3 are at an exceptional disadvantage because they do not 
have the means to even nominally “stand on their own” and “effectively fend for 
themselves or their families”. 
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 As noted above, the context in which the choice or preference selection takes 
place is also an important consideration. That is, when others are specifically 
attempting to disable the capacity for choice of a person with an IGSC, the former 
may have significant success because the latter is not prone to use others in her group 
for support. Torture and brainwashing, for instance, are specific attempts to disable 
the choice of another. Staub offers an example in which having an IGSC was a 
detriment to choice in this context. “American soldiers who became prisoners of war 
in the Korean War had more difficulty in resisting brain washing than, for example, 
Turkish soldiers” (Psychology of Good 354), who, one might argue, come from a 
more embedded GSC. The difference seemed to be that the “former were trying to 
face it alone while the latter supported each other” (354). Advertising (especially in 
the U.S.) may also be seen as an attempt to use persuasion (and perhaps exaggerated 
claims) to circumvent choice. For instance, if each member of an implicitly formed 
sub-group—say, young women between the ages of 20 and 30—are each 
experiencing the persuasive tactics of the advertisers alone, they will be more likely 
to succumb, perhaps even to their own disadvantage, when they are led to buy 
products that they do not need and/or cannot afford. After all, many ads emphasize 
that those who buy their product will be part of an exclusive club and/or that they will 
“be better” or be better off. In short, the IGSC is a mixed bag when it comes to 
helping to facilitate an ability to choose for its members. Those with a capacity for 
choice may fare well in many contexts; the exception might be the case in which 
others are specifically trying to circumvent their capacities. Those without choice will 
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be easily manipulated in nearly all contexts, a situation that is exacerbated by their 
decreased capacity to use other group members for support. 
 The embedded GSC (EGSC) is “characterized by a strong connection to other 
people that also embodies dependence on the group and an inability to separate” 
(Staub, Psychology of Good 354). With regard to the stir-fry analogy, this cultural 
story maintains that the sauce is both so strong and flavorful that it inundates all 
vegetables and so thick that the stir-fry is more like a quiche. Rather than 
downplaying the connections between persons, this story depicts them as 
overwhelming. Persons with an EGSC may find it “especially difficult to speak out 
against and oppose the direction the group” is taking (354); if the group begins, for 
instance, to scapegoat, vilify, or discriminate against a sub-group or persons in 
another culture (a possible response to what Staub calls difficult life conditions), 
group members will be “more likely to remain silent and go along” (354).  
 So what is the impact of the EGSC on the possibility of choice for members? 
Persons from areas 2 and 3 will have much in common with their counterparts in the 
IGSC. Since they, to varying extents, lack a capacity for choice, they are easily 
manipulated and tend to follow which ever direction is put forth by the group or its 
leaders. However, given their GSC, they are much more likely to use their 
relationships with others effectively and they will be much less likely to blame 
themselves for what is beyond their control. Persons from areas 4 and 5 will have less 
in common with their counterparts in the IGSC, because the EGSC tends to be 
intolerant of innovation that is inconsistent with cultural concepts. Of course, EGSCs 
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vary in this respect in different contexts. One might well argue that both Iran and 
Saudi Arabia have EGSCs. However, the Shi’a Muslim religion, which is prominent 
in Iran, accepts, in general, that religious scholars and leaders may innovate and offer 
new direction (even with regard to theology), while the Sunni Muslim religion, which 
is prominent in Saudi Arabia, generally forbids such change (they hold that Allah has 
not and will not provide further revelation). As such, the Iranian EGSC may 
encourage innovation (at least to some extent),34 whereas the Saudi EGSC strongly 
discourages it. Moreover, both tend to backup their position with effective informal 
and formal methods of control (such as, ostracism or incarceration in response to 
deviation). Another example might be the Japanese kamikaze pilots during World 
War II. While surely at least a few of them would have chosen not to die, pressure 
from the group forbade that option. The flip side is that persons with an EGSC are 
less susceptible to brainwashing since they can use each other for support (unless one 
wants to argue that this type of GSC is brainwashing in itself).35 Where innovation is 
frowned upon, persons in area 1 may be more numerous than need be, since new 
methods and techniques that prevent such difficulties may not be undertaken. In short, 
persons without choice may be in a better position in the EGSC because they can 
more readily obtain help from others; however, the EGSC may, in effect, prevent 
                                                 
34 Iranians generally see a man with female tendencies (or vice versa) “as someone who is consciously 
acting dirty” (Eshaghian cited in Barford). However, Iranian clerics are increasingly recommending 
“sex-change operations to those who are troubled about their gender” (Fathi) and Iranian physicians 
have become quite adept at performing the operations. “Iran caries out more sex change operations 
than any other nation in the world except for Thailand” (Barford). 
35 If the EGSC is to be considered brainwashing, perhaps because it does not depict reality (the notion 
that people are not as constrained as vegetables in a quiche), it seems that the IGSC is brainwashing as 
well (the notion that people really are not as disconnected as the cultural story would have it). 
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persons with choice from choosing to employ concepts that are inconsistent with 
group norms. Such persons may resort to hiding behavior that is inconsistent or 
offering QAI (however reluctantly) in support of the status quo. Of course, they may 
also take the contrary option, but, in many cases, choosing otherwise may simply be 
too costly.   
 The connected GSC (CGSC) views the individual as both interdependent and 
autonomous. With regard to the stir-fry analogy, the CGSC is a closer representation 
of reality (when compared to the IGSC and/or the EGSC), because it allows for the 
fact that humans need others both to develop and maintain a capacity for choice and 
for the possibility that persons may want to choose what is inconsistent with group 
norms (at times, it may be in their prior interest to do so). Since the CGSC 
encourages both interdependence and autonomy, its members are neither likely to 
downplay and ignore their need for connection to others nor likely to “relinquish their 
own identity” in service of group concepts (Staub, Psychology of Good 355). Persons 
from areas 4 and 5 will be able to choose (without the cost they would pay in an 
EGSC) a course of action that is inconsistent; moreover, they can innovate when the 
need arises. However, they, like the rest of us, cannot do it alone. Recall that we gain 
our identity and world understanding from others and that ostracism and loneliness 
pose a threat to us all. Persons with choice need some sub-group, however small, to 
provide AAI for their actions; the CGSC accommodates this need. Presumably, those 
from areas 1, 2, and 3 would fare better as well. Given the relative emphasis on 
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connection, such persons would likely receive more help from the group in addition 
to support that may allow them to function in an autonomous manner. 
 When a proposed decision entails selecting between following implicit norms 
of the group and risking one’s capacity for choice, the decision is not a meaningful 
choice. In the case of the EGSC, for instance, persons who act in ways that are 
inconsistent risk ostracism and persecution from group members. But connection is a 
basic need. Recall from section 2.5 that attachment to instrumental caregivers is 
required in order for choice to even get off the ground (it is necessary in order to 
develop an effective emotional response). Research regarding the Romanian orphans 
attests to the outcome of a lack of attachment. Recall also from section 3.4 that 
identity, knowledge, novelty, personal change, worldview, and even a sense of sanity 
are dependent upon connection to a group/sub-group(s). Thus, even the maintenance 
of choice depends on an attachment to others. As such, the implicit structure of the 
group matters immensely. However, as I will explain, so does the explicit structure 
and institutions. If we want to enact choice, we need the pre-conditions and beneficial 
cultural concepts, but we also need to live with laws that respect us as choosers.  
 What use to a person, for instance, is a capacity to choose to travel alone, if 
the law to which she is subject forbids her to do so? What practical application does 
an education have if the law impedes one’s ability to make use of it? In Iran, women 
have the right to an education (many take advantage of it too, since about 62% of 
college students are women); they are formally restricted, however, when it comes to 
practically applying what they have learned, because the law bars women “from work 
 213
that is ‘dangerous, difficult or harmful’” (italics mine) and it “grants the husband the 
right to forbid his wife from accepting a job that is incompatible with the interests of 
the family or her dignity” (Ertürk 9). A recent news article highlighted the fact that 
homosexuals in Iran also lack the conditions of choice due to discrimination and out 
right persecution. The article described the crisis of a gay Iranian man who is 
currently seeking asylum in Britain. His plea for help began in 2006 (he was in 
Britain attending school) “when he learned that his partner in Iran had been arrested, 
charged with sodomy, and hanged” (“Gay Iranian”). While being tortured, the partner 
had revealed his name; thus, if the man is returned home, he will surely face the same 
fate. Other examples abound. In the U.S., while homosexuals are not hanged (by the 
government), they are (in most states) forbidden to marry. As such, they are denied 
the many practical and financial benefits that the law accords to heterosexual married 
couples.  
 A listing of all the laws conducive to choice seems impossible to provide. The 
following should be considered a partial and general list that is open to revision. 
Persons thrive and are able to make choices when laws provide for: 
• choice in movement, which includes the ability to leave a non-conducive 
environment and be fully accepted in one that is 
• choice in verbal and written communication of concepts, that are in keeping 
with or contrary to group norms and laws, to any sub-group, to the group, or 
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to other groups (to be limited by respect for one’s own and all others’ 
capacities for choice) 
• choice in sub-group affiliation, including religious affiliation if said religion 
includes only notions that respect all persons as choosers 
• truthful representations of world and cultural events, objects, and reality (as 
far as information regarding reality can be ascertained from scrupulous 
scientific reasoning and testing), and so forth in the media and advertising  
• conceptual and physical privacy that is consistent with others enjoying the 
same in order to facilitate deviation from one’s GSC 
• existence without arbitrary interruption, search, and/or seizure 
• a judiciary process where persons are considered innocent until shown to be 
guilty 
• bodily integrity, including an absence of torture, brainwashing, and cruel or 
inhumane punishment 
• fair and equal treatment for all persons (no matter race, ethnicity, gender, 
capacity, sexual orientation, religion, or other group/sub-group category), 
while taking into account that some members have particular needs according 
to circumstance 
• participation in making or contributing to the laws to which one is subject 
• economic security at the level that is needed to provide the pre-conditions 
adequately for the self and for dependents 
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• all of the pre-conditions, including nutrition, education, clothing, shelter, 
overall health, absence of fear, absence of virtual and/or actual (emotional or 
physical) violence, and so on.  
 Each provision, I will argue in Chapter 4, ought to be limited only by the prior 
interest that each person has in choice. A capacity for choice is developed in 
conjunction with many others, but it remains, in a particular way, quite personal. That 
is because if one has not personally had the pre-conditions of choice, living within a 
cultural structure that is generally conducive to choice will be irrelevant to her 
personal situation. If a given person does not have the requisite neural structures, she 
will not be able to choose in any case. On the other hand, even if she has had the pre-
conditions, if either cultural concepts or laws restrict choice, one still may not have a 
reasonable ability to choose. Four scenarios are possible: first, both the pre-conditions 
and the conditions of choice may be present for a person; second and third, one may 
be present while the other is absent; and, fourth, neither may be present. The only 
case in which a person will be said to have an ability to choose—that is, to exist in a 
state of freedom—is in the first scenario.  
3.6: Inter-cultural Interdependence 
 Inter-cultural interdependence is in many ways analogous to intra-cultural 
interdependence, because many of the same tendencies driving the latter are present 
in the former although they may manifest in different ways. As I will explain, since in 
the modern world members of different cultures necessarily come into contact 
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(people, products, and ideas now cross cultural boundaries and national borders on a 
daily basis), a novel type of conceptual interdependency (born of sharing ideas and 
the conflict that often happens during contact between the different types of inner 
worlds created in different cultures) also occurs. This interdependency may take the 
form of cooperation between members of different cultures; alternately, it may take 
the form of conflict. Persons all over the world prefer the concepts that are dominant 
in their own cultures. Consonance between persons’ inner and outer worlds is a 
neurobiological imperative (Wexler 230). However, when they come into contact 
with other’s concepts, they experience interference (AAI, QAI, or DAI) with regard 
to their own concepts, impact from the resulting interaction, and change (whether 
they come to hold their own understandings in a way that is less strong or more so).  
 Persons are intra-culturally interdependent (some are dependent) because they 
share culture (a system of meaning) and they must engage in tacit or express 
coordination with each other for conceptual understandings, physical necessities, and 
possessions. Throughout this process of engagement they experience interference and 
impact and, given the eight reasons that support the IT, they tend to change 
accordingly. Some concepts promote cohesion among members of the group (or sub-
group), while others promote conflict. In the U.S., for instance, the concepts and 
symbols involved with the 4th of July holiday encourage a spirit of camaraderie, while 
other concepts, like those that are hotly contested in the evolution vs. creationism or 
the pro-choice vs. anti-choice debates, engender conflict between opposing sub-
groups. When persons A and B hold in common some concept that is sufficiently 
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important to both, they will tend to belong to the same sub-group. However, when A 
affirms a concept that B vehemently disaffirms, they will tend toward different sub-
groups and a potential for conflict exists between them (think of the polarization that 
existed in the U.S. during the Civil War). Conflict becomes a possibility because 
people are neurologically attracted to what is familiar simply because it is familiar. 
Both A and B then attempt to control the types of concepts that are common 
culturally (and perhaps those reflected in law), and when A and B act on concepts that 
disaffirm those held by the other, they create interference that impacts the external 
reality of the other. For instance, A may want the scientific theory of evolution to be 
taught in science classes in the U.S., while B may advocate teaching the religious 
notion of creationism; if the latter’s wishes come to be a dominant cultural concept, A 
will experience discordance between her inner world and external reality (A’s 
environment will be altered in a way that is inconsistent with her neurological 
structures). Since this type of situation is possible even where persons share culture, 
when one culture’s system of meaning largely disaffirms another—that is, when 
culture A experiences predominantly DAI from culture B (and vice versa)—the 
potential for conflict is even greater.  
 I will first consider the case in which two cultures have in common large parts 
of their systems of meaning or GSCs and then the one in which the GSCs 
predominantly clash. Of two cultures, A and B, A may feel an affinity with the 
symbolic conceptual understandings of B and vice versa, in which case A and B may 
form something of a sub-grouping within the larger grouping of the world’s cultures. 
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In this case, a significant portion of the concepts that make up A’s shared system of 
meaning provides AAI, or at least QAI, on behalf of B’s cultural concepts as B’s do 
for A’s. Here, cooperation is likely to occur between the two (consider, for instance, 
the significant cooperation that exists between the U.S. and Britain). They will tacitly 
or expressly coordinate with each other regarding conceptual understandings, 
physical necessities, and mutual protection from threats. These interdependent 
relations ensure that interference, impact, and (often) change will occur. In much the 
same way that person A can affirm the worldview of person B (reason #8 in support 
of the IT), members of group A can affirm the worldview or system of meaning held 
by those in group B. Recall that members of the two groups do not have to be present 
to each other for interference, impact, and change to occur. The policies they hold and 
the goods, products, and media they exchange and share (including television shows, 
movies, video games, music, internet exchanges, and so forth) all embody the 
concepts they have in common. Interference will not be hard to come by. 
 Now, conflict is possible (though it need not be violent) even between groups 
with similar worldviews. The U.S. and Canada, for instance, share peaceful relations 
and “hundreds of years of cultural heritage” (Wexler 240); but these commonalities 
have not stopped Canadians from feeling threatened by the encroachment of certain 
American concepts. Canadians, like all other persons in the world, prefer their own 
concepts and meanings simply because they are familiar. But the U.S. has become a 
major exporter of its own concepts, i.e., media and popular culture (all the things 
listed above and more). These things bring with them interference and impact that 
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encourage change, especially for young persons who (in every culture) adapt to 
whatever concepts are common in their environment (recall that the prefrontal cortex 
is developing until between the ages of 20 to 25). Canadian officials have taken steps 
to protect Canadian culture. For instance, the 1991 Canadian Broadcasting Act states 
that “each broadcasting undertaking shall make maximum use, and in no case less 
than predominant use, of Canadian creative and other sources” (cited in Wexler 238). 
Others, who also share much in common with the U.S., are acting in kind. The 
European community is concerned, for instance, about “resisting the invasion of 
United States Culture” such that it has issued “a directive requiring that at least half 
of television air time be dedicated to European-made programs” (Wexler 239).  
 Consider the greater tendency toward conflict that often occurs when cultures 
with dissimilar GSCs come into contact. Within this conflict, interdependency still 
occurs, though in somewhat altered form, because it is not that A and B experience 
AAI or even QAI from the other. Since they are dissimilar, each will receive mainly 
DAI. With regard to conceptual interdependency, it becomes more difficult for either 
A or B (or both) to create or maintain their external environments in a way that is 
consonant with their inner worlds. Thus, when A experiences interference, impact, 
and change due to interaction with B, A may attempt to control or eliminate the 
concepts put forward by B (as B will do for A’s concepts as well).  
 In this type of scenario, although the cultures’ respective concepts and 
symbolic understandings are inconsistent with each other, each wants their own 
concepts (much like person A and B in the example above) to prevail. Members 
 220
desire what is familiar to them (especially adult members, since their neural processes 
have become more fixed (Wexler 143 and 171)). But when one comes into contact 
with the other, say via international politics or an exchange of goods or media, both 
experience inconsistency. Their worldviews or GSCs—literally, the way that 
members come to define themselves and the concepts they utilize to function in the 
world—are disaffirmed (constituting affronts to points 1, 2, and 8 in support of the 
IT). Neither side will be likely to select (by preference) or choose to form a sub-
grouping with the other (point 5).  
 Since each requires consonance, A and B may (in accord with point 3) attempt 
to ignore, discredit, re-interpret, and forget information about the other group; that is, 
A may take B, as far as possible, to fit into A’s worldview (as B may as well). 
Historical examples of this type of coping mechanism abound. The first English 
people who migrated to North America not only named their new home “New 
England”, they also took the Native Americans to be “the lost tribes of Israel 
described in European religious texts” (Wexler 203). When Captain James Cook and 
his entourage arrived “off the coast of Hawaii at the start of the annual 2-week-long 
celebration of the return of the deity Lono”, the Hawaiian natives took Cook to be 
Lono (204-206). The Hawaiians treated him like a king, until, upon leaving the 
island, Cook had difficulties with his ship and was forced to quickly return. This early 
return failed to concord with the Hawaiians’ understanding of Lono’s behavior; they 
killed Cook, burnt his body in sacrifice, and divided his remains (206). When 
Belgium colonized Rwanda, the Belgians attempted to understand the Rwandans 
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“according to the Hamitic myth propagated by [John Hanning] Speke” (the British 
explorer), which encouraged the Belgians to regard one Rwandan tribe, the Tutsis, as 
superior to another, the Hutus (209). According to Speke, the Tutsis “more closely 
resembled . . . a superior race descended from the biblical King David” (209). The 
fact that the Belgians supported a “Tutsi domination of the Hutus” for roughly sixty 
years contributed to the angry sentiments that inflamed the Rwandan genocide in 
1994 (210). Thus, there are many historical examples that illustrate the tendency of 
group A to explain the existence of group B in a way that accords with A’s symbolic 
understandings. These examples also demonstrate, however, that such attempts at 
interpretation do not often work. Group B has its own sets of valued cultural 
understandings; when these are significantly different from A’s, members of A are 
often unable to sustain this forcing of B into A’s conceptual mold. In such cases, 
conflict results. 
 Alternately, (in keeping with point 4) rather than treating B as if its concepts 
fit with A’s, A can attempt to act on the world in such a way as to keep or make the 
external world consonant with A’s dominant concepts. That is, A may try to force B 
to accommodate A’s concepts (or vice versa). The fact that A’s young people will 
easily adopt B’s understandings exacerbates A’s problem. The presence of B’s 
worldview may become an existential threat to A’s, and conflict between A and B 
(that may offend the capacity for choice for members on one or both sides) becomes 
extremely likely. There are many historical and contemporary examples of such 
behavior. The Roman Catholic Church, for instance, during the middle ages held the 
 222
Inquisition in an attempt to rid Europe of concepts that were heretical—that is, 
inconsistent—with the teachings of the Church. The Crusades provide another 
poignant example. For some two hundred years, European Christian soldiers set out 
to regain control of Christian holy places in the Middle East from Muslim rule. 
Christian leaders encouraged the soldiers to recapture Christian symbolic monuments 
that were “polluted by . . . foul practices . . . [and] enslaved to pagan rites” (Robert of 
Rheims cited in Wexler 217). They fought for the “reward of martyrdom” (Guilbert 
of Nogent cited in Wexler 217) but did not limit themselves to attacking merely 
Muslims. That they also targeted both the Jews and Wends, who have little else in 
common with Muslims besides advocating belief systems that are inconsistent with 
Christianity, indicates that a significant part of the motive of the Crusaders was to 
“eliminate alternative belief systems” (Wexler 221). In essence they were fighting “to 
control the opportunity to create external structures that fit with their internal 
structures and to prevent others from filling” their environment with inconsistent 
concepts (Wexler 230-31).  
 More recent examples are prevalent. When British teacher, Gillian Gibbons, 
allowed her class of 7 year olds in the Sudan in the Fall of 2007 to name the class 
teddy bear Muhammad, she found herself jailed for “inciting religious hatred” (a 
crime punishable by “up to 40 lashes” (“Sudan Charges”)), surrounded by angry 
crowds calling for her death (Britten), and facing a Sudanese judicial system that 
wanted to prove a point regarding what kinds of concepts would be allowed in the 
Sudan. Many Sudanese believed that naming the teddy bear Muhammad was 
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religious blasphemy as well as an insult to the Prophet Muhammad and Islam; their 
actions against Gibbons were clearly an attempt control the concepts being taught to 
their children as well as those that are present in the environment. A similar point 
may be made regarding the Danish cartoons, published in September 2006, that 
depicted the Prophet Muhammad “wearing a turban shaped like a bomb with a lit 
fuse” (Shadid and Sullivan). The Muslim public outcry and the conflict that followed 
in several countries around the world—including, protests “stretching from Europe 
through Africa to East Asia”, 12 killed in Afghanistan and 5 in Pakistan, embassies 
burned, and ambassadors withdrawn—indicate a broad “collision in worldviews” 
(Shadid and Sullivan). Such collisions can be violent. Over two years after the 
cartoons, the Danish embassy in Pakistan was bombed in revenge (Thomas, G). 
 Other examples include roughly 600 Christian families fleeing from Mosul, 
Iraq in October 2008 “amid threats by Muslim extremists to convert to Islam or risk 
death” (“Christian Families”). On October 20, a young British, Christian aid worker, 
Gayle Williams, was gunned down in Kabul, Iraq as she walked to work; her crime, 
according to the Taliban, was preaching Christianity (“Taliban”). During the same 
period, an American woman was being held in Iran on the pretense of a traffic 
violation through her apparent “real crime” was traveling to Iran to gain information 
for her master’s thesis on women’s rights in Iran (“U.S. Student”) and a 24 year old 
male journalism student in Afghanistan was sentenced to “20 years in prison . . . for 
asking questions in class about women’s rights under Islam” (“Afghan Court”). In 
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each of these cases, the basic issue is an inconsistency and subsequent conflict 
between two concepts; advocates of one attempt to force it on advocates of the other. 
 Prior to orchestrating the attacks on the New York World Trade Center in 
2001, Osama bin Ladin had long been offended by U.S. policies, such as the U.S. 
maintaining troops in Saudi Arabia (“the home of Islam’s holiest sites”), sanctioning 
Iraq after the first Gulf War, and supporting Israel in its actions against the 
Palestinians (9/11 Commission 48-49). His grievances against the U.S. have, 
however, become much deeper. In bin Ladin’s view, the U.S. culture is “the worst 
civilization witnessed by the history of mankind”; his goal is to force the U.S. to 
“abandon the Middle East, convert to Islam, and end the immorality and godlessness 
of its society and culture” (51). The concepts embodied in American policies, 
practices, and products are to him (and his followers) so inconsistent with his own 
that they must be denounced and dismantled. As such, the attacks on the world trade 
center were spawned, in part, by a sub-group’s (i.e., al Qaeda) attempt to rid the 
world of a competing system of meaning. In the U.S., politicians were busy making 
sure that al Qaeda’s attack would fail in its intent; while Bush encouraged Americans 
to keep flying and buying, then Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, explained that 
Americans “have a choice – either to change the way we live, which is unacceptable, 
or to change the way that they live; and we choose the latter” (Bacevich). The 
administration of George W. Bush managed to sell the war against Iraq to a 
significant portion of the American public, in part, by claiming that it is in U.S. 
interest to spread democracy and “freedom” to other parts of the world. That this 
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justification proved useful indicates that many American people would prefer the 
world to be dominated by concepts that are familiar to them. I will return to a 
discussion of the pre-conditions and violent sub-groups (such as al Qaeda) in section 
4.4. For the moment, my concern is with the fact that both parties to the attack on 
9/11 consider the other’s worldview as one that is so inconsistent (with their own) 
that it simply cannot be countenanced. Both intend to force the other into 
accommodating their own concepts. Groups (and their members) are inter-culturally 
interdependent because the concepts of one group constitute interference that impacts 
and can change the symbolic environment of the other.36  
 In inter-cultural interdependence (as with intra-cultural), there is a dynamic 
system at work. Each group wants its own system of meaning to prevail. In general, 
each group has choosers (though one group may have more than others)—persons 
who can extrapolate and move beyond an existing situation or conflict (though 
choosers are not constrained to do so)—and (at least at present) non-choosers—
persons who are constrained by their inner worlds and the cultural concepts they 
encounter on a daily basis within their own sub-groups/group (the two main forms of 
interference). Given the dynamics of intra-cultural interdependence, choosers on both 
sides are inclined to hold more tightly to their own concepts (at least where sub-
groups and the group affirm them); and, on both sides, non-choosers cannot help by 
think their own concepts are the correct ones, i.e., the one’s that ought to prevail in 
                                                 
36 The current world economic crisis has demonstrated the extent to which the economies of the world 
are interdependent, but that discussion will be left for another endeavor. 
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the world. Moreover, since non-choosers are constrained by the two main forms of 
interference, they will act in accordance with them even if those actions offend choice 
and its pre-conditions (that is, what is in each person’s prior interest) for themselves 
and any other person. If cultural concepts affirm peace (and this concept also fits 
within the non-chooser’s inner world), the person without choice will act peacefully. 
If cultural concepts affirm war, terror, and torture—things that are specific offenses to 
choice (see section 2.6 and 2.7)—she will act accordingly if her inner world also 
allows for these offenses to choice. And remember since she is without choice, 
offenses to choice have been common in her life. She is accustomed to affronts to her 
humanity. As such, she will often respond with behavior that is harmful or inhuman (I 
will return to this topic again with specific examples in section 4.4). 
 In Chapter 4, I will argue that each person has reasons that are in her prior 
interest to help provide the pre-conditions of choice for all people in the world. If one 
considers just this section on inter-cultural interdependence some of these reasons 
become apparent. In modern times, the cultures of the world inevitably come into 
contact. While choosers may prefer their own cultural concepts, they can choose to 
override this tendency when they are faced with novelty. They are well placed to 
innovate when interference and impact change the culture to which they are 
accustomed. They have at their disposal what it takes, if they so choose, to engage 
cooperatively on the international scene. Non-choosers are not well situated to do so. 
Thus, conflict may be more likely when persons are left without the pre-conditions of 
choice. But one other issue is also apparent at this juncture. If two cultures intend to 
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engage peacefully and cooperatively, each must respect the concepts and symbolic 
understandings of the other. Where they do not, conflict and violence become more 
likely (and violence is an offense to choice). As such, there is a prima facie case for 
helping to provide the pre-conditions of choice for others, while at the same time 
doing so in a way that does not conceptually offend those receiving help (i.e., the 
point will be to provide culturally appropriate food and education as far as this is 
possible without offending either the others’ cultural concepts or choice in general).37 
Moreover, once persons are choosers, they will be in a position to establish the 
conditions of choice for themselves in a way that accords with their own 
understandings. Thus, the premise will be that, so long as members of group B have 
access to the pre-conditions, members of group A ought, in order to avoid conflict 
with B, provide QAI toward B’s concepts as well as with regard to the way that 
members of B choose to set up the conditions of choice for themselves.  
 As noted earlier, Chapters 2 and 3 were intended to perform a similar function 
in the appropriated theory as the notion of human ontology did for Beauvoir’s theory. 
Human ontology is a description of the basic being of humans—what they are, 
including their unique qualities such as choice, as well as how they live and get along 
in the world. The Beauvoirean theory relies upon an implicit thought experiment in 
                                                 
37 In some cases, it may not be possible both to help educate persons in other cultures, while at the 
same time failing to offend their cultural concepts and choice in general. Recall from section 2.6 that 
some religious ideas offend choice (e.g., teaching young women that they are to be subordinate to 
men). A dilemma may then occur if these ideas are embedded in the culture. One cannot teach such 
concepts without offending choice and one may offend cultural concepts if one does not teach them. 
Since, as I will argue in Chapter 4, choice is the basis of all justification, this dilemma must be 
resolved in favor of choice (while being as sensitive as possible to cultural concepts). 
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order to establish these things; however, that method leaves the theory open to a 
charge of arm chair philosophizing and it fails to establish the basic premises with 
clarity. The present theory relies instead upon the latest and most general scientific 
information regarding the being of humans. We are potentially choosers, via our 
genetic makeup, but that potentiality is fulfilled for an individual only if the pre-
conditions are present for her in sufficient amount over her lifespan. In the absence of 
the pre-conditions, persons fail to develop the neural structures of choice; in the 
absence of the conditions of choice, persons may be constrained by cultural concepts 
and understandings. 
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Chapter Four: Arguments in Favor of Choice and Freedom 
4.1: Introduction 
 In the previous two chapters, I have provided the reader with significant 
information regarding choice. The human capacity for choice is a neurobiological 
function that, given circumstances in the environment, may or may not be enabled for 
a given individual. A multitude of influences determine the outcome. Where the pre-
conditions are present, persons tend to develop a capacity for choice. Their humanity 
is fulfilled. Alternately, in the absence of the pre-conditions, well being, humanity, 
and free will is offended or absent. Without the pre-conditions, persons are 
conditioned such that they are constrained by their inner worlds and the sub-groups to 
which they are attached. They are not capable of acting except in accordance with 
those constraints. Moreover, even a person with choice may be unable to enact choice 
if she does not live within the conditions of choice. Of course, since the conditions of 
choice are determined by the symbolic and conceptual understandings of the group, 
since members of each group have a neurological affinity with their own 
understandings, and since conflict is likely where the members of one group offer 
DAI with regard to the concepts of another, there is a prima facie case for offering at 
least QAI toward other groups’ worldviews (exceptions will be considered 
momentarily). 
 One should note that I have not taken for granted the ethicist’s basic 
phenomenon. In essence, I have challenged the notion that philosophical undertakings 
ought to be based less on empirical inquiry than on logical reasoning. While that may 
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be the case regarding certain subjects (perhaps metaphysics and philosophy of 
language are well suited to this approach), ethical and social/political philosophy 
concern people—the way people should live and the way they ought to treat each 
other. That is, these two philosophical concerns have real life consequences and 
empirical inquiry is part of what it takes to develop an adequate understanding of 
what is at stake. If ethical arguments are based, for instance, on ill information or 
unwarranted assumptions, the ramifications are not limited to a failed or flawed 
theory. Such a failure may translate into an offense to the very humanity of actual 
people.   
 In this chapter, the scientific information, compiled, analyzed, and interpreted 
in the previous two chapters, features as the basic premises in the three main 
arguments and is also utilized in order to critique the assumptions used in some 
opposing views. Sections 4.2 through 4.4 contain the three arguments. The first—the 
argument from consistency—regards types of interference a person will provide if she 
behaves in a way that is consistent with her own prior interest in choice. The 
argument does not address why she should behave in this manner, since that issue is 
taken up in the second and third arguments: the justification argument and the 
argument from consequences. These offer separate reasons (that are in each person’s 
prior interest) for all to be consistent. After each argument, I will consider objections 
that are specific to the argument in question. After all three have been presented, I 
will deal with objections—such as those that may stem from concerns about just 
deserts, norms of non-interference, and special obligations—that may be applicable to 
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the arguments taken together. Lastly, I will argue that the existence of personal 
interests and special obligations give us significant reason to prefer setting up and 
contributing to systems that help provide the pre-conditions to all and I will consider 
briefly what ramifications the appropriated theory might have for political theory. 
4.2: The Argument from Consistency 
 The argument from consistency maintains that any person, who is acting from 
mere consistency, will engage in interference that helps provide the pre-conditions of 
choice for all persons and the conditions of choice for persons within one’s cultural 
group.38 Reasons for being consistent (that are in one’s prior interest) will be 
addressed in the second and third arguments. I begin the argument with a thought 
experiment for the reader’s consideration (it is to be undertaken by any person who 
has had and continues to have the pre-conditions and who is aware of the 
interdependent context of engagement). Suppose that shortly after birth, infants have 
a brief period of incredible lucidity. During this time, it is as if the infants had reached 
neurological maturity and as if all the pre-conditions and the conditions are and had 
been (during a period of development) present for them. The lucid infants would have 
well developed cognitive, social, and emotional neural processes and significant 
content to utilize during their deliberations. During this brief period, the infants would 
                                                 
38 The argument from consistency is based upon and in some ways analogous to John Rawls’ original 
position thought experiment (see Rawls 136-150). 
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be in a state of well being (as the notion was established in section 2.11).39 Now, 
suppose a researcher has gone to visit with a random sampling of the infants. The 
researcher explains to them that they will, throughout their lives, have particular 
interests; each will have needs and wants and must engage with others and objects in 
the world in order to satisfy them. Novelty—the presence of which designates an 
interest as non-trivial—is also, she explains, present in the world. It is an objective 
part of reality that in many instances cannot be avoided. The infants easily infer from 
this information that many of their particular interests will be non-trivial. The 
researcher tells each about her personal interest in receiving the pre-conditions; that 
is, that each person is able to fulfill her non-trivial particular interests only if she has 
received the pre-conditions of choice and that she will have the best chances of doing 
so if she lives within the conditions. Each infant then notes her own prior interest in 
obtaining the pre-conditions, in sufficient amount, both during development and 
throughout adulthood. It is through receipt of the pre-conditions that she will come to 
develop and maintain a capacity for choice, a capacity that (recall from section 2.11) 
makes humans unique, that enables freedom and self-determination, and that 
functions as the primary human adaptive strategy. Without a capacity for choice she 
will be constrained, in adulthood, to think and do what others will train or condition 
her to think and do once her period of lucidity ends. She will be unable to separate 
from sub-group/group activities and unable to fulfill her non-trivial particular 
                                                 
39 The analysis in Chapter 2 explains that some infants are unable, due to a lack of micro-nutrients or 
the presence of toxins, drugs, and so on in utero, to experience this state of well being. Thus, for the 
moment, I exclude these unfortunate situations from consideration in the thought experiment. 
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interests. The researcher also explains that persons tend to affiliate with groups and 
sub-groups, that the actions/inactions of the members greatly impact the actions of 
others, and that collectively the members of sub-groups/groups set up the conditions 
of group life. It is an ongoing process in which some conditions were initiated 
previously, but current contributions can change them via affirmative or 
disaffirmative interference. These others can set up conditions that are conducive to 
choice and such situations greatly increase one’s chances of being able to enact 
choices. They can make the pre-conditions of choice hard to come by and they can 
contribute concepts and laws that make choice costly from a personal perspective. 
Since cultural conditions help to determine whether or not persons receive the pre-
conditions, some contributions may make choice impossible.40 Lastly, the researcher 
points out to the infants that the pre-conditions and conditions of choice matter for 
each person no matter her situation in life (that is, without regard to her socio-
economic status, race, ethnicity, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or other sub-
group/group category). All persons benefit from them and suffer without them. 
Before the period of lucidity ends, the researcher asks the infants whether they would 
like to have both the pre-conditions and conditions throughout their lives. In view of 
all this information, would any lucid infant choose to decline receipt of them? To do 
so would be unreasonable; it is self-defeating to act in a way that is contrary to one’s 
                                                 
40 This is the case when cultural concepts hold some sub-groups of persons in low regard, perhaps 
failing to provide them with access to food, education, or other vital pre-conditions. 
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own prior interest. And just as declining them is self-defeating for the infant, so 
would it be for the reader or any other human.   
 Each has this prior interest in the pre-conditions. That is, each who receives 
them reaps a multitude of benefits from holding a capacity for choice. But, it is also 
the case that each can come to have such a capacity in virtue of belonging to the set 
or class of beings who have attributes for choice that can be enabled. All and (at least 
at present) only members of this class (those that are genetically human) are potential 
choosers. That is, in order to develop a capacity for choice, one must (1) be 
genetically human and (2) receive the pre-conditions. If one will be consistent, it will 
be with regard to these two criteria. While a sub-group or a group may have a 
relatively self-contained system by which it enables choice for its members, no 
member has a potential for choice in virtue of belonging to a sub-group or group. 
Each can develop choice due to species membership. Thus, if a person acts from 
consistency, it will be with reference to all members of her class or species. She will 
not be consistent if she limits her concern to those who belong to a particular sub-
group (for instance, family or friends) or group.  
 Moreover, with regard to (2), all members are in the same position, in that 
each requires (at least) the pre-conditions if their attributes for choice will become a 
capacity and each has a better chance of enacting choice—she will be able to choose 
and live freely—if she lives within the conditions of choice. The only way in which 
any member receives the pre-conditions and conditions of choice is through the 
interference (AAI, DAI, and QAI) she receives from others. Thus, if any member of 
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the class is merely consistent—if she realizes her own needs and that others of her 
class have the same sorts of needs—she will undertake interference that enables 
choice both for herself and for all other members of the class.  
 Intra-cultural promotion of choice takes the form of engaging in AAI 
regarding activities that further both the pre-conditions and conditions (e.g., food and 
nutrition programs, parenting classes, school and educational resource improvement, 
laws that establish equality, and so forth) and DAI with regard to any activities that 
denigrate choice (e.g., child abuse or neglect, media violence, low educational 
standards, bullying and the contexts that foster it, and so on). Intra-cultural QAI 
constitutes consistent behavior only in cases where the preservation and promotion of 
choice is secure. However, the analysis in section 3.6 demonstrates that inter-cultural 
promotion of choice will require a somewhat different tactic. The pre-conditions of 
choice must be provided (via either AAI or DAI) universally for members of other 
groups (as well as for one’s own) in order to remain consistent. However, since a 
group of people who have had and have the pre-conditions are well placed to 
establish the conditions of choice for themselves, since a group’s cultural concepts 
are of prime importance to its members (such that conflict is likely between groups 
who hold contrary symbolic understandings unless each group respects (offers QAI 
toward) those of the other), and since such respect diminishes the likelihood that 
members of other groups will enact DAI with regard to one’s own choices, other 
cultures’ GSCs and group understandings (concepts that establish group and personal 
identity as well as whether the conditions of choice are present) ought to be respected 
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as much as possible. That is, in general, QAI is the consistent response with regard to 
other cultural groups unless the pre-conditions are not present for any or all within 
that group or unless some cultural group is undertaking interference that impedes the 
presence of the pre-conditions for another group.   
 The argument from consistency maintains that each consistent person 
(hereafter, CP) will help provide interference such that the pre-conditions of choice 
will be made available to all other members of her class and such that the conditions 
of choice will be present for members of her own group. However, there are three 
objections that one might raise that are specific to the argument. One might contend, 
for instance, (1) that some members of the class of humans do not have the genetic 
potential that is required to develop a capacity for choice, (2) that some do not want 
to receive the pre-conditions, or (3) that some members of one’s cultural group do not 
want the conditions. The concern with regard to (1) is that mere consistency may not 
be enough in some cases. The worry with regard to (2) and (3) is that a CP who 
provides the pre-conditions or conditions for others who reject them (henceforth, 
rejecters) may be offending rather than encouraging choice. If the CP offends choice, 
she is no longer consistent. I will consider each objection in turn.  
 With regard to objection (1), it is true that at present there are (genetically 
human) persons who will fail to develop a capacity for choice even if the factors that I 
have included among the pre-conditions of choice are present for them. I am referring 
to those who have currently non-preventable genetic malformities and diseases. This 
is, on the face of it, a concern for the appropriated theory because the notion of 
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consistency does not appear to apply to these cases in the same way as it does for 
those without genetic problems. I respond, first, that co-membership in the class 
creates many commonalities between persons. If a person has had the pre-conditions, 
she will be able to utilize her capacity for choice (that is, she can extrapolate) to put 
herself in the place of the other in order to recognize the other’s needs. And secondly, 
due to ongoing innovations and discoveries in the biological sciences and technology, 
it is becoming more likely that we will in the future be able to prevent such 
malformities or overcome them as more stringent efforts to help are employed. For 
instance, many scientists have been looking for a specific gene that might be 
implicated in the onset of schizophrenia; however, a recent study indicates that “a 
myriad of different glitches in many genes” may be involved (Dunham). While the 
research does not provide specific answers to the problem (about 1% of the world’s 
population is inflicted (Dunham)), it does shed new light on how the disease might be 
prevented or treated (Walsh et al, 4). A recent case regarding therapy for severe 
autism also offers some hope. Although professionals had labeled 13 year old Carly 
Fleischmann “moderately to severely cognitively impaired”, with the help of a speech 
pathologist, she has become able to communicate her thoughts by using a computer 
(McKenzie). Carly has demonstrated that she understands her surroundings and 
people’s communications with her, and that she is not cognitively impaired. Thus, in 
the case of genetic malformities (or those that are created due to interaction with an 
inhospitable environment), consistency entails more than providing the pre-
conditions. It requires caring for disadvantaged persons, while at the same time 
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working to provide them with either a normal genetic base line or the means to 
overcome their difficulties (for instance, medications and therapies) so that the pre-
conditions can be helpful for them. That is, in some cases, consistency involves 
providing more interference than it does in others.41  
 With regard to objection (2), two types of circumstances seem possible: either 
(i) the rejecter has not had/does not have the pre-conditions or (ii) she has had and 
continues to have them. I argue that, in the case of (i), the rejecter acts from a 
maladaptive preference selection. Since the rejecter cannot choose, the CP must 
continue to help provide the pre-conditions, even against the rejecter’s preference, if 
she will remain consistent. Persons with a capacity for choice may also reject further 
receipt of pre-conditions. With regard to (ii), the question regards whether there is a 
case in which it is reasonable for the rejecter to decline the pre-conditions such that 
the CP may fail to help provide and still remain consistent. Since any rejection of the 
pre-conditions is self-defeating, there is only one type of case in which it is 
reasonable—that is, when rejection serves the choice of another or a group/sub-group. 
Then, the CP must, in order to remain consistent, support (via AAI) this rejecter’s 
actions. 
 Consider (i), the case in which the rejecter has not had and/or does not have 
the pre-conditions of choice. In order to understand her behavior (e.g., declining 
                                                 
41 When resources are scarce such that we cannot simultaneously provide the pre-conditions for 
persons with and without genetic malformities, it will be in the interest of choice to provide for the 
latter first. This way there will be more choosers to help provide for the non-choosers. However, this 
strategy may have repercussions (as I will explain in the argument from consequences) and should be 
used only temporarily and as a last resort. 
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nutrition or education), recall from section 2.11 that a person who lacks the pre-
conditions is constrained to utilize preference selection. She may have many wishes 
and desires, but she does not have a capacity for choice. Thus, she cannot choose 
whether or not she wants the pre-conditions and this situation is, in and of itself, an 
offense to her humanity. Her preference, determined by conditioning during 
development and/or by her interactions with the group/her sub-groups, is an adaptive 
preference (also called a deformed desire). Adaptive preferences generally have a 
“‘fox and grapes’ structure, that is, if the grapes are out of the [person’s] reach,” she 
develops preferences that preclude a desire for the grapes by “declaring them sour 
anyway” (Cudd 180). While all adaptive preferences need not be harmful to the 
person (180-81),42 in this instance her desire points to a maladaptation. She is 
selecting a situation that will bring her harm rather than well being.  
 An example may prove helpful. Consider an upper-class Saudi Arabian 
woman. The Saudi GSC holds that upper-class women ought to have a limited 
education, one might argue, in order to keep them docile in a restrictive environment. 
They are not permitted, for instance, to venture outside their homes without a 
culturally appropriate male escort. Now, it would not be puzzling if a woman from 
this sub-group were to maintain, if asked, that she prefers her lifestyle, including its 
limited education, to all others. Recall that persons generally have a neurological 
preference for what is familiar merely because it is familiar. However, via this 
                                                 
42 One may decline a specific food, for instance, due to an allergy or individual taste. As long as other 
foods are available to her by which she may fulfill her nutritional needs, she suffers no ill consequence. 
 240
preference, she effectively rejects a pre-condition (education). Since education is 
crucial to the development of choice—it grows neural processes and provides content 
for deliberations—she literally does not know what she is missing. She cannot choose 
her lifestyle or any other. The same goes for all other persons who either do not have 
or have not had what it takes to develop a capacity for choice. They are not in a 
position to make a choice regarding whether or not to receive the pre-conditions. 
Although their maladaptive preferences may be understandable given their situations, 
the CP must help to provide them with the pre-conditions in order to remain 
consistent. 
 Of course persons with choice (case (ii)) may also choose things that are 
contrary to choice. Nothing forces a person with a capacity for choice to use it in 
service of her own well being. Rather than utilizing choice, for instance, she may 
merely be following the concepts projected by others in her group/sub-group. 
However, the lucid infant thought experiment demonstrates that rejection of the pre-
conditions is self-defeating. And since human self-defeat is always a defeat of choice 
(or at least a potentiality for choice), what is self-defeating for a chooser cannot also 
be consistent with choice. Hence, the CP must help to provide for this person as well. 
However, there is one type of exception and it occurs when the rejecter is providing 
(through her rejection) interference that serves choice, either for another person, a 
sub-group/group, or the class of humans. If a parent, for instance, gives up her dinner 
in order to offer food to her hungry child or if a firefighter forgoes sleep in order to 
save a family from a burning building, they both reject a pre-condition in the interest 
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of choice.43 The rejection is DAI with regard to an existent situation that offends or 
threatens someone’s capacity for choice. When Mahatma Gandhi went on a hunger 
strike, he did so for sake of the choices of many others in his group; he sought no less 
than to change the GSC of his own culture. In these types of cases, how will the CP 
remain consistent? Should she lull the firefighter to sleep and force feed Gandhi? 
While she must help to feed the parent to remain consistent, she need not also retrieve 
the food from the child. These are acts in service of choice, and, if the CP will remain 
consistent, she will offer affirmative active interference (AAI) in support of this type 
of rejecter.  
 The worry with regard to objection (3) is that some persons within the CP’s 
cultural group may not desire to have the conditions of choice. If a person without the 
pre-conditions declines to live within the conditions, she exhibits a maladaptive 
preference selection. This type of scenario was discussed above. However, when a 
person who has the pre-conditions declines, she could have chosen otherwise. Ought 
the CP abide by her choice? Groups share the conditions of choice in a collective 
manner; one cannot will the conditions of choice only for the self. As I explained in 
section 3.6, offenses to choice, due to the interdependent context of intra-cultural life, 
tend to spread and propagate. Thus, the CP cannot be sure that she can consistently 
provide the conditions for some members of the group and not for other members. 
                                                 
43 Of course, the parent and the firefighter in these examples can only forfeit these pre-conditions for a 
relatively short amount of time or they act in a way that is contrary to choice. The parent’s capacity to 
nurture and educate the child will decline in short order if food is not present in sufficient amount; the 
firefighter who works without sleep will become groggy and incapacitated becoming less and less 
useful to those he intends to help.  
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Thus, the CP will work to provide the conditions for all members of her group 
whether or not they prefer it or choose it to be so.  
 The argument from consistency maintains that if one is consistent, one will 
help to provide interference such that all persons—all members of her class, no matter 
their genetic attributes—will receive the pre-conditions of choice; the one exception 
is that she need not provide the pre-conditions for a rejecter who chooses to forgo the 
pre-conditions in service of choice. Moreover, the CP will work to create the 
conditions of choice for all members of her cultural group and, in general, provide 
QAI toward others’ group concepts. However, why is it that any person has a 
significant reason that is in her prior interest to be consistent? This question is 
addressed by the following two arguments.  
4.3: The Justification Argument 
 Foundational justifications—those that ground or warrant others—are 
notoriously difficult to establish. J.S. Mill’s argument for the principle of utility and 
Descartes’ search for foundational truth are but two prominent and controversial 
attempts. I explained in Chapter 1 that the appropriated theory I am defending does 
not aim at founding an immutable truth, such as what is “good” in and of itself or 
what is incumbent upon any rational agent, no matter her attributes or situation. The 
reason is that the theory takes evolution seriously. If the universe, the world, and the 
world’s inhabitants are evolving, the desire to hold anything or any grounding notion 
as thoroughly unchanging is likely futile. As such, the theory seeks no more than to 
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address a current time slice. If either persons or their situations change significantly, 
the theory will have nothing more to say about how they ought to behave.  
 The appropriated theory does, however, leave open the possibility of a 
primary justification, some concept that, at this point in human history, warrants some 
actions/inactions while leaving others without warrant.44 This notion is choice. 
Earlier, I argued that choice is the core of our notion of humanity because it is unique 
to humans, it enables freedom, defines dignity via self-determination, and it functions 
as our primary adaptive strategy. The neural processes of choice are also the way in 
which humans can create, recognize, deal with, and adapt to novel situations. The 
justification argument (below) holds that, in addition to these important functions, 
choice is also the basis of and method toward justification in general and further that 
justifications that offend choice are without warrant. I set aside justifications that are 
purely descriptive (if one is asked “Why do you believe that the object before you is a 
table?”, one might respond, for instance, with a descriptive justification: “Because it 
has four legs that support a platform”) and address only those that purport to give 
reasons for action/inaction. 
 Consider now why we make justifications and how it is that we do so. The 
overwhelming tendency to justify is given by our inclination, due to pre-frontal 
processes, to act or not according to concepts (symbolic understandings of the world). 
                                                 
44 Justification is often used as a success term (the notion that x (as a justification of y) successfully 
warrants y), but this is not the usage I am employing. Rather, to justify will refer to offering a reason 
for action/inaction; the notion of warrant will refer to whether others have sufficient reason to accept 
the justification. 
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We then want other concepts to lend support or credence to the prior concept. For 
example, say that a person is driving in the middle of the night and comes upon a red 
light. No other traffic is present. Perhaps she stops, as is required by law, and 
patiently waits for the light to turn green. If, later, someone asks why she waited for 
the light, she might explain that she has respect for the law or that she did not want to 
get caught disobeying. Perhaps a few minutes later, another driver comes across the 
same intersection and again the light is red (no traffic is present). If she stops for a 
second, looks around to make sure no one is coming, and then proceeds through the 
intersection, she will need to supply a different type of reason for her interlocutor. 
She may explain that, even though she broke the law, she acted cautiously; since no 
person (herself or another) was hurt by her action, she finds her action to be 
acceptable. In the first case, the person appeals to respect for or fear of the law to 
justify her action and, in the second, she utilizes the notion of no harm, no foul. 
Although the two appeals are different, they both intend to lend warrant to a prior 
concept (“I will stop for the red light” or “I will run the red light”, respectively). Of 
course, one may also offer a justification prior to or during an action/inaction; timing 
is not the issue.  
 But how does one come to make such a justification? As running or not 
running red lights are common enough occurrences in modern society, the drivers 
need not have conceived of the supportive concepts on their own. Due to interactions 
with others (either during development or with their multiple sub-groups), the drivers 
will likely have a multitude of such concepts at their disposal. However, when cars 
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and stoplights were novel, some persons extrapolated from previous and similar 
experiences (likely from whatever etiquette was common in operating horse drawn 
transportation) in order to create novel justifications, ones that are applicable to 
current cases. These persons utilized amplified and sustained attention regarding the 
issue at hand, engaged their working and long-term memories (the latter to pull up 
similar and relevant experiences and the former to remain aware), separated off 
irrelevant stimuli, simulated different possibilities, imagined the responses of others, 
and considered their own emotional responses to the alternatives. That is, persons 
who create novel justifications utilize their capacities for choice and project beyond 
existing justifications in order to provide warrant for action and inaction in new 
circumstances. In our own era, persons are working to create new justifications for 
behavior in novel situations all the time. Novel inventions and discoveries—such as, 
nuclear weapons (who should have them and when, if ever, should they be used?) and 
advances in genetic science (who should have access to a person’s genetic 
information: an insurance company or employer?)—necessitate it.  
 Choice, then, is the basis of and method toward any novel justification, and 
every justification was at some point novel. Thus, choice is a necessary condition of 
any and every justification and the pre-conditions of choice are also pre-conditions of 
a capacity to justify in novel situations. In the previous section, I noted that one can 
come to have a capacity for choice in virtue of belonging to the set or class of beings 
who have attributes for choice that can be enabled. The same is true of a capacity for 
justification. Cats, dogs, and non-human primates cannot acquire such capacities; 
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they do not have the neural apparatuses (attributes) that support having and conveying 
symbolic concepts. Humans do. Moreover, a person does not have such attributes in 
virtue of belonging to a group or sub-group. The conditions established within group 
life may determine whether an attribute is enabled, but group membership does not 
determine whether the attribute is present. The attribute is unique to the members of 
the human species. 
 Given this information, consider the justification argument.45 When person a 
offers a novel justification w (either to herself or another member of the species), she 
implies that she takes w to be of value. If it were not of value to her, she would have 
no reason to offer it and the other (or she) no inclination to accept it (this point is 
considered further below). She also implies that whatever is a necessary condition of 
w is also of value; it is inconsistent to imply that something is of value while also 
maintaining that any or all of its necessary conditions are not also of value. Without 
the latter, the former literally cannot come to be. Thus, since x (a capacity for choice) 
is a necessary condition of offering w, and y (receipt of the pre-conditions) and z 
(species membership) are necessary conditions of x, person a also implies that she 
takes x, y, and z to be of value. Then, if w is inconsistent with valuing x, y, or z (or 
any combination there of), person a commits a performative contradiction. She 
implies that w is not of value. However, a justification that entails a performative 
                                                 
45 This argument is inspired by, though not at all the same as, Alan Gewirth’s argument (see “The 
Justification of Morality” 245-247).  
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contradiction cannot also have warrant. Thus, a novel justification is warranted if and 
only if it is consistent with imparting value to all of its necessary conditions.  
 At least three concerns are present at this juncture. (1) What does valuing x, y, 
and z mean and entail? (2) Does the same conclusion follow (regarding warrant) if the 
justification in question is common or no longer novel? And (3) what if the person 
who offers the justification does not (from a personal perspective) intend to convey 
that her justification is of value? Does she still commit a performative contradiction? 
I will consider each of these concerns in turn. 
 With regard to (1), one generally demonstrates that one values something 
(holds it in high regard) by actively sustaining it, helping others to sustain it, or at 
least not accepting its demise without attempting to bolster it. A person may be said, 
for instance, to value her children if she feeds, nurtures, and educates them (and so 
forth) because these things sustain the children and promote their well-being; if she 
neglects them, her assertion that she values them is empty.46 Similarly, one’s claim 
that one values democracy is empty if one neglects to vote, tries to suppress other 
votes, or fails to prevent/disaffirm others’ attempts at voter suppression. To exhibit 
that one values something one must actively engage in its favor. Thus, if a 
justification will have warrant it must be consistent with actively engaging in the 
world in favor of choice, receipt of the pre-conditions, and membership in the species. 
                                                 
46 There may rare exceptions to this point. For instance, in Haiti at the time of this writing, the food 
shortage is forcing some mothers to decide which of their children to feed and which to let starve 
(Blake). Their decision need not be made according to which children they value more; they may 
perhaps choose the strongest child since she may have the best chances of survival in the long run. 
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And throughout Chapters 2 and 3 I have discussed the kinds of things that a personal 
capacity for choice requires in order to be developed and sustained. To intra-
culturally value a person’s capacity for choice is to help provide her with the pre-
conditions and the conditions of choice, while to do so in an inter-cultural context is 
to help provide the former. 
 But perhaps one need only be concerned with one’s own capacity for choice 
and one’s own receipt of the pre-conditions, and merely be pleased that one is a 
member of the species. Is that enough to count as valuing x, y, and z? Recall that each 
person’s capacity for choice was developed in an interdependent context of 
engagement and that if such a context was not in place neither would the capacity. To 
value one’s capacity is to at least value the contribution of the vast network of 
persons (farmers, manufacturers, teachers, parents, family members, friends, peers, 
and so forth) who enabled it; and given the type of beings humans are, the way to 
express that value is to help make sure each of those persons has and can maintain 
their personal capacities as well. To value the pre-conditions is to respect the people 
who help provide them as well as to conserve (and utilize wisely) the resources that 
are involved and necessary. But what could it mean to value one’s species 
membership? To value membership in a club is to undertake activities that support 
the collective endeavor of all the members (for instance, pay dues and take part and 
engage); analogously, to value one’s membership in the species is to support the 
endeavor that all members (at least potentially) have in common: choice. Choice 
differentiates us from other species, enables our freewill and dignity, functions as our 
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primary adaptive strategy, and allows us to create, recognize, and deal with novelty. 
The way to value one’s species membership then is to support other members in the 
attainment of choice. Moreover, the relevant criterion—species membership—offers 
no non-ad hoc means of discriminating between members. To value species 
membership is to support all other members. That is, a novel justification is 
warranted only if it is consistent with imparting value to all members of the human 
species and their need for the pre-conditions in order to develop their capacities for 
choice which is also the capacity to justify. Thus, for a novel justification to have 
warrant, it must accord with humanity and all that the term implies. The person who 
puts forward an unwarranted novel justification denies or rejects the root of her own 
humanity: she denies that she belongs to the class of beings who can make and accept 
justifications. And any action or inaction that relies on this justification for grounding 
or support is also without warrant.  
 But what if (2) the justification is common or no longer novel? Or what if (3) 
the person offering the justification does not, from a personal standpoint, intend to 
convey that the justification she offers is of value? In these cases, does the offerer of 
an unwarranted justification still commit a performative contradiction? If a 
justification is novel, it has been initiated by a chooser; but that need not be the case 
with one that is well established. A common justification may be taken up by another 
chooser (other than the one who originated it) or by a non-chooser if it has been 
present in either’s background and/or sub-groups. The chooser may adopt it via 
choice or preference selection, while the non-chooser may only do so through 
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preference selection. However, the mode in which the justification is adopted by the 
person who offers it is not at issue. If the justification is utilized in the same type of 
circumstance as it originally was, it will retain the same warrant or lack thereof that it 
had in its original occurrence. If it is used in a different type of circumstance, then 
extrapolation was required on the part of the offerer in which case it is a novel 
justification. With regard to the third worry, the performative contradiction does not 
occur in virtue of the offerer’s intent. The individual may not intend to impart value 
to the justification she utters; perhaps she is depressed and fails to find anything to be 
of value or maybe her utterance is intended sarcastically. But this is not the point 
because the intent to impart value to one’s offered justification for action/inaction is 
part of the conventional meaning of offering it. Value is part of the concept of 
justification. Moreover, x, y, and z are, in fact, necessary (physical and conceptual) 
conditions of the justification in question. It does not matter whether the offerer is 
aware of this necessity or whether she intends to impart value to them. As such, every 
justification, whether it is novel or common and without reference to the intent of the 
offerer, must accord with valuing choice, the pre-conditions, and species membership 
if it will have warrant. 
 Since humans share the root of their humanity in common, an executed 
unwarranted action/inaction offends the humanity of each (just as a warranted 
justification respects and values the humanity of each). Thus, the person who enacts 
the offense invites DAI from any or every other member or the human species. This 
DAI is warranted in that it is consistent with a warranted justification. Every person 
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has a prior interest in tolerating all and only interference that is concordant with 
choice; persons who undertake DAI against the offending justification/action/inaction 
are CPs who act in the service of choice. Therefore, each person has a significant 
reason—one that is in her prior interest: the interest each has in fulfilling her own 
non-trivial interests and in virtue of her own humanity—to will only what is 
consistent with choice. Each ought only to undertake the types of interference that are 
delineated in the argument from consistency—that is, help to provide the pre-
conditions of choice for all persons and the conditions of choice for persons within 
one’s cultural group. Those who do not do so (i) denigrate their own humanity and 
that of all others, (ii) act or not according to an unwarranted justification, and (iii) 
invite justified censure and disaffirmative active interference, that is sufficient to stop 
the unwarranted action/inaction, from any other person. Every other person is 
warranted in curtailing the activities/inactivities of one who does not provide AAI (or 
QAI where appropriate) in support of choice.  
 Being a CP is in the prior interest of every human. Any person who acts 
without warrant, even one who has not had the pre-conditions and so cannot choose 
whether or not to use a particular justification, invites DAI. The CP need not blame 
one without the pre-conditions for her action; the notion of blame seems applicable 
only to cases in which a person could have chosen otherwise. In this sense, a person 
without choice cannot be responsible for the interference (AAI, QAI, or DAI) she 
provides. However, since undertaken action tends to continue and propagate through 
the mechanisms discussed in support of the IT (see section 3.4), the CP cannot engage 
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in QAI in the face of offenses to choice while still remaining consistent. The theory 
does not necessarily call for sympathy or mercy for one who offends choice without 
having a capacity for it herself, unless these are avenues in context that promote 
choice. However, if the offender lacks choice, the CP has a responsibility to help 
enable the offender’s capacity if at all possible. In such cases, rehabilitation is called 
for. But, even a person without choice who acts or not according to an unwarranted 
justification leaves herself open to justified DAI.  
 But perhaps the basic premise of the argument—that choice is the basis of and 
method toward any novel justification—is incorrect. Perhaps justifications spring 
from religion or divine revelation, cultural beliefs or concepts, scientific 
experimentation, or just the everyday experience of life. With regard to the first 
possibility listed above, the appropriated theory specifically rejects the inclusion of 
supernatural considerations. However, even if it were true that a deity were the 
ultimate source of justifications, it would always be persons receiving, cognizing, 
interpreting, believing, and applying the concepts or justifications. Persons would still 
need to utilize the neural processes of choice upon receipt of every revealed novel 
justification. The same type of reasoning applies to the other three proposed sources 
as well. It is always persons engaging with and creating cultural concepts, 
undertaking scientific endeavors, and experiencing the ongoing activities of life. And 
whenever novelty is present, persons utilize the neural processes of choice to 
recognize and deal with it. The novelty itself likely originated from human 
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interactivity as well. Thus, all the proposed alternatives lead back to the argument’s 
original premise.  
 The justification argument gives each person an important personal reason 
that is in her prior interest to act in ways that are consistent with choice. In the next 
section, the argument from consequences arrives at a similar conclusion by taking a 
different path. Before continuing, however, it is important to consider the limits of 
one’s personal responsibilities to choice. Since the justification argument hinges on 
each person’s prior interest in choice, this interest also provides criteria by which 
actions/inactions will be considered obligatory, permissible, impermissible, and 
supererogatory. It is obligatory to help provide the pre-conditions for all and the 
conditions within one’s cultural group. This personal responsibility is limited only by 
one’s own need to develop and/or sustain one’s capacity for choice and that of others 
who specifically rely on one to provide the pre-conditions. This latter responsibility to 
conceptually and/or physically dependent persons will be lightened by all other 
people having a responsibility to help one fulfill the obligation. Thus, one is obliged 
to keep for oneself whatever possessions, resources, income, or wealth that is 
necessary to meet one’s obligation to oneself and dependents. Anything beyond what 
is necessary ought to be given up to help others. It is not permissible to give up what 
is necessary to sustain one’s and one’s dependent’s capacities, because to do so would 
be to offend choice and invite DAI. When the situation is such that the pre-conditions 
are secured for all on an ongoing basis and all in the culture enjoy the conditions—
that is, when choice equilibrium has been attained—it will be permissible to keep 
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whatever is not necessary to sustain the equilibrium. In this scenario, giving more is 
supererogatory. Anything that is consistent with all persons having choice is 
permissible; anything that offends choice, either for oneself or for any other, is 
generally impermissible, unless one is enacting DAI to prevent another from 
offending choice. When the choices of different people come into conflict, as they 
undoubtedly will, the dispute ought to be settled according to which of them either 
better serves choice or promotes greater opportunity for choice in the future. I turn 
now to the argument from consequences. 
4.4: The Argument from Consequences 
 What if persons exist in situations in which they cannot obtain the pre-
conditions of choice? Are there any consequences? Certainly there are significant 
consequences for the person who lives with such a deficit. She will be ill-equipped to 
recognize and deal with novelty, unable to fulfill her non-trivial particular interests, 
and unaware that she as a prior interest in the pre-conditions. She will be constrained 
to use preference selection, to engage in activity/inactivity that is the same as or 
similar to what she was conditioned to do during development and/or to imitate the 
actions/inactions of others in her sub-groups. She will be conceptually (and, in some 
cases, physically) dependent. However, the question I address in this section is 
whether there are repercussions for others in her cultural group or other cultural 
groups. More specifically, will a person who lacks the pre-conditions (and who thus 
lacks or is at risk for choice) have a significant tendency to enact DAI with regard to 
the pre-conditions or conditions of choice for others because she does not have a 
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personal capacity for choice? Given the analysis in Chapter 2 (section 2.11), the 
answer to this question will likely be different for persons who have different deficits 
in the pre-conditions. A person (from area 1 on the continuum) who is extremely 
weak from severe malnutrition, for instance, will likely enact QAI (quasi-active 
interference) in every situation with which she comes into contact (that is, she will 
not be active). Of course, persons may, due to circumstances, change areas on the 
continuum. When food prices rose dramatically around the world during the spring 
and summer of 2008, rioting broke out in Haiti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, and 
other places. They still had the energy to demand this important pre-condition of 
choice. As they experience sustained hunger, they will be less able to do so. Persons 
from areas 4 and 5 are not at issue here because they have choice and only differ 
from each other with regard to a capacity to innovate. This section is concerned then 
only with persons in areas 2 and 3, those who suffer, for instance, from the effects of 
mild malnutrition, neglect, abuse, exposure to violence, lack of education, and so 
forth. In section 3.4, I argued that persons from areas 2 or 3 (along with those from 
area 1), to a greater or lesser extent, will be constrained by two sets of interference: 
their inner worlds (the neural processes and content they have at their disposal given 
their periods of development) and the types of meanings (interference) they encounter 
through interactions with their group/sub-groups. As such, whether such a person 
enacts DAI with regard to others’ choices (including interference that helps to 
determine whether others have adequate access to the pre-conditions) depends upon 
what she has been conditioned to do and upon what others around her do. All persons 
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provide and are subject to interference from others, but persons without the pre-
conditions do not have choice with regard to the way in which they will be impacted 
and changed by said interference. They also have no choice with regard to the 
interference they enact in return.   
 Consider: if respect for choice has been prominent in the background of a 
person who has not had the pre-conditions during development (an unlikely scenario 
since she has not received the pre-conditions) and if persons in her sub-groups 
undertake interference in support of choice, she will have a great tendency to enact 
AAI and QAI in support of other people’s choices. On the other hand, if she 
experienced denigration of choice—that is, her own humanity—during her 
childhood—if she was not well-nourished and hence does not know the importance of 
nourishment, if she is uneducated or under-educated, if she was exposed to neglect 
instead of nurture or violence as a form of stimulation—and if others in her sub-
group(s) undertake interference (engage in activities/inactivities) that projects 
concepts that are inconsistent with the concept of choice, she will likely follow suit. 
That is, when a person’s humanity has been or is offended, she will often respond 
with behavior that is harmful to others or that is inhuman. She is constrained by the 
two types of interference; she has no ability, like a person with choice, to extrapolate 
and move beyond.   
 Below, I utilize four examples regarding two types of activities that 
demonstrate this point. Each concerns current and ongoing issues in order to 
demonstrate to the reader that when some persons suffer without the pre-conditions 
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the risk to the reader’s and other persons’ capacities for choice increases. The 
argument is not about necessity but about probability; however, given how important 
choice is for each (it enables freedom, dignity, adaptation, and non-trivial interest 
fulfillment), any likelihood that one’s capacity may be offended or disabled is too 
high. The first and second examples regard non-violent interference that impedes (or 
potentially impedes) others’ access (either intra- or inter-culturally) to the pre-
conditions of choice; the third and fourth examples concern violent interference in 
intra- and inter-cultural contexts, respectively. I will refer to a person engaging 
without the pre-conditions of choice as a PEWOP. I do not maintain that all of the 
interference projected by the PEWOP will interfere with the choices of others in 
general; often, only members of her immediate sub-groups (such as, family or those 
at her job) receive significant impact. If, for instance, the PEWOP fails to provide 
adequate nutrition for her children, it is the children who experience the immediate 
impact of her inaction. If the PEWOP is malnourished or under-educated, she will be 
less able to provide adequate stimulation for her kids and will be less able to solve 
problems at her work. Her employer will be affected due to her deficiencies (though 
she will experience a greater problem when she has difficulty keeping a job). The 
point is that in many cases those in close proximity to the PEWOP receive the 
immediate impact. But that does not mean that other members of the group receive no 
impact or that what they experience is insignificant. 
 The first scenario under consideration concerns the PEWOP’s role in the 
production of the group’s food supply, while the second regards the same role at the 
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inter-group level. A recent report, put out by the Pew Charitable Trusts and Johns 
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, points to the fact that some key 
conditions of choice are lacking in the United States (and other countries around the 
world) with regard to laws and practices that safeguard a healthy food supply and that 
prevent pathogens and toxins from affecting the public (Pew Commission on 
Industrial Farm Animal Production viii). And, as I will explain, since many of the 
workers in this industry are deficient in the pre-conditions (most notably with regard 
to education but likely in other ways as well), an important pre-condition of choice—
overall health—is (or is potentially) being compromised for millions of people. The 
report specifically concerns the effect that industrial farm animal production (IFAP) 
has upon the well-being of rural communities, public health, and the environment.47 It 
also explains that, prior to the rise of the large IFAP facilities (they have come into 
being within the last 40 to 50 years), poverty was already common in rural areas of 
the U.S.; in some cases, IFAPs were lured to specific areas with the hope that they 
would help provide jobs in poverty stricken communities (41). However, that has not 
been the case. Because “capital-intensive agriculture relies more on technology than 
on labor,” there are many fewer jobs in the areas dominated by IFAPs than there were 
when family farms were more common, and the jobs that do exist are “low-paid, 
itinerant jobs, which go to migrant laborers who are willing to work for low wages” 
(43). Recall from Chapter 2 that low socio-economic status and poverty strongly 
                                                 
47 The report also addresses the welfare of the animals that are raised for human consumption; I will 
not, however, address that issue here. 
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predict the existence of risk factors for choice; persons with low SES are much less 
likely, for instance, to be well nourished and well educated. Indeed, inadequate rural 
educational systems are a significant contributing factor to rural poverty (41), and it is 
reasonable to assume that migrant workers, in general, fare no better when it comes to 
nourishment and educational opportunities. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that most 
IFAP workers do not have the pre-conditions of choice; they are PEWOPs.  
 The question is then will the PEWOP working at an IFAP be more likely to 
provide for or offend the choices of others? I am not concerned here with the actions 
of the IFAP owners (presumably, they have a capacity for choice and they use it in 
order to turn a profit). The concern is whether, when confronted with questionable 
health and safety practices, will the PEWOP blow the whistle (alerting USDA 
officials and/or the media) or will she take part in (contribute AAI) or overlook (enact 
QAI) activities/inactivities that contaminate the food supply and grow new diseases, 
putting thousands or millions at risk for choice? Unfortunately, according to the 
Pew/Johns Hopkins report, the latter is the case.  
 According to the report, current practices at the IFAPs put the public health at 
considerable risk by creating an environment where (1) pathogens may be “passed 
from animals to humans”, where (2) “microbes resistant to antibiotics” can emerge, 
and where (3) “food-borne disease” can spread (Pew Commission on Industrial Farm 
Animal Production 11-13). With regard to (1) and (2) workers carry the pathogens 
and microbes to others in the community (11; since many are migrant workers, how 
far and to whom might the microbes spread?), which is relevant to the choices of 
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many given that the CDC has “declared antibiotic-resistant infections to be an 
epidemic in the United States” (15). The problem is compounded by the fact that 
IFAP workers (as participants in an “agricultural activity”) are often exempt from 
mandatory participation in “public health monitoring, disease reporting, and 
surveillance programs” (11). Moreover, since many of the migrant workers are 
undocumented, they avoid such programs due to their legal status (11). 
 A recent item in the news demonstrates the PEWOPs role with regard to (3). 
A sting operation has brought to light that workers at the Westland/Hallmark Meat 
Packing Company have engaged in “‘clear violations’ of USDA regulations at a 
California slaughterhouse” (“USDA”). Federal law states that animals must be 
examined for chronic illness and be able to walk unaided to slaughter; if the animal 
cannot walk, it must undergo a second examination. The law is in place due to 
worries about mad cow disease, E. coli, and salmonella and because downed animals 
often have compromised immune systems and “sometimes wallow in feces, raising 
the risk of contamination” (“USDA”). For over two years, workers at the 
slaughterhouse had been “kicking [downed] cows, jabbing them near their eyes, 
ramming them with a forklift and shooting high-pressure water up their noses in an 
effort to force them to their feet” so they would be upright for the slaughter 
(“USDA”). Clearly, these workers acted against their own prior interest; but that is 
because they were apparently unable to extrapolate (a function of choice) in order to 
see themselves as victims of their own actions. If contaminated meat enters the food 
supply, the workers and their children are as likely as anyone else to consume it. 
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While about 143 million pounds of meat was recalled (enough to feed every person in 
the U.S. two hamburgers (“USDA”), officials are assuring the public that there were 
no reports of illness. That, however, is not surprising given that “IFAP monitoring 
systems are inadequate” which makes it “difficult if not impossible to trace infections 
to the source” (Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production 11). A 
significant portion of the recalled meat has gone into school lunch programs 
(“USDA”); but even government officials, according to Representative Rosa DeLauro 
of Connecticut, cannot find out which schools and retail outlets received it, because 
the IFAPs regard the information as proprietary (Doering). Other IFAP practices are 
also cause for concern. Because there are so many animals in close proximity, they 
produce more waste than the ecosystem can absorb (Pew Commission on Industrial 
Farm Animal Production 23). Animals raised in IFAPs produce about “500 million 
tons” of waste, more than three times all human waste in the U.S., and disposal of it is 
poorly regulated (23). As a result, manure is allowed to contaminate groundwater 
resources such that “over a million people” in the U.S. obtain drinking water from 
sources that show “moderate to severe contamination” (29). Due to the gases and 
fumes that are emitted, persons living close to the IFAPs have higher rates of 
“tension, depression, anger, reduced vigor, fatigue, . . . confusion”, and intellectual 
impairment (17-18), once again ensuring that those who will work at the facilities, 
even if they are not migrant workers, will be at risk for or without choice. 
 Recall that basic health (absence of pathogens, microbes, toxins, and 
contaminates) is one of the pre-conditions of choice because disease affects one’s 
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ability to inhibit stimuli as is necessary to carry out the neural processes of choice 
(see section 2.10). Thus, the interference undertaken by PEWOPs who work in the 
IFAPs constitutes serious risks to choice for all members of the group. Who in the 
cultural group will be affected? That is determined by the luck of the draw; it 
certainly is not determined, for instance, by socio-economic status. A person of high 
SES is vulnerable to either an antibiotic-resistant bug or contaminated meat.48 One 
might argue that the owners of the IFAPs, and not the workers, are to blame for these 
offenses to choice. And that certainly is the case. The PEWOP has not had the pre-
conditions and thus, in a very real way, could not have done other than participate in 
these activities. But that is precisely the point. Persons without choice are used to 
affronts to choice; such offenses are par for the course in the PEWOPs inner world. 
Moreover, PEWOPs are constrained to follow whatever activities are already 
underway in their sub-groups; if those activities offend choice as they do in the IFAP, 
the PEWOP will tend to provide AAI and QAI in support of those activities. 
 The USDA’s proposed solution to this IFAP problem is to install cameras in 
the slaughter houses; but, while that may cut back on workers forcing downed cows 
into the food supply, it will not address the core problem. It is in the financial interest 
of the IFAP owners to undertake activities that offend choice (even their own) as long 
as there is a profit in doing so. The owners have choice; they can think of new tactics 
for profit making. And whatever their tactics might be, they will have ready and 
                                                 
48 In so far as a person of low SES may be more likely to have a suppressed immune system, she may 
have a higher risk than a person of high SES. 
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willing assistants—PEWOPS—as long as persons are left without the pre-conditions 
of choice. Persons with choice may choose to work at an IFAP, but they will demand 
a living wage and will be more likely to balk at being sickened by toxins. The 
PEWOP is unaware of her own prior interests; she will offend them, as well as those 
of others, until she is informed and until she can choose to enact DAI with regard to 
the activities/inactivities of others in her sub-group(s).  
 The second example—the recent Chinese melamine-tainted milk and food 
scandal—demonstrates a similar point. Although complaints regarding contaminated 
infant formula began as early as March 2008, the full extent of the problem was not 
made public until September. As the scandal unfolded, “[t]wenty-two dairy brands 
[were] . . . found to contain melamine, an industrial chemical used to make plastics 
and glue” (Fan). Four Chinese infants died from “kidney stones caused by drinking 
tainted milk powder” (and perhaps two others earlier in the year), while more than 
54,000 infants were sickened, “including 12,892 who [were] hospitalized” (Fan). 
Chinese products laced with melamine were found in Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Australia, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, Vietnam, Russia, the 
Netherlands, and the United States, and more than 16 countries issued recalls or bans 
on Chinese dairy products or goods containing dairy. More recently, melamine 
contaminated eggs turned up in Hong Kong (the chemical “was present in nearly 
double the maximum permissible level” (Lister)) indicating that animal feed is also 
contaminated (3,682 tons of it had been located and destroyed by 11/02/08 (“China 
Seizes”)). Since melamine can, at high levels, cause kidney stones, kidney failure, or 
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death, the chemical constitutes an offense to choice (recall that overall health and the 
absence of toxic chemicals is a pre-condition). Moreover, since the chemical has been 
present in China’s exports, the members of many groups may potentially be affected. 
This situation and others like it are inter-cultural problems for choice. 
 Such scandals are, unfortunately, not new for China. In 2004, “[t]hirteen 
babies died of malnutrition . . . and almost 200 were hospitalized in eastern [China] . . 
. after being fed substandard milk” (Lawrence and Jun). The milk had been watered 
down and actually “had no nutritional content” (though the label indicated otherwise); 
the “infants’ heads swell[ed] while their bodies starved” (Lawrence and Jun). In 2007, 
melamine-laced pet food exported from China was the cause of death for some 4,000 
animals in the U.S. (Barboza). 
 No systematic report exists (like the Pew/Johns Hopkins report cited above) 
that can be utilized to explain all the factors at work in these scandals. However, 
evidence suggests that lax oversight, governmental imposed price caps, as well as 
poverty and ignorance are significant contributing factors. That is, while some blame 
may be placed squarely with choosers (I presume that governmental officials in 
charge of price caps and oversight have a capacity for choice), the preference 
selections of PEWOPs (persons who are at risk for or lack choice due to factors 
related to low socio-economic status and insufficient education) largely enabled the 
offense to choice. Recently, the “Chinese government has limited price increases of 
staple goods, including milk products, . . . to reduce the impact of inflation on 
consumers” (Lawrence and Jun). However, small farmers—who live off “farms as 
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small as a fifth of an acre” (Cha)—have difficulty making ends meet. They need to 
make a living with the few resources they have available. Other small businesses, 
such as milk collectors, are under the same sorts of pressures. Adding melamine to 
milk that has been watered down or to poor quality animal feed is useful to them, 
because the chemical falsely raises protein content in product testing (“Du Qunjun, a 
former salesman for several [Chinese] dairy factories,” indicated that previously 
“urea, a component of urine,” had been used for the same purpose (Fan)).  
 Since these small farmers and business people tend to lack education (which 
in itself qualifies them as PEWOPs), one might wonder how they came across this 
method of falsely increasing protein content. “China’s vast network of food research 
centers and laboratories”—whose “work on chemical use, pollution risks and 
genetically engineered crops is considered to be among the most advanced in the 
world”—produces large amounts of information regarding farming technology (Cha). 
The problem is that there is a gap between what is recommended in the research and 
the way that the technology is practiced in the “200 million farming households and 
500,000 food-processing companies” (Cha). Small farmers have access to chemicals 
and pesticides, but little or no information about how to use them safely. For instance, 
one farmer, Li Xiujuan, says she understands little about the chemicals she uses on 
her crops except that “they are very strong . . . [and] kill everything” (qutd. in Cha). 
Although the label specifies that the pesticide should be used at most twice per 
month, Li does not hesitate to apply it weekly when insects threaten her $1300 annual 
income (Cha). Li and many like her “remain unaware that a problem exists”, even 
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though shipments of pesticide-laced produce from Li’s province have been blocked 
from entering the U.S. and even though many of the small farmers fall ill and a few 
die from eating their own produce (Cha). 
 The research centers also publish information about “cheap additives that can 
boost the protein content of animal feed” in order to help “farmers and food producers 
maximize profit” (Cha). In 2003, Feed Review (a Chinese journal) published an 
article suggesting that melamine could be added to feed “for animals with more than 
one stomach, such as cows, that can convert such substances into protein” (Cha). 
Thus, it seems that the initial idea for adding melamine to boost apparent protein 
levels came from educated choosers who had an understanding of a safe way to 
utilize the chemical. The idea was then picked up in altered form by uneducated and 
economically desperate people who failed to understand what the ramifications of 
their actions would be. The farmers and small business people and their families are 
as likely as anyone else to ingest pesticide or melamine laden products. As such, it is 
clear that they are PEWOPs who do not have the capacity to extrapolate beyond the 
ideas that are propagated within their sub-groups.  
 The problem of poor official communication with the uneducated farming 
population is exacerbated by the fact that, in rural areas, pesticides and chemicals, 
such as melamine, are purchased from vendors who operate more “like old-time 
village apothecaries” (Cha). Although the Chinese government has initiated a 
program whose goal is to educate rural farmers regarding chemical safety, “experts 
estimate that those efforts are able to reach only 20 to 30 percent of farmers” (Cha). 
 267
Often, the farmers’ only source of information is the person who runs the village 
apothecary (Cha), creating a situation in which PEWOP is leading PEWOP. Given 
the dynamics of the situation, “‘[i]t could take five or even 10 years’ before some 
companies stop adding the chemical to food products” (Yan qutd. in Wong).  
 The first and second examples demonstrate that when a person’s humanity is 
offended, when she is not taught about her own prior interest in choice and its pre-
conditions, she will often provide interference in the world that fails to respect both 
her own humanity and that of others. Given the interference such persons have 
received, they will often respond with behavior that is harmful to others. And one 
does not have to be culpable (in the common sense) to experience the harmful 
repercussions; they are possible because humans live in an interdependent context in 
which the action/inaction of one impacts another. The persons in the first and second 
examples lack key pre-conditions of choice. They are uneducated or under-educated 
and, given their low socio-economic status, they likely lack other pre-conditions as 
well. They are constrained by their own inner worlds that were not conditioned to be 
capable of choice and the interference the experience from their sub-groups. If 
activities/inactivities that offend choice are common within these sub-groups, then, 
given the eight reasons that support the IT, they will likely follow suit. They may not 
know what kinds of things accord with choice. They are PEWOPs who are unaware 
of their own prior interest; they will offend this interest as well as that of others, until 
they are healthy and informed—that is, until they can choose to enact DAI with 
regard to that which offends choice. 
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 The third and fourth examples concern violent interference enacted by 
PEWOPs that may negatively impact choice for victims and witnesses. In section 2.7, 
I explained that not only do some offenses to choice lead to violence, witnessing or 
experiencing violence is itself an affront to choice that, in some cases, encourages the 
witness to engage in violent behavior as well. If one considers the information in 
section 2.7 in conjunction with the eight reasons that support the IT (section 3.4), it is 
safe to say that violent behavior can be likened to a contagion that tends to spread 
within vulnerable sub-groups. Those who are most vulnerable are PEWOPs who have 
been conditioned during development via neglect, punitive caregiving, difficult life 
experiences associated with low socio-economic status, virtual or actual violence, and 
so on. Individuals who experience these affronts to their very humanity during 
development have an increased tendency (when compared to choosers) to respond 
later in life with behavior that is inhuman; they may engage in violent interference 
that offends choice for others.  
 I do not claim here (or anywhere else in this work) to explain and analyze all 
aspects of and antecedents to violence. Human behavior is as complex as all the 
multitude of influences that shape a person during development; an attempt to treat 
such a subject exhaustively would take a lifetime of research. I merely wish to 
explain the role that an absence of certain pre-conditions tends to play in conditioning 
a person toward violence and the way that subsequent sub-group affiliation and 
interaction with members of other sub-groups can channel that tendency. The risk to 
other people’s capacities for choice increases accordingly. 
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 Certain kinds of violence—for instance, violence that is spurred by poverty 
and despair in inner city neighborhoods—is usually easy for persons of high socio-
economic status to avoid. For instance, although there were 30 gang and drug related 
shootings (6 were fatal) in Chicago during one weekend in April of 2008 and 
authorities project that Kansas City is on track to have its deadliest year in nearly a 
decade, most choosers in Chicago and Kansas City remain relatively unaffected. This 
is not always the case; innocent and unsuspecting persons of any SES can, for 
instance, be caught in the crossfire of gang violence or by a stray bullet from a drive 
by shooting, but such worries are remote for people of high SES given that they 
seldom visit the areas where gang violence is prevalent. However, random violence—
cases in which members of the group have roughly equal chances of being subject to 
or witnessing violence or where there is no apparent pattern of victim or witness 
selection—is a threat to choice for members of all SES sub-groups. Any member of 
the group may be affected. I focus here on relatively recent cases of school, mall, or 
public shootings where there is sufficient evidence that the shooter is a PEWOP (to 
my knowledge no comprehensive report on the subject exists, so I will be relying on 
news reports). In many cases, the PEWOP is part of a sub-group that advocates 
violence, and in some cases interference from bullies (who have also experienced an 
offense to choice during development (see section 2.7)) is part of what encourages the 
PEWOP toward violence.  
 Random violence is not uncommon. For instance, during a (roughly) four 
week period in March 2008, two people were killed and 3 injured when they were 
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shot (in separate incidents) on California freeways. The only apparent motive was 
road rage and the evidence suggests multiple perpetrators. Similar incidents occurred 
in 2005 and 1987, in which 4 were killed/4 were injured and 5 were killed/11 were 
injured, respectively (Edds). On March 3, 2008, Alburn Blake opened fire in a Florida 
Wendy’s during the lunch hour, killing one and wounding four before killing himself 
(Semple and Guerra). Isaac Zamora’s mother explained that Zamora “is ‘desperately 
mentally ill’ and had been living in the woods” prior to his shooting rampage in 
Washington on September 2, 2008 “that left six people dead and four wounded” at 
eight different crime scenes (“Gunman’s”). After turning himself in, Zamora 
explained to authorities that he had done what God had told him to do (“Shooting 
Spree”). In October 2002, the DC snipers, John Allan Williams and Lee Boyd Malvo, 
terrorized the D.C. area during a three week sniper shooting spree that left nine dead 
and three wounded (“Timeline: Steps”). On December 5, 2007, Robert Hawkins 
killed six and wounded two at the posh Von Maur department store in Nebraska; the 
shooting obviously traumatized the high-SES shoppers who generally know the store 
as “a retailer and respite at once, offering serenity along with upscale goods” (Saulny 
and Doty). 
 One might argue that the perpetrators of these types of incidents have 
intellectual, social, and/or emotional difficulties that cannot be wholly accounted for 
by a deficit in the pre-conditions during development and adulthood and, in fact, that 
may well be the case. Recall from section 2.7 that researchers tend to “view violence 
as the end result of multiple risk factors that may include a biological vulnerability—
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either genetic or created in the prenatal environment—that may be brought out or 
reinforced by the social environment” (Holden 580). These perpetrators are likely to 
be chronically violent individuals; but even so, at least half of the relevant risk factors 
can be attributed to controllable environmental factors (580), such as exposure to 
virtual or actual violence, childhood neglect, low socioeconomic status, low parental 
education level, and so forth. But it is also the case that some individuals may require 
more help than others in order to attain a capacity for choice. Even if such individuals 
are born with a propensity toward impulsivity, anger, vindictiveness, or resistance to 
control, if their later behavior offends choice (which it is more likely to do when other 
risk factors are present as well), it is in the prior interest of every chooser to create an 
environment in which the biological tendency does not have an opportunity to 
develop. To not do so is to put one’s own humanity at risk. 
 Other examples demonstrate more clearly the role of the pre-conditions, 
violent sub-group influence, and bullying. The attack that Eric Harris and Dylan 
Klebold carried out on Columbine High School on April 20, 1999 left a dozen dead 
and two dozen injured (Janofsky). The two were fascinated by the film Natural Born 
Killers and were members of a school sub-group, The Trench Coat Mafia (an outcast 
clique), that was organized in part around playing violent video games, like Doom (a 
shooter game) (“Columbine Report”). Both were depressed and suicidal and felt 
ostracized from their high school community. They left behind a video of themselves 
in which they explained that their killing spree, which they hoped would “‘kick-start a 
revolution’”, was in “retaliation for years of taunting” and bullying (Janofsky). Given 
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this evidence, they were PEWOPs (as evidenced by their depressive and angry states) 
who belonged to overlapping violent sub-groups (involved with violent games and 
movies) and who viewed themselves as victims of bullying (they clearly were 
ostracized by other sub-groups). Their actions, of course, traumatized thousands 
(offending choice for each49 (recall the effects of stress (section 2.6))) who either 
witnessed the violence or were otherwise affected; they also initiated AAI in support 
of violence and killing that, as I will explain, would be carried out by other PEWOPs. 
They initiated a violent sub-group that so far has helped to channel PEWOP 
perpetrated, random violence for nearly a decade. 
 These factors present in the Columbine example (or some combination of 
them) are manifest in many other actual and foiled shooting incidents. Seung-Hui 
Cho had suffered with mental illness for years prior to carrying out the attack at 
Virginia Tech in which 33 died (including Cho) and 17 were injured (Davies 19-21). 
During early adolescence, he was diagnosed with selective mutism (21), though his 
problem with silence was apparent much earlier (Kleinfield). As a loner, he endured 
teasing and bullying from classmates; when he was forced to speak, they “mocked his 
poor English and deep-throated voice” (Kleinfield). According to one classmate, Cho 
merely “‘took it and took it and took it’” (Williams qutd. in “Cho’s High School”). In 
a video tirade he mailed to NBC prior to carrying out the second part of the massacre, 
Cho “praised the Columbine High School killers as martyrs” (Kleinfield); it was 
                                                 
49 Kacey Ruegsegger, for instance, has suffered from posttraumatic stress since her “shoulder was 
shattered by a shotgun blast in the Columbine High School library” (Carter). Initially, she avoided 
being in public at all, but slowly she has been able to resume a more normal life. 
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known as early as his middle school years that he was fascinated with the Columbine 
shootings and “that he had fantasized about carrying out a similar mass killing” 
(Davies 21). A video game, V-tech Rampage, based on the VA Tech massacre is 
available for violent video game connoisseurs. On February 14, 2008, Steven 
Kazmierczak entered Cole Hall on Northern Illinois University campus and opened 
fire, killing five and wounding 17 before turning the gun on himself. Initial reports 
indicated that Kazmierczak was a “sweet, unassuming, overachieving grad student 
who inexplicably snapped” (Vann); they were wrong. Kazmierczak “grew up 
watching horror movies with his mother” (Vann); she didn’t want him to play outside, 
wouldn’t “let him play much with other children” (Vann). He had few friends; he was 
teased earlier because his hand would hang too limply when he focused on his work 
and later because his high school classmates knew of his suicide attempts (Vann). 
During his teenage years, he was on and off antipsychotic drugs and in and out of 
mental institutions (Vann). In college, he told his best friend about his fascination 
with the Virginia Tech and Columbine killings. He knew all the details; he “admired 
how Cho thought to chain the doors . . . [and] how Dylan and Eric planned to create 
confusion with the propane-tank bombs” (Vann). Both Cho and Kazmierczak 
obtained their weapons from the same online firearms dealer (Boudreau). The 
Columbine, Virginia Tech, and Northern Illinois shooters had at least three things in 
common: they had mental conditions exacerbated by environmental risk factors 
which qualify them as PEWOPs, they identified with violent sub-groups that helped 
channel their behavior, and they experienced additional insults at the hands of bullies. 
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 These factors were present in other cases as well. A teen in Pennsylvania who 
has been arrested for planning a “Columbine-style attack on his old school” kept 
contact via email with Pekka-Eric Auvinen, who carried out an attack in Finland that 
left “eight people dead at his high school” (“Lawyer”). Finnish college student, Matti 
Juhani Saari, who killed ten people at his college in September 2008 posted a tribute 
to the Columbine shooters on YouTube (“Finnish Gunman”). A friend testified that 
14-year-old Asa Coon had pleaded multiple times for help with bullying before he 
wounded two students and two teachers at his school in Cleveland on October 10, 
2007; Asa was beat up for the last time just two days before (“Ohio School”). Five 
students were arrested in Columbus, Kansas in April 2006 for planning an attack on 
their school; police were tipped off due to MySpace communication about flak 
jackets and the anniversary of Columbine between one of the students and another in 
North Carolina (“Kansas Students”). A 15-year-old was arrested in September 2008 
for planning an attack in a suburb of Oklahoma City. He had weapons and plans and 
had associations with hate groups through his MySpace account (Maynarich). Ryan 
Schallenberger was arrested in April 2008 when his parents called the police because 
“10 pounds of ammonium nitrate was delivered to their home” (the chemical “was 
used in the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 that killed 168 people”) (“Police”). His 
diary contained plans along with “admiring notations about the Columbine killers” 
(“Police”). Three thirteen-year-old students in Florida were arrested in March 2008 
for planning an attack against their school. The ringleader explained that “bullies 
pushed him over the edge” and that “he thought shooting his classmates was the only 
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way out” (“Accused School”). His MySpace page referenced Columbine. Richard 
Sonnen’s plan to attack his high school in 2005 was foiled by his mother who turned 
him over to police. She and her husband had “adopted Richard from a Bulgarian 
orphanage” when he was four (Zamost and Boudreau) (Bulgarian orphanages are 
known to have conditions that are similar to the conditions in Romanian orphanages 
(see section 2.5)). By age six, Richard alternated between exhibiting good behavior 
and telling his mother that he wanted to kill her; by the time he was in the eighth 
grade, he was “put on anti-psychotic medications” (Zamost and Boudreau). After his 
arrest (at age 16), Richard explained that he planned the attack as a “fitting payback 
to his high school classmates who Richard said relentlessly bullied him”; the 
Columbine shooters had become his heroes (Zamost and Boudreau). He spent nearly 
a year and a half in a mental institution and subsequently moved on to college; but 
roughly 72 hours after Virginia Tech, he made threats against his college and old high 
school. He had hoped to “pull off a sniper attack from a clock tower on the college’s 
campus” (Zamost and Boudreau). Police released him due to lack of evidence. 
 The third example demonstrates that when persons exist without specific pre-
conditions of choice, when they have mental disturbances that are exacerbated by 
other risk factors, when they (due to conditioning) become affiliated with violent sub-
groups, and when they experience further offenses to choice at the hands of bullies, 
they often respond with behavior that is inhuman. They create offenses to choice for 
others such that any member of the group may be affected. Similar dynamics are at 
work with regard to inter-cultural violence. In section 3.6, I discussed the tendency 
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toward conflict that exists when two cultures of sufficiently different types of GSCs 
come into contact. That tendency becomes even more pronounced when one offers 
DAI with regard to the other’s cultural symbols and concepts. But inter-cultural DAI 
is only one factor involved in inter-cultural conflict, because just as it tends to be 
PEWOPs who carry out violent attacks that offend others’ capacities for choice intra-
culturally, it also tends to be PEWOPs who carry out (though not necessarily plan) 
inter-cultural violence. International terrorism is a case in point. Evidence, regarding 
9/11 (specifically about the muscle hijackers) and child and female suicide bombers 
in Iraq, demonstrates that persons who experience a deficit in the pre-conditions are 
easily co-opted into groups that advocate inter-cultural violence. As such, when one 
offers QAI in situations in which persons are left without the pre-conditions, one’s 
own capacity for choice may be put at risk.  
 The al Qaeda attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 left 
significant physical and emotional wounds for many Americans. For instance, of the 
71,437 “people enrolled in the World Trade Center Health Registry” (a number that 
constitutes only 17.4% of people who were eligible to enroll and that is made up of 
“rescue and recovery workers, lower Manhattan residents, area workers, commuters 
and passersby”), 3 percent had “developed new asthma, 16 percent had posttraumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), and 8 percent had severe psychological distress” 
approximately three years after the attacks (“9/11’s Health Effects”). These numbers 
are striking considering that the 71,437 are just a small portion of those who 
experienced impact. As I discussed in section 3.6, the 9/11 Commission Report 
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indicates that those who carried out the attacks had, on their view, experienced DAI 
to their important cultural symbols. The attack itself was aimed at what the planners 
of 9/11 took to be important symbols of American culture. However, the fact that 
some individuals (namely, the muscle hijackers) had experienced an absence of one 
or more of the pre-conditions and had become affiliated with violent sub-groups also 
played a role. My point here is not to maintain that those who planned and 
orchestrated the attacks were PEWOPs (though in some respects some of them may 
be); many of them are likely choosers. For instance, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 
(KSM), “the principle architect of the 9/11 attacks”, was highly educated in the U.S. 
and he adapts well in different circumstances; according to the 9/11 Commission 
Report, KSM has “applied his imagination, technical aptitude, and managerial skills 
to hatching and planning an extraordinary array of terrorist schemes” (145). The 
neural capacity involved in these things indicates (at least via circumstantial 
evidence) that KSM has a capacity for choice. But evidence suggests that that is not 
the case for the muscle hijackers—the “operatives who would storm the cockpits and 
control the passengers” (227)—that participated in 9/11.  
 The 9/11 Commission Report explains that, in general, al Qaeda recruits tend 
to lack some of what I call the pre-conditions of choice. Although the oil states had 
experienced “an unprecedented flood” of oil related wealth during the 1970s and 
early ‘80s which allowed them to expand education and create domestic social 
welfare programs, by the late ‘80s “diminishing oil revenues” made the programs 
unsustainable (9/11 Commission 53). Across the Muslim world, secular education 
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became scarce and under-funded, religious education failed to provide students with 
necessary skills, and both “devoted little if any attention to the rest of the world’s 
thought, history, and culture” (53-54). Many young people, who were unable to make 
a decent living and unable to benefit from education, became “easy targets for 
radicalization” (54). Al Qaeda was able to capitalize on their misfortune. More 
specifically, of the muscle hijackers, “most were unemployed with no more than a 
high school education” (231). Four came from “an isolated and underdeveloped area 
of Saudi Arabia”, five more came from a poor “weakly policed area [that] is 
sometimes called ‘the wild frontier’”, and another “had very little education” (231-
32). As such, most of the muscle hijackers were at risk for choice due to their low 
socio-economic status during development and poor educational opportunity.  
 Evidence also suggests that al Qaeda is recruiting vulnerable PEWOPs in Iraq 
in order to carry out suicide missions. For instance, in May 2008, “Iraqi soldiers 
rounded up six teenagers in northern Iraq who were being trained, against their will, 
to carry out” suicide bombings (“Officials”). Al Qaeda members had “threatened to 
rape [their] mothers and sisters, destroy [their] houses and kill [their] fathers” if the 
boys did not cooperate (“Officials”). Four of the six came from very poor families. 
There has also been nearly a quadrupling of female suicide bombers in Iraq (over 30 
in 2008, but only eight in all of 2007) (Hussein and McElroy). For instance, on 
November 11, 2008, a “13-year-old girl blew herself up at a checkpoint in central Iraq 
. . ., killing four Sunni guards and wounding at least 15 civilians” (“13-Year-Old 
Female”). Earlier in the year, two “mentally disabled women were strapped with 
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explosives . . . [and] were blown up by remote control”; Iraqi authorities determined 
that 98 were dead and 200 were injured (“U.S.: ‘Demonic’”). Intelligence indicates 
that, in general, al Qaeda in Iraq is looking for young women “who are illiterate, are 
deeply religious or have financial struggles” (Damon, “Iraqi Woman”); that is, al 
Qaeda is looking specifically for female PEWOPs who are easily co-opted into the 
violent sub-group because they are “desperate and hopeless” (Damon, “Iraqi 
Woman”). Some desire revenge over family members lost at the hands of Iraqi or 
U.S. troops (Damon, “Iraqi Woman”). The strategy is working because PEWOPs who 
are used to violence and used to offenses to their own humanity will have little 
difficulty using violence to offend the humanity of others. Given their personal and 
environmental constraints, the child and female suicide bombers are literally not in a 
position to extrapolate and project themselves into alternate scenarios. They are with 
without choice.  
 Beauvoir maintained that one cannot will freedom for the self without also 
willing it for all others. Given that all humans share the world in an interdependent 
way, on her view, willing that another ought to be restricted has an effect that is 
similar to restricting the self. Since the justification argument maintains that any and 
all others are warranted in stopping any other from offending choice, there is a way 
that this is true according to the appropriated theory; it depends on whether others 
actually carry out the justified DAI. The argument from consequences maintains that, 
in some cases, there can be repercussions when persons experience a deficit in the 
pre-conditions. Unfortunately, there are also cases where restricting another need not 
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create any constraint for the self. For instance, persons who are malnourished to the 
point of wasting will not be active enough to provide DAI with regard to others’ 
choices. But as I have argued, that is not the whole story, because many others whose 
humanity has been/is offended are active participants in the world who have 
significant impact (as the four examples above attest). Each of us has a prior interest 
in receiving the pre-conditions on an ongoing basis and existing within the conditions 
throughout life. These things enable and maintain choice—that is, the attributes 
through which a person is capable and able to fulfill her non-trivial interests. We have 
such interests because novelty objectively exists in the world; it cannot be avoided. 
However, we live in an interdependent context and the existence of PEWOPs puts 
others at risk with regard to non-trivial interest fulfillment because PEWOPs have a 
tendency to offend choice.50 As such, anyone who may be subject to the offense—
that is, any chooser—has a significant personal reason (one that is in her prior 
interest) to help provide the PEWOP with the pre-conditions of choice. The argument 
from consequences maintains that by offering QAI or AAI with regard to contexts in 
which some persons (who are either within one’s culture or in another) do not have 
the pre-conditions, one may be offering QAI or AAI of a situation the offends one’s 
own capacity for choice. This is especially the case when some sub-groups 
                                                 
50 One might argue that it is in a person’s self interest to keep as many PEWOPs as possible in area 1 
on the continuum, so that they would not be capable of providing the kind of interference that is 
described in the argument from consequences. Instead of helping to give them the pre-conditions, one 
might attempt to horde as many of them as possible. The PEWOP then could only provide QAI and the 
chooser’s prior interest would no longer be at stake. I respond, first, that such a chooser would be 
acting without justification (and thus would be inviting DAI) and, second, that the chooser would 
likely expend as much if not more energy depriving PEWOPs as she would in helping them (she would 
have to actively make sure that the PEWOPs are without the pre-conditions on an ongoing basis). 
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inadvertently or purposefully engage in ways that denigrate choice, because the 
PEWOP has been conditioned to accept such offenses. If the PEWOP is attracted to 
this type of sub-group she will engage in the offensive behavior as well, whether it be 
contaminating the food supply, helping to spread new infectious diseases, or 
perpetrating violence that is experienced/witnessed by others. When persons are left 
without the pre-conditions, when their own humanity is offended, they often respond 
with behavior that is harmful to others or inhuman. The reader might object that she 
has enacted no direct interference with such individuals; she is surely not to blame. 
While that may well be the case, it is not at all the issue. The point is that all 
chooser’s capacities for choice are at risk due to the activities that the PEWOP is 
likely to undertake. Since each chooser has a prior interest in receiving the pre-
conditions, each chooser also has a prior interest in preventing such situations—she 
ought to be a CP (consistent person as the term was defined in the argument from 
consistency) in order to protect her own personal capacity for choice.51  
                                                 
51 I have argued that what is right from a moral perspective need not be what is commonly accepted or 
easily implemented; these may merely reflect prejudice or the interests of the powerful. Our moral 
intuitions likely stem primarily from early moral training and a thorough moral investigation should 
take that into account. In order to circumvent the existence of any tight circularity (the ethicist initially 
holds moral intuitions that are utilized both in creating the moral theory and in testing its conclusions), 
I have incorporated significant scientific information to ground the present account (it includes an 
inherent reality check). Thus, my primary concern is not with whether the appropriated theory accords 
with common moral intuitions. That being said, the theory yields many intuitive results. For instance, it 
may be said to “cash out” the Kantian notion of what it means to treat someone as an end and never 
solely as a means, in addition to considering the consequences of one’s actions with regard to choice. It 
gives a decisive account of why it is wrong to lie (it offends choice), while maintaining the intuition 
that it may be necessary, on some occasions, to lie in service of choice (when asked, I do not have to 
disclose to the homicidal maniac the intended victim’s location). It is in general wrong to kill because 
such actions always defeat choice; though it is permissible to kill a person (say Hitler) who wishes to 
squelch others’ humanity (it would be better, from a moral perspective to prevent the situation). With 
regard to abortion, the optimal situation is the one in which every woman (and girl of child bearing 
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4.5: Just Deserts 
 I have argued that it is in each person’s prior interest to help provide the pre-
conditions of choice for all other persons in the world and the conditions of choice for 
other members of one’s culture; to fail to do so is to denigrate one’s own humanity 
(as well as that of all others), to act (or not) according to an unwarranted justification, 
to invite justified disaffirmative active interference upon the self, and to put one’s 
prior interest in choice at risk. However, in order to help provide assistance to others 
as the CP ought to do, persons of sufficient means are obliged to give up some 
portion of their income and assets; billions of persons exist in conditions that are not 
adequate to enable choice and each of them must be helped. According to the 
appropriated theory, one ought to keep, for oneself and one’s dependents, enough to 
facilitate choice now and in the future, because one must have a capacity for choice in 
order to function well and assist others. By the same reasoning, one is not obliged to 
give up an eye, a kidney, or other organ to a sick person. Bodily integrity and 
personal health are basic pre-conditions of choice; although, one certainly is obliged 
                                                                                                                                           
age) is educated, has full and affordable access to birth control, and the means to help develop choice 
for any child she chooses to bring into the world; still yet, abortion is permissible (even though it 
prevents a potential chooser from entering the world) if the woman has not chosen to initiate the 
pregnancy or if she is not capable or able to help facilitate choice for the fetus. It is permissible to 
euthanize a permanently comatose or terminally ill patient (the latter only if she is a chooser who has 
given consent) because choice cannot be restored or maintained (respectively). Torture is 
impermissible as a specific and purposeful attempt to disable choice; moreover, given the way a 
torturer must be trained (see Wolfendale 109), she would qualify as a PEWOP who ought not be 
countenanced. Homosexual marriage is permissible and should be supported, because any type of 
discrimination is an offense to choice. Pornography, media that depicts women as non-choosers, is 
impermissible. Animal cruelty is not to be tolerated because of what it does to and says about the 
perpetrator (she would qualify as a violent PEWOP). Action against global warming and pollution and 
for environmental conservation is a moral mandate given that a healthy environment is crucial for the 
development and maintenance of choice. Moreover, the appropriated theory is also capable of yielding 
an account of human rights that is commensurate with (nearly all of) the U.N. Declaration.  
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to fund research (or undertake innovative research if one is skilled enough) that seeks 
to cure disease and grow new organs from stem cells (or whatever method proves 
useful). But beyond security (including planning for adequate funds in retirement and 
for one’s dependents’ futures) and bodily integrity, what does the theory say is in the 
interest of choice to keep? Peter Singer points out that people in affluent societies 
spend incredible amounts of money on luxury goods that appear, on his view, to be of 
little moral significance (“Famine” 241). I largely agree with Singer,52 although I 
come at my (similar) position from a very different direction. Surely persons do not 
need luxury items and abundant wealth accumulation in order to secure a capacity for 
choice; what is not needed for choice should be shared. In this section, I address two 
positions that maintain that persons are not obliged to give up income and wealth or 
forego luxurious expenditures in order to help others. The basic idea I will counter is 
that people deserve the resources they have acquired through their own hard work; 
they are entitled, then, to keep it, no matter the situations of others. I will consider 
Daniel Dennett’s position first in some detail and then briefly address three points put 
forward by John Arthur. 
 In Elbow Room, Daniel Dennett argues that the process by which humans 
come to be responsible agents is analogous to a marathon, in which there need not be 
a specific winner and many losers because the process of the race “brings people 
                                                 
52 One main difference between Singer’s conclusion and mine is that he maintains that one should give 
“at least up to the point at which by giving more one would begin to cause serious suffering for oneself 
and one’s dependents” (“Famine” 243); I hold that one ought to keep whatever is necessary to maintain 
choice for oneself and enable choice for one’s dependents. 
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sooner or later to a sort of plateau of development” (96). Persons, he argues, are self-
creators who are genetically skilled at self-improvement. Although different people 
have different initial starting points (determined by luck) and experience a different 
number of “lucky breaks” along the way (Elbow 95), Dennett argues that “luck 
averages out in the long run” (95) and that “everyone comes out more or less in the 
same league” (96). On this view, after reaching the plateau, persons are responsible 
for their actions; since they are self-makers, they deserve the place that they reach on 
the plateau and all that comes with it.  
 Dennett’s work and the theory that I have proposed have much in common. 
Both seek to demystify the notion of moral choice by explaining the phenomenon 
from a scientific point of view that takes seriously the notion that humans have 
evolved along with all the other creatures on this planet. As such, both theories 
attempt to explain human behavior and the capacity for free will in naturalistic terms. 
I have, then, found much to admire in Dennett’s work. That being said, I take issue 
with a significant portion of Dennett’s account of moral agenthood, first, because, as 
the analysis in Chapter 2 has shown, we are not self-made selves and, second, because 
he defines luck as that which is not projectable; however, much of what Dennett 
designates as luck is actually projectable, calculable, and preventable by those who 
have choice. Contrary to Dennett, it is simply not true that we all (even if we take 
“all” to mean only those in the U.S.) end up “more or less in the same league.” Some 
persons are made to be choosers; others, due to relatively predictable and calculable 
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factors, are not. I will first offer a brief account of Dennett’s position and then raise 
specific objections. 
 Dennett wants to discredit two opposing notions: first, that we can never be 
responsible for our actions unless we are absolutely responsible for them (that is, that 
no one else is also responsible) and, second, (Sartre’s notion) “that one chooses 
oneself completely by a ‘radical choice’ that brings none of yesterday’s baggage 
along” (Elbow 83). Dennett is setting out a position that is somewhere between the 
two. He explains that each of us starts life with the same problem: “learning how to 
control himself or herself” (83). According to Dennett, “one starts in a certain 
position with certain limited resources, and must then bootstrap those resources 
somehow into a solution” (83). Children begin by accepting “by the book” answers to 
their problems (such as, “look before you leap, a stitch in time saves nine, don’t cry 
wolf”, and so on (86)) until such time as they graduate from this stage and move on to 
the “more imponderable questions” (like: “What kind of agent do I want to be or 
become?” (86)). At this point, much like “in the mid-game of chess,” one leaves 
behind “by the book” solutions and strikes “boldly out into the territory of risky, 
heuristic reasoning” (86).  
 Since we strike out on our own, we are, according to Dennett, self-made 
selves, who are responsible for the selves we are and become in much the same way 
that a manufacturer is responsible for its product. Just as the manufacturer is 
responsible for “releasing [its] product to the public with whatever flaws it has”, each 
person has “created and unleashed an agent who is [her]self; if its acts produce harm, 
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the manufacturer is held responsible” (85). On Dennett’s view, persons are 
responsible for their actions and deserve the consequences of them (pleasant or 
unpleasant) because persons are self-makers analogous to manufacturers of products. 
 Of course, if luck were to play a prominent role in Dennett’s self-making 
process, the notion of desert might be forced out. If an hundred dollar bill falls, 
completely unpredictably, from the sky into a person’s lap, this person will be hard 
pressed to maintain that she deserves to have it because she has earned it on her own 
(though if the owner cannot be ascertained, the law may allow her to keep it anyway). 
Generally, the notion of just deserts is said to apply to a person’s situation or not as a 
consequence of her own, unaided action; the person in this example did nothing but 
sit there. Dennett is concerned, then, about the role of luck. He argues that luck is not 
a significant concern in the race to personhood for two reasons: first, humans are 
skilled at self-improvement because if our genes did not include this quality we 
would not have made it this far in evolutionary history; and, second, since “luck is 
mere luck, not a genuine, projectible endowment” (Elbow 92), it evens out in the long 
run (because luck “is, after all, the same for everyone” (96)). Let’s consider Dennett’s 
position on luck more closely. 
 Dennett considers the quintessential instance of chance or luck: the coin toss. 
If there were a coin toss tournament, surely the winner would experience the illusion 
that she is a “lucky person” (rather than one who experienced luck on this occasion) 
(Elbow 93). He wonders whether there is an analogous “illusion of personal 
responsibility” in persons who take themselves to have free will. According to 
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Dennett, that is not the case because, throughout evolution, humans have developed 
the genetic capacity for self-control and responsibility. He explains: 
[t]he big difference between us and the winner of the coin-tossing 
tournament is that while we cannot take personal credit for the success 
of our ancestors, our genes can. The contest our genes have won was a 
test of genuine prowess. You have to be good at something (in fact, 
good at things in general) to get through to the round that is playing 
today. . . . [S]kill, unlike luck, is projectible. And since the skills of 
self-control and deliberation have been put to a fairly severe test over 
the eons, there is a real basis in fact for you having high expectations 
about the deliberative skill, and more generally the capacity for self-
control, of our fellow human beings (94). 
 
Dennett takes humans to be skilled at self-creation and self-improvement because 
their genes, in most cases, ensure that they will be so. Although a few may be, 
“through no fault of their own” (94), defective or lacking in this skill, the rest are 
roughly on par with each other. They are able to reach the “plateau” of responsible 
agenthood. 
 In order to dispel any remaining doubt in the reader’s mind, Dennett considers 
two other types of mere luck: the initial cognitive endowments or character one is 
born with and the number of “lucky breaks” one may incur “during one’s period of 
self-creation” (Elbow 95). He asks the reader to imagine that life is like a marathon 
“in which the starting line is staggered” (95); those who are born early in the year 
have starting positions at the front of the pack, while those born late are in the back 
(up to 11 yards behind depending on one’s month of birth). Is such a set up 
“manifestly unfair” (95)? Dennett argues that the staggered starting line would be 
unfair if the race were a sprint; but in a marathon small initial advantages, such as 
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heightened cognition, “would count for nothing, since one can reliably expect other 
fortuitous breaks to have even greater effects” (95). Luck, according to Dennett, 
“averages out in the long run” (95).  
 In Freedom Evolves, Dennett revisits this “gradualistic bootstrapping account” 
of the self-made self (288). He adds a supplement to the earlier version because, in 
his words, the earlier account “underplays the role of non-fortuitous breaks in the race 
to responsible agenthood” (276). He had previously deemphasized that acquiring such 
personhood is “a team effort, with coaches and supporters playing important roles on 
the sidelines, enriching the environment with a kind of scaffolding designed 
(unconsciously) to bring out the best in us” (276). He acknowledges that persons who 
are raised with violence, deceit, or a lack of concern “tend to perpetuate those 
character traits” and that those raised with reason, truth, and love tend toward those 
traits instead (276). He also concedes that severe deprivation can initiate problems for 
attaining personhood, but he contends that no one “has yet shown that the difference 
between having two toys and having twenty toys or two hundred toys makes any 
noticeable long-term difference in how the infant’s brain develops” (274). In any 
case, for Dennett, the differences that exist between people due to their being raised 
“rich or poor, pampered or abused,” are of “negligible importance” with regard to the 
“threshold of moral responsibility” (274); according to him, “these differences in 
starting conditions vanish into the statistical fog as time passes” (274). 
 Dennett’s account is off the mark, I argue, because it fails to recognize four 
crucial points: first, that many factors must obtain if choice, much less moral choice, 
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will be enabled for a given person (that is, he neglects to fully analyze his primary 
phenomenon: choice); second, that person’s are not self-made; third, that genetic 
endowments only supply a potential that must be actualized by environmental 
influence; and, lastly, that many (if not most) situations that impede a person’s 
potential progress toward choice, rather than being luck, are predictable, calculable, 
and preventable. I will consider each point in turn.  
 Dennett maintains that persons begin to solve their problem of self-control by 
utilizing “by the book” solutions; subsequently, they strike out on their own by 
utilizing heuristic reasoning. A scaffolding, supplied by others, provides support and 
enrichment along the way. This vision of how one becomes a chooser—one who 
could have done otherwise and who is thus responsible—need not be construed as 
entirely incorrect. These components are present in the success story discussed in 
Chapter 2; however, Dennett’s account is so bare bones as to be meaningless. 
Without a caretaker training and conditioning the infant to return to equilibrium after 
becoming upset, the latter will not develop self-control; without the requisite 
micronutriture, her brain will never be capable of controlling itself or anything else. 
Moreover, if one will become a chooser, one needs extensive nurture and stimulation, 
adequate education and sleep, an absence of stressors and violence, macro-nutrition, 
and overall health. And recall the interdependent context in which human life takes 
place. A caretaker does not provide the pre-conditions alone. She relies on her own 
past (if, in fact, such things have been included in her past) and many others in order 
to facilitate the child’s learning process. By the time that a young person is able to 
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consider and understand “by the book” answers to her questions, countless others—
from parents, caretakers, siblings, family members, friends, healthcare experts, and 
teachers to farmers and manufacturers—have taken part in constructing her inner 
world. As I explained, the functionality and the structure of the child’s brain are 
conditioned by her interactions with these others and their input and by what is 
available in the environment. Throughout the period of development, we are not self-
makers, ready at any moment to strike out on our own. All the intricate, minute, and 
momentous interactions we have with the world make us what we are, and we have 
virtually no control over whether or not we become choosers. 
 Consider then Dennett’s view of the role luck plays for individual persons. 
First, one might note that his notion that “luck averages out in the long run” (Elbow 
95) seems to be based on a bit of faith, but that will not be my main concern here. 
Rather, I will address two points: (1) whether there is reason to assume, along with 
Dennett, that persons are genetically skilled at deliberation, self-control, and self-
improvement, and (2) whether the luck involved in a coin toss is sufficiently 
analogous to the “lucky breaks” that Dennett maintains occur in life. Regarding (1), 
recall that a person comes to be whatever she will through the interaction between her 
genetic attributes and all the interference she receives from her environment. She 
begins with a genetic potential, but that is all. Given that persons are raised and exist 
within all sorts of environments, some of which enable choice and some of which do 
not, we are not justified in assuming that nearly all persons are skilled such that they 
will necessarily become self-controlled, deliberative persons. We can assume that 
 291
most of us who have shown up at this point in evolution have a potential, maybe even 
a propensity, toward choice; but that potential is one that will lie dormant and wither 
if it is not enabled (recall that whole brain structures die without stimulation).  
 Consider (2). Dennett explains that phenomena that are not projectable, are on 
his view, to be counted as luck (Elbow 94). While the outcome of a coin toss, for 
instance, is surely “the deterministic outcome of the total sum of forces acting on the 
coin” (Freedom 85), this “total sum has no predictive patterns in it” (85). That is, the 
outcome of the toss may, in fact, be determined, but no one, no matter her vantage 
point, can call it since “no predictive patterns” are present. Two other kinds of 
things—one’s initial endowments and the “lucky breaks” one gets—fall into this 
category as well. It seems that, on Dennett’s view, there is no way to predict which 
endowments one will have to start with and how much positive interference one will 
get along the way. I have argued, along with Wexler, that we are the sum total of our 
interactions with the world. Persons often have an exaggerated sense of having 
unique qualities—such as, particular cognitive endowments or character traits—
possessed initially by the self that unfold through development; but what we come to 
be is thoroughly dependent on environmental input (Wexler 39). An initial 
endowment is but a potential (some of which may have been actualized during the 
prenatal period). As such, if there is luck involved in whether or not one becomes a 
chooser, it will have less to do with what Dennett designates as initial attributes or 
starting points and more to do with what he calls “lucky breaks”. So let’s consider 
lucky breaks or the absence of them—things like affluence or poverty, caring or 
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violence, adequate or inadequate nutrition, nurture or neglect, stimulation or 
debilitation, education or ignorance, healthcare or rampant disease. Are these things 
non-predictable in a way that is sufficiently analogous to a coin toss? Recall that the 
coin toss lacks predictability no matter the vantage point that is taken. From the 
personal perspective of a new born, a child, or many persons without choice, the 
experiences of life may seem unpredictable and uncalculable. The world from that 
point of view may even appear totally willy-nilly, because one needs sufficient 
cognitive capacities in order to take stock of all the different factors that impact 
choice. But the analysis in Chapter 2 demonstrates that, from the scientific 
perspective of an informed observer, whether or not a person will develop a capacity 
for choice is not only relatively predictable and calculable, it is also within human 
control (though not initially and, later, only partially within control of the individual 
would-be chooser). We know a lot about what goes into making choice possible. We 
know that a child who shows up at a hospital with signs of abuse is at risk for further 
abuse and possibly death; we know, that if she makes it into adulthood, she will have 
emotional scars and decreased volume in her hippocampus. She will have a brain that 
has adapted to the experience of abuse. We also know that she is at heightened risk of 
subjecting her children to similar conditions.  
 Contrary to Dennett, we also know that there is a quantifiable difference, with 
regard to brain development, between having 2, 20, or 200 toys available for use and 
that these differences do not “vanish into the statistical fog as time passes”. However, 
it is unclear whether Dennett means for us to take this notion literally or whether he 
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takes the number of toys one has to be an indication of one’s socio-economic status 
(SES). Thus, I will address both possibilities. With regard to the first interpretation, 
recall that there is increasing evidence that exposure to and use of human-made 
artifacts—such as, toys, musical instruments, written language, computers, and so 
forth—increases “brain functional capability as measured by intelligence tests” 
(Wexler 101) and that the capacities measured by such tests are positively correlated 
with a capacity for choice. Contact with these artifacts enhances a child’s neural 
processes both functionally and structurally. Toys and other human artifacts make a 
difference! If the number of toys is said to stand for SES, even more evidence is 
available. One study showed that children who were born into low SES backgrounds 
and who were later adopted into a high SES, gain, on average, 11 IQ points; those 
who were born into high and were adopted into low lost an average of 12 points 
(when compared with those who remained in high SES). Another study demonstrated 
roughly the same increase (11.8 points) for disadvantaged children who were adopted 
by parents of high SES. Socio-economic status makes a difference, because the 
disadvantaged children who continued in a low SES remained borderline with regard 
to IQ and thus remained at risk with regard to choice. The differences neither vanish 
nor average out; they become exacerbated. So whether one interprets Dennett’s 
statement literally or figuratively, there is a huge cognitive benefit in having 200, as 
opposed to 2 or even 20, toys. And as the research in Chapter 2 attests, we can predict 
and calculate, both at the individual level and at the level of the aggregate, who is at 
risk and what happens to people when they are left without the pre-conditions of 
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choice. As such, the “breaks” one gets in life do not seem to be so much about 
Dennett’s notion of luck after all. 
 In “Uneven Starts and Just Deserts”, Bruce N. Waller discusses Dennett’s 
marathon analogy “in which the starting line is staggered” according to birth month. 
Waller argues that, rather than initial differences evening out in the long run (as 
Dennett believes), they “are more often amplified” (Waller 210). The exploratory 
activities of the alert child is reinforced; “the eager student . . . receives extra 
attention;” but the “less talented teammate’s skills and stamina and confidence 
gradually erode on the bench” (210). He proposes that a “better analogy might be a 
horse race on a muddy track, in which the slow starters are additionally handicapped 
by the mud kicked onto them by the early speed” (211). Waller, I believe, is onto 
something here, but he does not take it far enough; that is, it is not just that 
confidence and stamina erode from sitting on the bench, but whole neuronal systems 
atrophy without appropriate nurture and stimulation (Wexler 19 and 41). Children 
who experience macro-malnutrition, for instance, really do incur decreased 
myelination, decreased connectivity in the hippocampus, and decreased cognitive 
capacity and emotional control.  
 I suggest a better analogy then would go something like this. The starting 
position in the marathon and whether or not there are any “breaks” (help from 
another) are largely determined by socio-economic status (low SES in the back, high 
SES in the front). Some begin at the back of the pack in a mud pit; of these, some are 
buried to the neck, others to the waist, and others to the knees. Due to the consistency 
 295
of the mud, all in the pit will sink deeper unless they receive help from someone at 
the front of the pack. Others, just outside the pit, are hobbled to prevent the ability to 
walk; some can pull themselves with their arms, others can crawl. Unless they receive 
help from those at the front, their torsos and limbs will be bloodied and burned by the 
rough, hot asphalt. Just ahead of them are people who can walk, maybe even run, but 
who have no shoes; their feet will be burned and only people at the front have an 
extra pair. Lastly, in the front rows there are three sorts of persons: those who can run 
and have sufficient resources (shoes, skilled trainers, food, and water); those who can 
run and who have abundant resources, far in excess of what is required; and those 
who not only can run and have abundant resources, but who have wings—they need 
only fly to the finish line. The people in the front rows are the minority of those 
present in the race and they are largely concerned only about their own performances. 
Only a few of them are inclined to help the majority who are buried, hobbled, or 
shoeless. Now, consider again Dennett’s question: is this “manifestly unfair”? The 
appropriate answer would appear to be: Yes, no matter how one attempts to justify it. 
Dennett’s account of moral responsibility as a justification for desert fails to note that 
much is involved in the development of choice. One never does it on one’s own; thus, 
one cannot be self-made. Moreover, the factors that Dennett counts as luck are really 
projectable phenomena that determine whether or not choice will be enabled. They 
are calculable from the perspective of any chooser who has adequate grasp of the 
information and they are preventable if we choose to work together. Moreover, the 
present theory maintains that it is obligatory to do so.  
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  Dennett’s position entails that persons deserve what they are responsible for; 
they are responsible because, being self-made, they can take credit for the persons 
they have become. The present theory parses things differently. A person is 
responsible for an action and its consequences when she has a capacity for foresight 
(she can project herself into the future) and has reasonable knowledge (she does not 
act out of ignorance), and when she could have chosen otherwise. That is, a person is 
responsible when she has a capacity for choice; this may be reason to blame (a mild 
form of DAI) or praise (mild AAI) in the context of different situations. But can she 
also take full credit, in the sense of deserving the result of her action/inaction? Just 
desert arguments generally maintain that one can take full credit for something one 
has done entirely on one’s own. However, the analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 
demonstrates that even a person with choice does not act without reference to or on 
account of other persons. Recall that she has at her disposal an inner world that 
includes a well-developed and well-connected prefrontal cortex. If others had not 
provided the pre-conditions for her, that would not be the case. She cannot take full 
credit for herself; a multitude of others created her capacity for choice. Persons 
without choice cannot be responsible (deserve neither praise nor blame) and can take 
no credit for their current states. But the present theory does not rely upon a notion of 
desert to determine who gets what. Persons ought to receive the pre-conditions 
because all others have a prior interest in that being the case. Neither does it rely on 
desert to determine whose activities/inactivities ought to be terminated. One ought to 
enact DAI with regard to any thing that offends choice. The method of termination 
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will be different in different contexts. For instance, until reliable methods of 
rehabilitation are developed, murderers, rapists, child molesters, and other violent 
criminals need to be securely confined (imprisoned) to prevent them from harming 
choice for others. A death sentence (a permanent curtailment of the offender’s 
capacity for choice) ought to be utilized only if there is no other way to stop future 
infractions. This is so whether or not the offender has a capacity for choice; the point 
is that the rest of us ought not countenance what this person has done and may do 
again (given what is most likely included in a violent person’s inner world). But if 
choice can be enabled for a PEWOP offender, we ought to do so. Persons, on the 
other hand, who fail to give up their extra resources need to be compelled to fulfill 
their obligations. We ought to do these things because they are in our prior interest, 
not because persons deserve something in particular according to what they have or 
have not done. 
 Before considering whether norms of non-interference ought to mitigate 
against the appropriated theory’s conclusion, I will consider briefly an argument set 
out by John Arthur in response to Peter Singer’s position in “Famine, Affluence, and 
Morality”. Arthur argues that certain bad consequences might follow from striking 
the (now common) notion of desert from our moral considerations. According to him, 
people “care too deeply about their own lives and welfare, as well as the welfare of 
loved ones” to accommodate a moral rule that instructs them to give away their 
possessions (Arthur 588). They would either “work less and produce fewer useful 
commodities, with the result that everyone’s well-being would decline” or they would 
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fail to live up to their obligations (589). The latter might “lead to widespread guilt 
among those who don’t contribute” and/or create discord and resentment between 
those who do and those who do not help (589). Arthur believes that a moral code 
needs to be easily implemented given the current state of human behavior; he 
explains that it is “important that we not assume that people are more altruistic than 
they are” (588). He seems to take it that what is ethical must also be something close 
to what people already do and this is certainly an odd conception of morality. For 
instance, the Nazis were attempting to kill all Jews; would we declare the situation to 
be ethical if they could have been convinced to kill every other Jew or every third? 
Killing every third would be easier to implement given that the Nazis were trying to 
kill all. Thus, it is quite possible that what ought to count as ethical is far removed 
from how persons actually behave. The present theory argues that each person who 
has more than is needed to develop/maintain choice ought to give it up to help others; 
pointing out that most affluent people fail to do that or won’t want to is hardly 
poignant criticism. Each person’s obligation, due to a prior interest in choice, remains 
whether or not people work less, have a lower standard of living, or feel guilty. The 
analysis in Chapter 2 showed that people are basically what they are made to be. If 
ethical considerations entail that we need to make persons to be more altruistic, then 
that is what we ought to do. But since that type of solution is long term (it involves 
how we raise future generations), Arthur’s objections may be taken as important 
considerations regarding present implementation. It may well be difficult to convince 
affluent adults (who have, in their inner worlds, a desire for more than they need) to 
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give up their possessions. In practice, then, we may need to target media campaigns at 
such persons in order to make them respect their obligations to their own capacity for 
choice. If they feel guilty for noncompliance, then perhaps that may be used as 
leverage as well. Lastly, there is something correct in Arthur’s last concern: according 
to the present theory, everyone has the right to provide disaffirmative active 
interference against anyone who fails to help. This will certainly foster discord 
between those who attend to the demands of their prior interest and those who do not. 
I will address this point again in section 4.8. 
4.6: Norms of Non-Interference 
 Instead of (or in addition to) arguing that persons need not help provide the 
pre-conditions for others due to a consideration of just deserts, the interlocutor might 
argue that persons have a right to non-interference from others. That right, one might 
claim, blocks the inference to the conclusion in the justification argument or the 
argument from consequences. While helping others may be in a person’s prior 
interest, given her rights, she need not do so and no one or no group (or government) 
has the right to force her to help. Norms of non-interference—what are often called 
negative rights—may derive from various justifications in different theories. My 
purpose here will not be to address each of those possibilities; instead, I will focus on 
one prominent sort of conception of such rights—the sort espoused by John Locke 
and, in slightly altered form, by Robert Nozick—and then address how the theory 
would respond to this type of objection. I will first briefly address Locke’s and 
Nozick’s positions and then argue that these notions of negative rights are 
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unwarranted because they assume, first, that all persons are choosers and, second, that 
they are somehow equal in that capacity.   
  Locke held that in the “state of nature” (a hypothetical scenario that is to be 
taken as prior to the advent of the state) persons are in “a state of perfect freedom to 
order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit,” 
without “depending on the will of any other” (Second Treatise 8; §4). Since each 
person is the workmanship of the same omnipotent creator and master, none is in a 
subordinate position with regard to any other; thus, “no one ought to harm” another’s 
“life, health, liberty, or possessions” (9; §6). Persons are, on this view, endowed 
“with like faculties” (9; §6); as such, they are (at least roughly) equal. Locke’s notion 
of negative rights is, then, grounded in an appeal to a divine deity; because persons 
are all created by and answer to the deity, they ought to refrain from acting in certain 
ways toward each other.  
 In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick utilizes an appropriated conception of 
Lockean negative rights—one that is thoroughly secular and does not rely upon a 
divine justification—as a basis upon which to build a case for a night-watchman or 
minimal state. He takes it that the Lockean conception of rights is a “strong 
formulation of individual rights” (Nozick xi) that may be utilized both as a starting 
point for his theory and as a reason to limit a state’s authority over its citizens. A 
person, on Nozick’s view, ought to be free from others’ interference so that she can 
choose how to order her affairs, what kind of activities she will undertake (including 
whether she will help others), and what she will do with what she has. He explains 
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that negative rights are side constraints on the actions of others that reflect the 
“Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means; they may not be 
sacrificed or used for the achieving of other ends without their consent” (30-31; 
italics mine). Since, in merely protecting citizens, the state may prevent persons from 
doing exactly as they choose, the state may treat them as means and, as such, it is in 
need of substantive justification for its existence (xi).  
 I would not be the first to note that Nozick merely assumes that persons are 
such that they have the right to non-interference (see, for instance, Pojman 610); 
Nozick himself makes that point clear when he discusses his own philosophical 
discomfort at the “yawning” gap that is left in his work without a theoretical 
justification of negative rights (Nozick 9). This is at least a prima facie problem for 
Nozick since he encourages the reader to scrutinize her own presuppositions (x). 
However, his decision to forego offering a justification is not the focus of my 
criticism; rather, my concern is that Nozick’s conception of negative rights implies 
and presumes that persons are equally choosers, while the analysis in Chapters 2 and 
3 has demonstrated that such a position is without warrant. 
 Consider: if one maintains that persons ought to be allowed to choose how to 
order their affairs, one also, at least, implicitly maintains that those persons have a 
capacity for choice. Moreover, the notion that individuals ought not to be treated as 
means without their consent also implies that the neural functions of choice are 
operative. A capacity for choice is a prerequisite of consent; otherwise, the person in 
question is constrained or limited in her response according to the interaction between 
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her inner world and the concepts now being proposed to her. Whether she offers her 
consent or not, such a person is compelled toward a particular, non-trivial preference 
selection. Consent is only meaningful if choosing otherwise (non-consent) is a 
possibility. While it may be true that persons ought to be treated as ends, they can 
only be ends if their capacities for choice are enabled. And since Nozick (along with 
Locke) wants negative rights to apply to everyone prior to the existence of the state, 
his position entails that persons are somehow at least roughly equal as choosers. 
Otherwise, considerations regarding fairness might take precedence. Nozick never 
considers that without micro- and macro-nutrition, nurture, stimulation, education, 
sleep, overall health, and the absence of stress and violence persons are either not 
choosers or are at grave risk with regard to choice and that millions or billions of 
people, some of whom will undoubtedly live under his night watchman state, are 
without these (or other) vital pre-conditions of choice. That is, he takes for granted his 
basic phenomenon: choice. We are not automatically, innately, or equally choosers, 
though most of us have a potential for choice that can be enabled.  
 Although Locke attempts to justify negative rights by an appeal to a deity, my 
objection is equally applicable to his position. Even if persons were divinely created, 
the deity apparently did not make them all equal with regard to choice. It remains a 
possibility that most of us are generally equal in our potential for choice—that is, that 
all may be equally choosers if the pre-conditions are present in adequate amount over 
the lifespan—but even that may not be the case. If we set aside those who, for reasons 
beyond our present control, are in area 1 on the continuum, some persons, upon 
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receiving the pre-conditions, may end up in area 5 and thus have the capacity to 
innovate, while others may remain in area 4 and thus be more inclined to utilize the 
innovations of others. In any case, the present theory does not rely on a presumption 
of potential equality, because it appeals to reasons that each person has due to her 
prior interest in choice. Even if you and the other do not share perfect equality, the 
other is justified in stopping any offense to choice that you might undertake; 
moreover, if a person has been without the pre-conditions, she will tend to provide 
disaffirmative active interference with regard to others’ capacities for choice, perhaps 
yours. When offenses to choice are common cultural concepts, anyone can be a 
target. However, Locke’s and Nozick’s conceptions of negative rights depend on two 
assumptions: that all persons are choosers and that they are at least roughly equals in 
the capacity. Scientific evidence simply does not support either assumption. Thus, 
neither is reasonable. Persons are made to be choosers or not according to the 
interference they experience from others. Then, since these presuppositions are 
without warrant, the notion of negative rights that rests upon them is as well. If 
persons have some particular set of rights prior to the rise of the state, they will not be 
the negative rights that Locke and Nozick promote. 
 Now, perhaps this notion of interference is not what Nozick has in mind. He 
would surely concede that infants and children need appropriate care even though he 
has not acknowledged that the pre-conditions are a prerequisite of choice. 
Presumably, he would respond that supplying the pre-conditions is the sole 
responsibility of the parents or family and that others need not be (and in most cases 
 304
are not) involved. This position amounts to a denial of the interdependent conditions 
under which all persons live. Some of us are physically and conceptually dependent, 
some merely conceptually, and others are interdependent; but no one is self-reliant. In 
a way, Nozick admits his own conceptual interdependency in the preface to Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia. He explains that he understands that some people will be opposed 
to the views that he is espousing, because he once was as well. “With reluctance, [he] 
found [him]self becoming convinced of . . . libertarian views, due to various 
considerations and arguments” (ix). With time, he grew “accustomed to the views and 
their consequences, and . . . now see[s] the political realm through them” (x). Now, if 
we paraphrase these sentiments utilizing the language of the present theory, Nozick 
held certain views given his inner world and the concepts with which he had come 
into contact in his early sub-groups. One presumes that a person of his professional 
stature likely did not want for the pre-conditions; thus, his capacity for choice was 
enabled. Then, because of exposure to “various considerations and arguments”—that 
is, contact with concepts that provided disaffirmative active interference with his 
early views—he experienced impact and change. He came to hold prior concepts in a 
way that was less strong and new concepts in a way that was stronger. By utilizing his 
capacity for choice, he used his inner world and the sub-cultural concepts with which 
he came into contact in order to extrapolate and form a new position (indeed, a whole 
theory). Thus, in denying the interdependent context, Nozick (like the fictional 
parents in section 3.4) commits a performative contradiction.  
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 Consider the content that Nozick provides regarding negative rights. Nozick is 
concerned about others (1) harming one with regard to life, liberty, and health, or (2) 
impeding one’s choices in what to do with one’s possessions. The theory I have 
presented is also concerned with protecting each persons’ life, liberty, and health; 
however, evidence does not warrant distinguishing between the three in the same way 
that Nozick has. That is, without all that is conducive to life and health (the pre-
conditions), one will not have liberty (choice). But if we take Nozick to mean (as I 
believe that he does) that one should not (in general or without just cause) murder, 
enslave, infect another with a disease, and so on, I have no quarrel, as each of these 
types of interference is a specific offense to choice. One ought to keep in mind, 
though, that refraining from these types of things does not entail that those who are 
not dead, not enslaved, and/or not sickened will have a capacity for choice. 
 Consider (2). Is it the case that one ought not impede another person’s choices 
regarding what the latter will do with her possessions? I have argued that no one has a 
negative right to dispose of her possessions as she sees fit, because the notion of 
negative rights is without warrant. The demand that others leave one’s possessions 
alone is then merely a demand that others provide quasi-active interference (QAI). 
Since QAI is a tacit approval of the status quo (whatever activities/inactivities are 
already being undertaken), this position is equivalent to maintaining that the other 
ought to approve of whatever one does with one’s income, wealth, and assets. But 
this other, I have argued, only has an interest in approving of what is consistent with 
choice and her responsibilities to it, because choice is in her prior interest and only 
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actions that are consistent with choice are justified. Thus, we have reason to leave 
another alone in her use of her assets if and only if she is giving whatever portion she 
does not need in order to help provide the pre-conditions of choice for all others. 
4.7: Special Obligations & Systems to Redistribute the Pre-conditions of Choice 
 Throughout childhood and any period of physical and/or conceptual 
dependency, dependent persons rely on many others in order to obtain the pre-
conditions of choice. Even if choice is enabled, we take part in intra-group, intra-sub-
group, and personal interrelations in order to obtain them. This type of engagement is 
of the utmost importance to choice. But the theory I have put forward holds that it is 
in each person’s prior interest to help provide the pre-conditions of choice for all 
persons in the world, no matter the other’s distance or lack of group, sub-group, or 
personal relation. These two points seem taken together seem to create something of a 
dilemma for the individual chooser. She has to somehow fulfill her obligations to 
choice both for those who are either near to her and rely on her due to a conceptual 
and/or physical dependency (say, her children, her patients, her customers, or her 
students) and those who are in a dependent situation on the other side of the earth.  
 If she does not help in both situations, she dehumanizes herself, acts according 
to an unwarranted justification, leaves herself open to justified disaffirmative active 
interference, and puts her prior interests at risk. What might justified DAI look like? 
As noted earlier, if one is enacting interference that violently thwarts the choices of 
others (like, murder or assault), others are justified in completely limiting her freedom 
(i.e., putting her in prison). If she is not contributing to conditions that promote well 
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being for others, DAI might include a seizure of whatever portion of her assets she 
does not need to maintain support for herself (and her dependents) or it may mean 
forcing her to work in the redistribution of the pre-conditions. That is, if she does not 
contribute to the well being of all, others are justified in restricting the time and 
resources she would usually expend on fulfilling her trivial and non-trivial interests. 
If she opts to neglect those near to her and/or those who are dependent on her, she 
may help to actively create more PEWOPs within her group/sub-groups. Alternately, 
in neglecting those at some distance, she allows PEWOPs to be created in other 
cultures; and the argument from consequences demonstrates that neither of these 
options is in her prior interest. 
 How then will she fulfill both her special and her general obligations to choice 
and humanity? She can opt to limit the number of special obligations she creates in 
order to expend more energy on helping those at some distance. But for most of us, 
this is an unattractive option. Our special obligations are part of what creates value 
and love in our lives. Thus, for most persons, the best option will be to devote our 
personal energies (both the resources we are warranted in keeping and the bulk of our 
time) toward special obligations and whatever particular trivial and non-trivial 
interests that we desire to fulfill (as long as these do not offend choice), while at the 
same time contributing our excess resources and assets to systems that provide the 




4.8: The Politics of Freedom: Choice as a Justification for the State 
 I have argued that norms of non-interference, as they are conceived by Locke 
and Nozick, are without warrant. While we do have reason not to harm others with 
regard to life, liberty, and health—such harms are specific offenses to choice—we 
also have reason to utilize our possessions, whatever is in excess of what is needed to 
enable and maintain choice, to help others. This section briefly addresses what our 
moral obligations to choice might look like in the political arena. I will merely 
discuss what the basic structure of a government that services choice will entail and 
leave a more detailed account for another endeavor. I argue that it is in each person’s 
prior interest to only accept the authority of a government that provides the pre-
conditions of choice for its citizens and helps to provide them for all others. A place 
for the conditions will be delineated as well.  
 Each person has a moral obligation to help provide what it takes to enable 
choice for all others. Choosers—especially those who are affluent and who currently 
have greater access to the necessary resources—will have a greater initial obligation 
due to practical considerations. Given that these persons, like most others, have 
special obligations (personal, social, and professional ties) and non-trivial interests, 
they may choose to initiate systems that fulfill their responsibilities to choice (the 
dilemma that compels this strategy is discussed above). And it may be that the most 
efficient way to distribute the pre-conditions is through political channels (although 
non-profit organizations may be able to manage the distribution as well).  
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 As noted at the end of section 4.5, if compliance is voluntary, conflict will 
develop between those who do and those who do not comply. Moreover, anyone 
acting in service of choice is warranted in forcing the latter to fulfill her obligation. 
That is, in the absence of a group level agreement regarding how such matters will be 
handled, vigilante justice is justified. I will not address the full details of such a 
scenario, but clearly it would be costly regarding choice. One would have little time, 
energy, or resources available to pursue one’s non-trivial self-interests if one is 
morally obliged to police one’s neighbors. And anyone else is justified in policing 
you as well. Thus, there is a prima facie case for the group members to develop a 
system of justice based on choice with mechanisms to handle conflict and ensure 
compliance. That is, it is in the members’ prior interest to agree to establish a 
government.  
 In order to determine what the basic grounding of the government might be, I 
return to the lucid infant thought experiment. Again suppose that, shortly after birth, 
infants experience a period of incredible lucidity. For a brief time it is as if the infants 
had reached neurological maturity and as if all the pre-conditions and conditions are 
and had been present for them. Recall that the researcher visiting them has adequately 
explained to them their prior interest in choice and the pre-conditions. If the 
researcher polled the infants regarding the type of government they would be willing 
to submit to, what would their response be? The infants know that after their period of 
lucidity ends they will be at the mercy of whatever situation exists in their 
environments. Even if it appears to them (given their current surroundings) that they 
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will receive the pre-conditions, they know that other infants, children, and adults exist 
in less than conducive situations and that it is in their own prior interests if no person 
is raised to be a PEWOP. If PEWOPs exist the infants’ future moral obligations will 
be more extensive and costly and PEWOPs have a greater tendency to offend choice 
for others.  
 As such, it is in the infants’ prior interest to agree to accept a government as 
legitimate only if it provides the pre-conditions to all of its citizens and helps to 
provide them for all persons in other groups as well. Moreover, given that persons 
cannot become choosers in the absence of the pre-conditions, a government that fails 
to provide them runs the risk of being coercive. PEWOPs cannot choose whether to 
accept any governmental authority, because they cannot choose. Additionally, it is 
only reasonable for the infants to accept political, economic, and legal systems that 
protect and promote choice; that is, it is in their interest to submit to a government 
whose laws are structured in accordance with the conditions of choice (see section 
3.5).  
4.9: Conclusion 
 Chapter 1 considered Simone de Beauvoir’s ethical theory, including its 
structure, its strengths, and inherent flaws. Since Beauvoir conflated the desire to 
disclose with a desire for freedom, significant adaptation of her position was required. 
Moreover, for her, all persons have ontological freedom (which includes a capacity 
for choice). Although she acknowledged that some people exist in situations in which 
their freedom is hidden from view (and thus limited), she failed to acknowledge that 
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some may not develop a capacity for choice, freewill, and freedom. These are 
drawbacks to her theory; however, her work also includes a wealth of useful ethical 
notions. She was aware that choice cannot be taken for granted and she knew that it 
was important to consider the human’s type of being, her needs, and her contexts in 
determining how she should live and treat others. Given that a person shares an 
interdependent context with her group and in some ways with members of other 
groups, given her own conceptual and physical vulnerabilities, given her own prior 
interest in non-trivial interest fulfillment, choice, and the pre-conditions, and given 
that competing theoretical notions—such as just deserts, norms of non-interference, 
and special obligations—fail to mitigate against the appropriated theory’s conclusion, 
she ought to help provide all others with what it takes to enable choice. She ought to 
be a consistent person who acts in favor of the basis of every person’s humanity.  
 When a person receives the pre-conditions, her capacity for choice is enabled. 
When she also lives within the conditions, she will be able to engage in a such a way 
that she knowingly and purposefully utilizes her capacity to enact choice—that is, its 
use will not be impeded and she will not be compelled, via incapacity, cultural 
factors, and/or force, toward revealing or contributing trivial or limited objects 
and/or significations, in the present or in the future. She will have the best ongoing 
chance of fulfilling her particular non-trivial interests and she will exist in a state of 
freedom. What choices will be said to be in her general interest will be limited only 
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